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1 
1. Introduction and Overview 
Youth labor market outcomes have declined over the last four decades across advanced 
economies. In absolute terms or relative to adults, young people now earn less, are more likely to 
be unemployed, less likely to be employed in full-time, permanent jobs, and more likely to be 
employed on a temporary or part-time basis (Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000; Ryan, 2001; 
Blossfeld et al., 2005; DeFreitas, 2009). Policy makers have had a long-standing interest in 
facilitating the transition from school to work, in particular for non-college-bound youth, to avert 
the far-reaching negative individual and societal consequences that may result from failed 
integration into working life. That we have witnessed deterioration nevertheless, and despite 
steadily shrinking youth cohorts and ever-rising levels of educational attainment, should 
therefore be a cause of concern. Squandering youth potential at the transition from school to 
work cannot be economically sustainable in countries where fewer and fewer economically 
active have to support an increasing number of pensioners. These concerns have gained new 
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relevance in the recent economic and financial crisis, during which young people have again been 
among those affected the most (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010). 
While some factors that have contributed to the decline of youth labor market outcomes are 
difficult to manipulate, especially in the short run, much research has emphasized the role of 
policies and institutions. When surveying the literature, employment protection legislation 
frequently tops the list of labor market institutions affecting not only unemployment but also 
temporary employment among young people (Scarpetta, 1996; Esping-Andersen, 2000; Heckman 
and Pages, 2004; Russell and O'Connell, 2001; van der Velden and Wolbers, 2003; Breen, 2005; 
Allard and Lindert, 2006; Bertola et al., 2007; OECD 1994, 2004, 2006; Kahn, 2007). To many, 
employment protection seems to perfectly exemplify the idea of “labor market rigidity”, which 
neoclassical economics sees at the root of European unemployment (OECD, 1994; Siebert, 
1997). Hence, employment protection continues to spark debates in politics and academia 
(Kalleberg, 2009). As markets become more integrated, individuals become more vulnerable to 
economic decisions taken far removed from their sphere of influence. Across European countries 
workers have been granted degree of job protection against market forces beyond their control; 
and employers have accommodated these demands. However, granting workers rights to a job 
seems fundamentally at odds with an apparent consensus that has emerged across academic 
disciplines and political divides: Economies, employers, and individuals alike need to be always 
ready to respond to changes in markets that have become irrevocably more turbulent. 
While it has been increasingly acknowledged that the impact of employment protection on 
the aggregate unemployment rate is indeterminate, a new consensus has emerged that stresses the 
distributional effects of employment protection legislation. Employment protection may not 
affect some aggregate outcomes, but its effects are detrimental for specific demographic groups, 
in particular young people. On this basis, economists continue to recommend deregulation of 
Introduction and Overview 
 
3 
 
employment protection to improve youth labor market outcomes, in particular to lower youth 
unemployment and regulate the growth of temporary employment (OECD, 1994, 2004, 2006). 
I began working on this issue, because a number of influential empirical studies that are cited 
in support of the consensus rely on cross-sectional data, comparing employment protection 
legislation and youth labor market outcomes across countries (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Breen, 
2005; Polavieja, 2006; Kahn, 2007; Wolbers, 2007). A key goal of this study therefore is to 
perform a longitudinal assessment, estimating the effects of reforms of employment protection on 
youth labor market outcomes within countries over time, which may result in credible estimates 
of the effects of employment protection. Second, hardly any evidence exists on whether distinct 
dimensions of employment protection, i.e. job security provisions on regular employment 
contracts and regulations on the usage of temporary contracts, have different effects or interact 
with each other. Third, indicators of employment protection legislation have been developed, 
revised and extended several times over the past twenty years, which has led to more accurate 
measurement of employment protection legislation. For this study, we can draw on the most 
recent and arguably highest quality indicator of employment protection, released by the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2009 (see Venn, 2009). 
Fourth, while many studies supporting the consensus have used aggregate data on youth 
unemployment or employment, this study estimates the effects of employment protection 
legislation at a more disaggregate level, focusing on demographic groups defined by gender and 
education. 
While initial results indeed supported the consensual view, subsequent work showed that 
these results were not robust to inclusion of control variables, to changes in the country 
composition, and changes in model specification. Indeed, I could not even reproduce the simple 
bivariate relationship that youth unemployment is significantly higher in countries with strict job 
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security provisions on regular employment contracts. The persistent lack of empirical support for 
the economic and sociological consensus linking employment protection to youth unemployment 
led me to reassess its theoretical underpinnings. Against common interpretations (Lazear, 1990; 
OECD, 2004; Breen, 2005; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2007), my reading of theoretical research 
suggests that the effect of employment protection on (relative) youth unemployment is 
indeterminate and can only be resolved empirically. 
Given this theoretical indeterminacy, an even larger burden is imposed on the empirical 
analysis. However, empirical research on this issue has tried to simultaneously tackle various 
explanations of youth (un)employment, where typically a number of predictors of youth 
unemployment are entered into a regression model and each estimated coefficient is implicitly or 
explicitly given a causal interpretation. Even though we cannot eliminate all obstacles to causal 
inference, our premise here is that focusing our theoretical and empirical analysis on just one 
factor, we may be more successful in identifying the true, causal effect of employment protection 
legislation. We devote more space to a detailed discussion of the complex underlying 
mechanisms, which in this case leads to some qualifications of the consensual view about the 
adverse effects of employment protection on young people. Empirically, we can make a broader 
assessment of the effects of employment protection on different dependent variables, use 
different analytical designs and perform more extensive specification checks to probe the 
robustness of our findings. 
Using differences-in-differences to estimate the effect of employment protection reforms 
(changes in job security provisions on regular employment contracts, changes in regulations on 
the usage of temporary contracts), we obtain the following results, focusing on sixteen Western 
countries for the period from 1992 to 2006: We find no effects of job security provisions on 
regular employment contracts on overall employment, temporary employment or unemployment 
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among young people or adult men. Neither could we find evidence that the effect of job security 
provisions differs significantly across education groups nor depends on the extent of regulations 
on temporary contracts. However, strict job security provisions may constrain labor market 
opportunities of young people, which causes them to drop out of the labor market. We could not 
detect aggregate effects of the deregulation of temporary contracts on employment, 
unemployment and labor force participation. We also could not find any evidence that the effect 
of deregulation depends on the strictness of job security provisions on regular contracts. 
Considering different demographic groups, in particular tertiary educated youth seem to benefit 
from deregulation, while less educated adult men seem to suffer. Deregulation of temporary 
contracts therefore seems to have increased inequalities in job insecurity, but has not led to 
employment gains among the less educated. 
The rest of this study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 surveys recent trends on the youth labor 
market. We document a gradual erosion of job security on the youth labor market over the past 
four decades, which manifests itself in terms of rising unemployment, temporary employment 
and part time employment. Job insecurity grew in absolute terms and especially relative to adults 
and continued to grow in the 1990s and early 2000s, despite more favorable macroeconomic 
conditions compared to earlier periods and despite favorable supply side shifts. We offer several 
explanations that focus on the role of demand shifts and institutions in accounting for this trend. 
Chapter 3 presents a theoretical discussion of the relationship between employment 
protection and job insecurity, and assesses the theoretical foundations of the claim that 
employment protection makes young people worse off on the labor market, in relative or absolute 
terms. We distinguish two dimensions of employment protection legislation, job security 
provisions on regular/permanent contracts and regulations on the usage of temporary contracts, as 
well as two main dimension of job insecurity, unemployment and temporary employment. While 
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we can derive unambiguous hypotheses about the effect of employment protection on temporary 
employment, we argue that contrary to the prevailing consensus the effect of employment 
protection on youth unemployment is theoretically indeterminate. 
Chapter 4 outlines the analytical strategies and data sources that the empirical analyses rely 
on. We begin with a description and discussion of the data sources, the countries and years 
covered. We describe the advantages and drawbacks of analytical designs that rely on cross-
sectional or longitudinal data from the perspective of casual inference. In particular, we explain 
how we adapted the differences-in-differences approach to the question and data at hand, as well 
as how we estimated standard errors. The Data Appendix to the chapter provides references for 
all data sources used in the analyses as well as variable definitions. 
Chapter 5 and 6 summarize the results of the empirical analysis. We use two different data 
sources for labor market outcomes and three main analytical steps. We begin with a cross-
sectional analysis, where we rely on both variation within and across countries, since this type of 
design is commonly used in published research. In the next step, we adjust for unit-specific 
(country-specific) fixed effects, eliminating all variation between units (countries), and conduct a 
conventional fixed effects analysis. The main point is to assess the robustness of the cross-
sectional results and relate our findings to published research using similar designs. In the third, 
decisive step, we use differences-in-differences to estimate the effect of reforms of both 
dimensions of employment protection legislation on different outcomes. We assess whether there 
have been interactions between both dimensions of employment protection (job security 
provisions, regulations on temporary contracts) and whether the impact of reform differed for 
individuals with different genders or levels of education. 
In Chapter 7, we restate the consensus about the distributional effects of employment 
protection legislation, focusing on the role of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
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Development (OECD) in its making and maintenance, and we contrast this consensus with the 
findings from this study. We summarize and discuss our results in light of their policy relevance 
and also address some methodological concerns. We conclude by discussing potential 
shortcomings of this study as well as alternative explanations for the decline in job security on 
the youth labor market. 
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2 
2. The Changing Labor Market  
As the post-war economic boom came to an end in the early 1970s, labor markets in advanced 
economies entered a period of crisis and restructuring. Across European countries, individuals 
have been increasingly exposed to unemployment and have had to cope with jobs that are limited 
in duration, in hours, and in terms of benefits. At the same time, the United States experienced a 
dramatic polarization of the wage and employment structure (Acemoglu, 2004; Autor et al., 
2006; Lemieux 2008). Since the late 1970s, the distribution of wages has become more polarized, 
as high earners have recorded robust gains, and middle and bottom earners have lost. The 
polarization of the wage structure is mirrored by a polarization of employment, with shrinking 
middle, and expanding upper and lower classes. Similar tendencies, although less extreme, have 
been observed in European countries as well (Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2009; Spitz-
Oener, 2006; Dustmann et al., 2009). 
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In 1994, Paul Krugman provided a succinct summary of the mainstream economic consensus, 
hypothesizing that both rising unemployment and rising wage inequality are "two sides of the 
same coin" (Krugman 1994: 37; Blau and Kahn, 2002). The basic argument behind this “unified 
theory” is that Europe and the U.S. have reacted to similar changes in different ways because of 
different wage setting institutions. Universal changes have swept across advanced economies, 
most important of which has been a skill-biased demand shift, i.e. a shift in labor demand away 
from less skilled to more skilled workers. If wages are determined flexibly by labor market 
participants, a skill-biased demand shift leads to higher wage inequality in the U.S. (and other 
liberal economies), as employers pay lower wages to unskilled and higher wages to skilled 
workers. In Europe, however, institutions (minimum wages, unemployment insurance, collective 
wage bargaining, trade unions) constrain wage flexibility. If institutions prevent employers from 
lowering relative wage of less skilled workers, their only response can be to adjust employment 
(Bertola and Rogerson, 1997). Consequently, employment among the less skilled declines and 
unemployment rises. 
The "unified theory" has been appealing for its simplicity and analytical ambition: a common 
explanation of two of the most important trends witnessed on the labor markets of advanced 
Western countries in recent decades. It has also been appealing to some for condensing the 
neoclassical critique of European unemployment: a portrayal of "European institutions" as rigid, 
as being in the way of markets, at the root of unemployment in Europe (OECD, 1994; Siebert, 
1997). Economists have attacked the Krugman hypothesis, mainly on empirical grounds (Nickell 
and Bell, 1996; Card et al., 1999). Other scholars have voiced more fundamental concerns, 
emphasizing that analysis ought to be more sensitive to the diversity in employment outcomes 
across European countries and to the variation in institutional conditions across European 
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countries and over time (Ebbinghaus and Kittel, 2005; Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005; DiPrete 
et al., 2006; Nickell, 1997; Nickell et al., 2005).  
In this chapter, focusing on trends on the youth labor market over the past four decades, we 
want to offer some extensions and modifications to the current consensus. Much of the literature 
on growing skills gaps has focused on inequalities between education groups. However, when 
considering the growth and distribution of atypical employment, inequalities between 
demographic groups defined by age, gender and ethnicity become crucial. The empirical analysis 
illustrates this point by comparing the changing labor market outcomes of young people and 
adult men. We show in the following that job security on European youth labor markets has 
eroded (see also Ryan, 2001; Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000; Blossfeld et al., 2005; DeFreitas, 
2009). Across Europe, young people have had to come to terms with a decline in full-time 
permanent employment, a growth in unemployment, temporary and part-time employment in 
both absolute terms and relative to adult men. These trends suggest that young people have 
shouldered a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment to structural change. 
The key point we want to illustrate and offer explanations for is that the growth of labor 
market inequalities in Europe, the rise of unemployment, job insecurity or precarious 
employment, should not just be understood from a class- or education perspective, but from a 
demographic perspective. It is well known that young people, women and migrants have a 
weaker attachment to the labor force and are hence more responsive to structural and cyclical 
changes, but most research has almost exclusively focused on inequalities between education 
groups. However, research on the labor market disadvantages experienced by women, youth and 
migrants has shown that their relative disadvantages can often not be fully accounted for by 
productivity, education and class position alone. Comparative research suggests that their relative 
disadvantages vary substantially across countries and time, which points to the importance of 
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social and cultural factors. 1
The overall goal of this study is to analyze whether employment protection legislation affects 
the labor market position of young people, and whether employment protection reforms are 
generally effective policy tools to improve the labor market conditions of young people. Apart 
from employment protection legislation, which we discuss in the following chapters, we identify 
three other theoretical accounts linking institutions to the growth of demographic inequalities, in 
particular age-based inequalities, across advanced economies. We survey these explanation in the 
following section and then proceed with an analysis of youth labor market trends. 
 From a sociological perspective, a way of approaching this issue is to 
focus on the role of institutions in structuring and generating inequalities at particular life course 
transitions (DiPrete, 2003). In this chapter, we illustrate this perspective focusing on the youth 
labor market, but it clearly applies to other demographic inequalities as well. 
2.1. Explaining the decline in job security on the youth labor 
market 
From a labor demand perspective, changes on the youth labor market are consequence of changes 
in labor demand, i.e. adverse, cyclical demand shocks or skill-biased demand shifts. Young 
people disproportionately suffer in this context because they lack skills, both general and specific 
skills. Institutions condition the impact of demand shocks, and may also change in response to 
these shocks. In particular, institutions determine which outcomes are affected, whether young 
people's wages or job security declines.  
  
 
1 Experimental studies repeatedly show evidence of ethnic and gender discrimination on the labor market 
(Rouse and Goldin, 2000; Pager, 2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). Comparative research also 
documents persistent gender gaps in income and unemployment (Azmat et al., 2006; Gangl and Ziefle, 2009) 
and age gaps (Ryan, 2001; Breen, 2005) in employment outcomes, which appear not reducible to skills alone 
and which appear to be responsive to institutional or cultural factors. 
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From a bargaining perspective, young people may lose out in the distributional conflict over 
quality jobs since they lack bargaining power relative to labor market insiders, in particular adult 
men. The institutional and possibly cultural context is decisive in how this conflict is resolved. 
Following Goldthorpe (1984), we identify a tendency towards dualization, a demographically 
selective retrenchment of job security, protecting the rents of the core workforce, while exposing 
marginal labor market groups to higher risks, or a corporatist response, where collective 
bargaining has managed to partly contain dualization tendencies. Finally, it may not be so much 
be the presence of strict job protection legislation, but the absence of generous unemployment 
benefits (in countries that have strict job security provisions), which causes job insecurity to shift 
onto young people. In the following, we survey each of these explanations, and then continue 
with a survey of key trends on the youth labor market. 
2.1.1. Labor demand shifts: extending the unified theory 
Economists have clearly recognized a deterioration of outcomes among young people over the 
past four decades, starting in the early 1970s (Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000; Ryan, 2001; 
DeFreitas, 2009). Within the framework of the "unified theory", this decline is found to manifest 
itself either in terms of a decline in relative wages in liberal countries like the U.S. and Great 
Britain or a decline in employment in regulated European countries like France or Spain. In a 
third group of countries, including Japan and Germany, institutional factors seem to have 
prevented major declines on either dimension. This deterioration occurred despite changes on the 
supply side that should have improved labor market outcomes of young people, including 
shrinking cohort sizes and rising educational attainment. Hence, the problem must lie on the 
demand side. 
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Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) argue that the youth labor market merely reflects, in an 
amplified way, general economic tendencies, including weak aggregate labor demand. However, 
cyclical factors alone cannot explain the persistent erosion of job security among young people, 
characterized by permanent losses in relative wages and increases in unemployment, temporary 
and part-time employment. To account for the persistent decline, Ryan (2001, 2009, see also 
Christopolou, 2009) argues that a “doubly skill-biased” demand shift has not only led to 
widening differentials between education groups, but also to widening differentials between 
individuals with different levels of labor force experience.  
Conventional approaches assume that skill-biased demand shift have led to increasing skill 
gaps in terms of employment/unemployment, where skill is defined by educational attainment 
(Krugman, 1994; OECD, 1994). However, this perspective has run into empirical difficulty as it 
does agree with simple trends observed across advanced countries (Nickell and Bell, 1995, 1996; 
Card et al., 1999). 2
 
2 A basic problem facing the Krugman hypothesis is that it does not seem to agree with basic evidence. 
Nickell and Bell (1995, 1996) identify a cluster of countries including the U.S., Japan, Norway and Sweden, in 
which aggregate unemployment grew little from the mid 1970s to the late 1980s, but most of the increase in 
aggregate unemployment was driven by increases in unemployment among the unskilled. Widely diverging 
institutional setting seem to have produced similar employment responses. In contrast, unemployment grew 
strongly in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Canada, but both skilled and unskilled unemployment 
contributed to this rise, which Nickell and Bell (1996) interpret as the consequence of a skill-neutral shock. 
 Operating along-side a skill-biased demand shift raising the returns to 
educational degrees, an experienced biased-demand shift would explain why we have observed a 
deterioration of youth labor market outcomes despite favorable developments on the supply side. 
It would explain the relative stability in outcomes among labor market insiders, in particular adult 
men, and the concurrent decline in the position of young people. Thus, apart from rising returns 
to education, we have witnessed rising returns to experience, which implies growing inequality in 
outcomes between youth and adults. Rigid pay setting institutions then determine whether rising 
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returns to experience translate into a deterioration of young people's relative wages or relative 
employment/unemployment.  
Recent critiques of the "unified theory" have argued that focusing on the contrast between 
employment/unemployment vs. wages as labor market outcomes ignores the growth of atypical 
jobs, in particularly temporary employment. Moreover, the assumption that rigid, time-invariant 
pay setting institutions are the key institutional factor accounting for cross-country variation in 
outcomes has been modified (Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005; DiPrete et al., 2006). European 
labor market institutions have been responsive to market changes that have lowered relative 
demand for unskilled workers. In particular, the deregulation and growth of temporary 
employment represents a market-driven institutional adjustment to increase employer flexibility, 
which results in higher job insecurity in particular among the unskilled. "European adjustment 
strategies have thereby produced rising inequality, but rising inequality in the job security rather 
than the wage component of the employment relationship" (DiPrete et al., 2006: 217).  
Taking stock of the deregulation and growth of temporary employment as well as moving 
beyond the wage-unemployment contrast is a crucial extension to the unified theory that better 
accounts for the trends we have observed on European labor markets. However, while these 
contributions emphasize growing skill-gaps in job security, measured by education or occupation, 
we think that this perspective ignores that temporary employment grew particularly on the youth 
labor market in a number of countries.3
 
3 For example, Giesecke and Gebel's (2009a) analyses for Germany suggest that growth in age-gaps in 
temporary employment were clearly more pronounced than changes in education- or class-gaps. Moreover, they 
show that temporary jobs are particularly prevalent among university graduates, which seems to contradict 
expectations that educated are generally less likely to be affected by insecure employment contracts (see also, 
McGinnity et al., 2005). 
 Similar to Ryan's critique of the "unified theory", we 
should think of skills or human capital not just in terms of educational attainment, but also in 
terms of job-specific skills or in terms of labor force experience.  
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Combining both economic and sociological critiques, we offer the following "doubly-
augmented unified theory" to link changes in labor demand to the growth of job insecurity on 
European (youth) labor markets. Following Ryan (2001), skill-biased demand shifts have led to a 
widening of skill-differentials in labor market outcomes, where skills have to be interpreted both 
in terms of general skills (measured by educational attainment) as well as specific skills 
(measured by labor force experience). This should lead to relative declines in labor market 
outcomes among less educated (compared to more educated) as well as young people (compared 
to adults), suggesting that uneducated young people have suffered the most. Second, European 
labor markets have responded to these demand shifts by granting employers more flexibility. By 
deregulating the usage of temporary contracts, employers now have at their disposal employment 
contracts with low or zero dismissal costs that effectively lower the costs of hiring less skilled, 
including young workers. Thus, to the extent that they cannot adjust wages, deregulation of 
temporary contracts as well as rising returns to education and experience have led to an erosion 
of job security, a growth of unemployment and temporary employment, among less educated and 
among young people. In countries with flexible pay setting regimes, however, employers have 
used wages to accommodate demand shocks, leading to a decline in earnings among young 
people. In either case, less educated youth should have suffered the most. 
2.1.2. Political economy: dualism vs. corporatism 
From an institutional perspective, the labor demand perspective has at least two shortcomings. 
First, it interprets age differences in labor market outcomes solely as the result of skill 
differences. Young people also differ from the adult workforce in other characteristics, in 
particular in terms of bargaining power. They have less political influence in determining the 
distribution of labor market outcomes through institutionalized channels, in particular collective 
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bargaining arrangements. Second, the labor demand perspective has difficulty in accounting for 
relatively favorable youth labor markets observed in some countries, despite their "rigid" 
institutions. While the youth labor markets in Japan, Germany or the Netherlands have shown 
strain, they still seem to perform better than some of their European or Anglo-Saxon 
counterparts. The following perspective addresses both critiques, by analyzing the role of 
collective bargaining regimes in distributing employment across demographic groups. Following 
Goldthorpe (1984), we conceptualize a 'dualist' and a 'corporatist' response to labor market crisis 
in European countries. 
Dualism in this context refers to the selective retrenchment of social rights, such that 
particular groups are no longer covered by certain rights that were won during the post-war boom 
years, like job security. As full-time ("full-benefit"), permanent jobs become increasingly scarce, 
labor representatives, i.e. trade unions and left parties, are faced with a zero-sum distributional 
conflict. In this situation, they have strong incentives to protect the labor market position of their 
core constituents. Political considerations (vote maximization) lead them to protect in particular 
the employed, core workforce, at the expense of the unemployed, precariously employed or 
inactive, by supporting policies safeguarding or extending rents of the employed (Saint-Paul, 
2000; Rueda 2005, 2007).4 Cultural factors privileging a male-breadwinner-model may further 
add a gender bias, as labor representative try in particular to protect the position of male 
breadwinners. Thus, groups with a weak labor force attachment (or with a weak political 
relevance in the eyes of labor representatives) find themselves at the losing end.5
 
4 These models bear some resemblance to the insider-outsider models developed in economics (see Saint-
Paul, 2000, for an updated account).  
 Depending on 
5 To the extent that employment chances are merely redistributed within households, from wives, sons and 
daughters to male household heads, net changes in the flow of economic resources from employers to 
households do not change much. This in turn would calm outsider political resistance in the case of women and 
in the case of young people, to the extent that they still live with their parents. 
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the organization of wage bargaining, trade union influence may be particularly detrimental, if 
unions pursue sectional interests, and extract substantial rents for specific occupations or 
industries, which are won at the expense of outsiders' employment opportunities. Thus, 
particularly if wage bargaining occurs at decentralized or intermediate levels (industry or 
occupation), we would expect particularly adverse employment outcomes among outsiders in 
times of crisis (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). Altogether, the dualist response to labor market 
crisis possibly characterizes best the experience of Southern European countries (including 
France), combining traditional family values, aggressive labor movements and influential left 
parties. 
An alternative response has occurred in countries with corporatist industrial relations 
regimes, where employer and worker representatives, with variable involvement of the state, 
bargain over wages, employment and employment conditions for a large portion of the 
workforce. It is commonly argued that by coordinating their wage demands across the economy, 
trade unions are more likely to internalize the consequences of excessive wage demands, since 
resulting reductions in employment are likely to affect their members (Kenworthy, 2002). By 
bringing about (the expectation of) real wage restraint, governments may also be more likely to 
spend more on policies to reduce unemployment, having to worry less about inflation. Moreover, 
in some corporatist countries, employers and the state have maintained large scale vocational 
education systems that facilitate smooth transitions from school to work (Rosenbaum et al., 1990; 
Müller and Shavit, 1998; Ryan, 2001; Breen, 2005).  
While active labor market policies have been particularly prevalent in the Scandinavian 
countries, extensive vocational education programs exist in Austria, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland. Corporatist arrangements may explain why some countries, in 
particular the latter Continental European countries could maintain relatively low rates or quickly 
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restore low rates of youth unemployment, and they may also account for the exceptionally low 
unemployment rates found in Nordic countries before the financial crisis of the early 1990s. 
However, a number of studies also show that corporatist arrangements have come under pressure, 
by deregulatory reform, budgetary problems, gradual erosion of coordinating mechanisms and 
waning employer participation in vocational education (Thelen and Kume, 2006; Culpepper and 
Thelen, 2009; Thelen, 2009; Barbieri, 2009). The consequence of this erosion may be understood 
as a growing dualization, as certain demographic groups in the workforce, including young 
people, no longer enjoy the rights and benefits of older cohorts, like access to quality 
apprenticeship places or permanent, full-time employment. 
2.1.3. Unemployment insurance 
Apart from employment protection and collective bargaining regimes, unemployment insurance 
may be a factor contributing to the distribution of unemployment risks. Employed workers as 
well as labor representatives have a greater incentive to bargain for job protection, if 
institutionalized support for the unemployed is lacking. If employed workers face drastic income 
losses upon unemployment, we should expect more resistance to dismissal and more litigation to 
enforce existing employment protection legislation. If countries predominantly rely on either 
strategy, job security provisions or unemployment insurance, to reduce outflow from 
employment or to mitigate the consequences of unemployment, it may be less the prevalence of 
strict job security provisions, but the absence of generous unemployment support, which led to 
higher insider protection and diminishing employment chances for young people.  
Cultural norms, favoring a male-breadwinner-model, may exacerbate this tendency (Algan 
and Cahuc, 2006; Azmat et al., 2006). In effect, employers and incumbent (male) employees act 
to protect male breadwinners in times of crisis, which at the societal level implies that at least one 
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family member remains in stable employment and guarantees economic sustenance. In the 
absence of unemployment benefits, it would be too costly for society to risk job loss among sole 
family breadwinners, which were mainly men, especially in Southern Europe and in times of 
acute crisis throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, weak unemployment insurance provisions for 
adult workers may therefore independently or in interaction with job security provisions led to 
adverse relative employment outcomes for labor market outsiders. 
2.2. Youth unemployment 
The following section charts the erosion of job security on the youth labor market. We start with 
the evolution of unemployment for different demographic groups in the United States and 
selected European countries, which were particularly affected by rising unemployment (Figure 
2.1 and Figure 2.2). In the following, we usually define the youth labor market in terms of the 
age of participants, where youth or young people are 15-29 year olds. 6
Figure 2.1
 We contrast their 
experience with the group that is normally most strongly attached to the labor market, adult 
(prime-age) men aged 45-54.  shows that young people were disproportionately 
affected by rising unemployment. While the U.S. had comparatively high unemployment rates in 
the 1970s, some Western European countries witnessed substantial increases in unemployment. 
Youth unemployment rates virtually exploded in some countries, particularly among female 
youth, whose unemployment rates climbed well beyond 20-30% in a number of countries during 
the 1980s and again in the early 1990s. Compared to the magnitude of changes among youth, we 
hardly observe changes among adult men. 
 
6 In most aggregate data analysis, the youth labor market is defined in terms of age. While individuals aged 
15-24 are considered to be on the youth labor market, we extend the upper limit to 29 whenever the available 
data permits this, reflecting that increasing participation in higher education has postponed the age at which 
young people enter the labor market for the first time. 
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Figure 2.1 Unemployment 1970-2008, % unemployed in labor force unemployed, by age and 
gender 
 
Note: Data smoothed using one year moving average7
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics 
 
Comparing the experience of Italy to the experience of the U.S. allows for a very drastic 
numeric portrayal of the age-gap in unemployment: In 1981, 1.2% of Italian adult men aged 45-
54 active on the labor market were unemployed, a decrease of 0.1 percentage points compared to 
1970. Adult men's unemployment rate would reach a high of 3.8% in 1998 and recover to 2.8% 
by 2008. Over the entire period of observation, 1970 and 2008, it averaged around 1.4 percentage 
points below the rate of the corresponding demographic group in the U.S. In the meantime, 
unemployment among young Italians skyrocketed. In 1981, 25.5% of active young women aged 
15-29 were unemployed. Female youth unemployment was roughly 21 times as high as the 
corresponding rate for adult men. Female youth unemployment would continue to rise, rarely 
dipping beneath 30% in the period from 1984 to 1999. Male youth unemployment followed a 
similar path, but averaged 8 percentage points below the corresponding female rate over the 
 
7 Each value in this and the following figures in this chapter is calculated as 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1)/3 
in order to smooth out some cyclical variation and enhance readability. 
0
10
20
30
40
1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Men, ages 45-54
0
10
20
30
40
1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Men, ages 15-29
0
10
20
30
40
1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
Women, ages 15-29
DE ES FR IT SE US
The Changing Labor Market 
 
21 
 
period from 1970 to 2008. Over that same period, young Italian women's unemployment 
exceeded the adult men's unemployment rate on average by a factor of 12 (8 in case of young 
Italian men). In contrast, unemployment among young Americans of both genders averaged at 
around 10% exceeding the adult rate roughly by a factor of 3. 
While the Italian case is maybe the most dramatic from a distributional perspective, a number 
of European countries witnessed rapid increases in youth unemployment rates from the 1970s 
until the mid-1990s. European youth unemployment peaked in the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 
Thereafter, we have observed some recovery. Average unemployment rates for Western 
European countries declined after 1995, for youth and adults, men and women alike. Although 
European youth unemployment is lower in 2008 compared to the mid-1980s or mid-1990s, we 
see substantial heterogeneity in the underlying country trends. In Italy and Spain, unemployment 
declined steadily from very high levels since the mid-1990s, but youth unemployment remains 
stubbornly high in Greece and France. Starting at very low levels in the 1980s, German and 
Swedish youth unemployment has shown a long-term upward trends. In contrast, Irish, British, 
but also Dutch and Danish youth unemployment rates have diminished substantially from high 
levels in the 1980s.  
In 2008, we still observe the long shadows of the preceding decades (Table 2.2, Appendix, p. 
26). Considering a broad sample of 28 OECD countries, Spain still has the highest 
unemployment rate among young men, in absolute terms and relative to adult men. Male youth 
unemployment is similarly high in Turkey and Italy. Sweden has the fourth highest 
unemployment rate among male youth and, in relative terms it ranks third among 28 OECD 
countries, surpassing Greece by a narrow margin. Averaging across countries, female youth 
unemployment is 0.7 percentage points above the male rate, but there exist considerable gender 
gaps in a number of countries, where we observe higher relative male unemployment in some 
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Anglo-Saxon countries and higher relative female unemployment in Mediterranean countries. In 
absolute terms, female youth unemployment is highest in the Mediterranean countries, with 
Greece taking the lead in terms of both relative and absolute female youth unemployment. Spain, 
Turkey, Italy and Portugal follow. At the other end of the distribution, among Western European 
countries the Netherlands is the top performer among both men and women. Youth 
unemployment is also low in Denmark and Switzerland. Extraordinarily low youth 
unemployment appears to be a thing of the past in Germany, although in relative to adult men, 
German youth unemployment is still among the lowest in Western Europe. 
In Figure 2.2, we consider the duration of unemployment spells, comparing the percentage of 
unemployed youth who are out of a job for one year or longer over countries and years. The 
trends in the share of long-term unemployed reflect the trends in the aggregate youth 
unemployment rate, but there is evidence of a persistent decline since 1985. While average 
European youth unemployment rates have approached levels similar to those in the U.S., the 
incidence of long-term youth unemployment in Europe is still substantially higher compared to 
the U.S. Long-term unemployment among young people is also remarkably low in Sweden. 
Further analyses (data not shown) indicate that in 2006, the modal group of unemployment spells 
is six months or less in the countries considered here, except for Italy and Greece, where youth 
unemployment is predominantly long-term, i.e. exceeding 12 months. While still having 
predominantly short-term unemployment spells, we observe a rise in long-term spells among 
Austrian and German youth as well as among French and Greek male youth throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000s. 
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Figure 2.2 Long-term unemployment 1985-2008, % unemployed one year or longer among 
unemployed, by age and gender 
 
Note: The EU14 comprise the pre-2004 EU member states minus Luxembourg, plus Norway. Bars represent 90% robust 
confidence intervals around the unweighted EU14 mean for a given year. 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics 
2.3. Precarious employment on the youth labor market 
European countries implemented a number of reforms to improve labor market outcomes and 
bring down unemployment, including a shift from passive to active labor market policies, 
reforms of public employment services and deregulation of temporary and part-time 
employment. These reforms occurred in the context of broader structural and macroeconomic 
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changes, including the phasing out of anti-inflationary fiscal and monetary policy of the early 
1980s, intensifying European and global integration, persistent technological change, as well as 
declining youth cohort sizes and rising participation in tertiary education. While these factors 
have probably contributed to the decline in youth unemployment, the structure of employment 
that has emerged after crisis and reform has changed fundamentally. Across Europe, precarious 
forms of employment have grown, and it is particularly young people who have been affected by 
this trend.  
In Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4, we chart the growth of temporary jobs for selected European 
countries and the U.S. Temporary jobs expire after a contractually specified period and usually 
impose no further obligations on the employer after expiration. While subject to some regulation, 
they grant employers considerable flexibility in adjusting employment, especially since in a 
number of European countries regular employment contracts are subject to rather strict dismissal 
regulations. Temporary employment is more likely to be involuntary than part-time employment, 
and usually implies contract durations of less than 12 months (see Table 2.3 in Appendix to this 
chapter). 8  We define temporary employment here as the number of individuals holding a 
temporary job in the active labor force.9
Temporary employment has grown explosively in Spain, but we also observe persistent 
growth elsewhere in Europe, with the exceptions of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK, as well as, 
 
 
8 In the case of part-time employment, where part-time employment appears to be more prevalent, it also 
tends to be more often voluntary. In the Netherlands, where the incidence of part-time employment is high, only 
6% of young people holding a part-time contract in 2006 report doing so involuntarily. We should therefore 
bear in mind that part-time and temporary employment need to be distinguished as different forms of labor 
market “precarity”, where part-time employment is more often entered voluntary in the presence of a second 
full-time earner in the household. In contrast, in the case of temporary employment appears to be more often 
involuntary and of short duration (less than 12 months) particularly where its incidence is high. It thus 
represents a clear source of job insecurity, which is confirmed by many micro data studies (for example, 
Giesecke and Gross, 2003; DiPrete et al., 2006). 
9 In the following, we mainly rely on the augmented EULFS dataset, which like the available OECD data 
has some missing information (see Data Appendix, p.103). 
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Greece. These results correspond to Booth et al. (2002) assessment of aggregate trends in 
temporary employment. However, it is less frequently noted that, across Europe, a lot of the 
increase in temporary employment has occurred among young people. If we average over all 
countries (which is problematic given the unbalanced availability of data), we observe that 11% 
young people's jobs are under a temporary contract in 1983. The corresponding number in 1996 
is 29%, and 36% in 2006.10
Figure 2.3 Temporary employment, % in temporary employment in labor force, by age and 
gender 
 At the same time, among 45-54 year old men, we observe only a 
slight increase, from 2.5 to 5.5% between 1983 to 2006. 
 
Note: Data for U.S. on 15-24 year-olds (young people) and 25-54 year-olds (adult men). 
Source: EULFS, own calculations. OECD Labor Force Statistics for data on U.S.  
The imbalance in the distribution of temporary employment across age groups is even more 
pronounced than in the case of unemployment (Table 2.1). In 2006, temporary employment 
among young people (aged 15-29) exceeds temporary employment among adult men (aged 45-
 
10 Between comparison between 1996 and 2006 is unaffected by changes in country composition, while we 
lack data for certain countries before 1995.  
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54) roughly by a factor of 7. Compared to adult men, average temporary employment among 
young people is 22 percentage point higher among young women and 19 percentage points 
higher among young men. Temporary employment is also slightly more common among young 
women compared to young men. 
Table 2.1 Temporary employment in 2006, % in temporary employment in labor force, by age 
and gender 
 
Men, 
ages 45-54 
Men, 
Ages 15-29 
Women, 
Ages 15-29 (2) - (1) (3) - (1) 
Austria 2.04 25.41 21.24 23.37 19.20 
Belgium 2.01 15.48 18.46 13.46 16.45 
Denmark 4.23 21.93 21.69 17.70 17.46 
Finland 3.73 25.51 36.77 21.78 33.04 
France 3.67 27.07 27.98 23.40 24.31 
Germany 2.59 34.76 33.15 32.17 30.56 
Greece 2.95 10.93 12.69 7.98 9.74 
Ireland 1.06 5.96 9.60 4.90 8.54 
Italy 3.86 19.22 22.83 15.36 18.97 
Netherlands 3.45 29.48 30.12 26.03 26.67 
Norway 1.96 19.85 27.73 17.89 25.78 
Portugal 6.88 31.68 34.51 24.80 27.63 
Spain 11.19 42.16 42.41 30.97 31.22 
Sweden 5.04 28.87 40.16 23.83 35.12 
UK 2.12 7.53 9.08 5.40 6.96 
Average 3.79 23.06 25.90 19.27 22.11 
Source: EULFS, own calculations 
In 2006, temporary employment is now highest (in absolute terms and relative to adult men) 
in Spain, Sweden and Finland. The majority of Finish, Spanish and Swedish youth who hold a 
temporary contract, do so involuntarily, and around 80% of these contracts (70% in Finland in 
2006) are shorter than twelve months (Table 2.3 in Appendix to this chapter). We also note 
relatively high temporary employment in Germany and the Netherlands, which is to a certain 
extent accounted for by the extensive apprenticeship system that relies on temporary 
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apprenticeship contracts. In the Swedish and Finnish case, active labor market policies account 
for a certain share of temporary contracts. 
In Figure 2.4, we compare the evolution of temporary employment and unemployment on the 
youth labor market across Western Europe. In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Belgium, France, and Sweden, we observe pronounced rises in temporary employment that 
exceed corresponding decreases in unemployment. In Austria and Germany, we observe 
simultaneous increases in youth unemployment and temporary employment. The Anglo-Saxon 
countries as well as Denmark, Norway and Greece show a divergent pattern of stable or declining 
youth unemployment and no (persistent) growth of temporary employment. 
That growing temporary employment does not generally translate into lower unemployment 
becomes more apparent, when we sum these two rates. In Figure 2.5, we chart the evolution of 
job insecurity, which we define as the percentage of individuals in the active labor force that are 
either unemployed or employed on a temporary basis. We observe persistent growth of job 
insecurity among young people in the majority of European countries. Exceptions are the Anglo-
Saxon countries, where we observe no trends or even recoveries, driven by declining youth 
unemployment rates and absent growth in temporary employment. Greece, Denmark, Finland11
Figure 2.5
 
and Norway also show no clear trend in the period observed.  also shows that young 
people have been more affected by the increase in job insecurity compared to adult men. 
Compared to the magnitude of change on the youth labor market, adult men were barely affected.  
In Figure 2.6, we add another dimension of youth labor market outcomes, distinguishing 
between part-time and full-time jobs. Labor market precarity is defined here as being either 
unemployed or in part-time/temporary employment. Conversely, we define job security as being 
 
11 If we would include data from before 1995, which are unfortunately not available in the EULFS, we 
would, however, also observe an increase in job insecurity, triggered by the economic and financial crisis in the 
early 1990s. 
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in a full-time, permanent job. We express the number of individuals in each state as a percentage 
of the active labor force, so that both add up to unity. As a reference, we also plot labor force 
participation rates. Despite rising levels of educational attainment and declining cohort sizes, 
young people are less likely to hold full-time, permanent jobs and more likely to be found in a 
precarious labor market position in the majority of European countries. Much of these trends 
have persisted throughout the 1990s, during a period of declining youth unemployment. Even in 
the liberal UK, we see a growth in precarious labor market outcomes, while Ireland shows a 
strong performance mainly due to economic boom during the 1990s.  
In Figure 2.7, we focus on the same outcomes as in Figure 2.6, but we subtract the outcomes 
for men aged 45-54 from the corresponding youth outcomes. The resulting trend lines indicate to 
what extent both groups were equally affected by rising job precarity. If both were equally 
affected, the resulting trend lines would be flat around zero. What we observe, however, is that 
young people were disproportionately affected by rising precarity and declining job security. The 
decline in relative job security is nearly universal, as is the growth in relative job precarity. These 
underlying trends continued unabatedly in a number of countries in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, which suggests an ongoing trend that the current economic and financial crisis may even 
exacerbate. The most dismal trends in the 1990s and early 2000s are visible in Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, France and Belgium, where youth labor force participation has been declining faster 
than among adult men. Even though part of these declines are due to increased educational 
participation, young people in these countries seem to be unable to convert their educational titles 
into secure jobs. We now also observe growing age-gaps in Greece, which we did not observe 
focusing on absolute outcomes. 
 29 
 
Figure 2.4 Unemployment (% unemployed in labor force) and temporary employment (% in temporary employment in labor force), 
young people aged 15-29 
 
Note: Data for U.S. on 15-24 year-olds 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics for unemployment and U.S. data for temporary employment; EULFS, own calculations for temporary employment 
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Figure 2.5 Job insecurity (% unemployed or in temporary employment in labor force), young people aged 15-29 and adult men aged 45-
54 
 
Note: Data for U.S. on 15-24 year-olds (young people) and 25-54 year-olds (adult men) 
Source: EULFS, own calculations; U.S. data from OECD Labor Force Statistics  
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Figure 2.6 Precarity (% in labor force unemployed, in temporary and/or part-time employment), job security (% in labor force in 
permanent, full-time employment) and labor force participation rates (% in labor force in population), young people aged 15-29 
 
Note: Data for U.S. on 15-24 year-olds (young people) 
Source: EULFS, own calculations. OECD for U.S. data.  
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Figure 2.7 Relative precarity (% in labor force unemployed, in temporary and/or part-time employment), relative job security (% in 
labor force in permanent, full-time employment) and relative labor force participation rates (% in labor force in population), young 
people aged 15-29 
 
Note: Outcomes for young people (ages 15-29) minus outcome for adult men (ages 45-54); data for U.S. on 15-24 year-olds (young people) and 25-54 year-olds (adult men) 
Source: EULFS, own calculations. OECD for U.S. data. 
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To summarize these trends, we averaged the data depicted in Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7 for 
the "regulated" Continental and Southern European as well as Scandinavian countries, omitting 
the liberal countries (U.S., UK and Ireland).12
Figure 2.8 Absolute and relative trends in precarity (% in labor force unemployed, in temporary 
and/or part-time employment), job security (% in labor force in permanent, full-time 
employment) and labor force participation rates (% in labor force in population), young people 
aged 15-29 
 In a period of declining relative and absolute youth 
unemployment, we observe a decline of secure employment, a growth of insecure jobs and 
precarious labor market positions among young people. The decline in full-time permanent 
employment relative to adult men is particularly salient.  
 
Note: Unweighted averages for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden; Relative outcomes are the outcomes for young people (ages 15-29) minus outcomes for adult men 
(ages 45-54) 
Source: EULFS, own calculations 
Between 1983 and 2006, the decline in youth unemployment was outpaced by the growth of 
temporary employment, as job insecurity among young people grew on average by 0.55 
 
12 We have to exercise some caution in interpretation because a number of countries lack information 
before 1995. 
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percentage points each year, while precarious labor market positions grew on average by 0.82 
percentage points. Relative to adult men, full-time, permanent employment was declining at a 
rate of 0.76 percentage points. Further analysis (data not shown), for the period from 1995 to 
2006 show that declines in job security were mainly concentrated among the least educated, 
while tertiary educated held or improved their position. The late 1990s and early 2000s, despite 
an overall favorable macroeconomic environment in a number of countries, were therefore still 
marked by persistent growth in labor market inequalities. 
2.4. The impact of the recent financial and economic crisis 
Finally, we want to briefly survey the impact of the recent financial and economic crisis on the 
youth labor market. We rely on monthly unemployment rate data from Eurostat and resort to 
conventional definitions, where youth are individuals aged 15-24 and adults are aged 25-74. 
Figure 2.9 traces the evolution from the early 1990s, just before the second peak of European 
youth unemployment to May 2010 for a selected set of European countries and the U.S. In Figure 
2.10, we take the unweighted annual average over 15 Western European countries and the U.S. of 
the youth and the adult unemployment rate. 
While recent shocks to economic output were more severe than the crises in the early 1990s, 
we may judge the unemployment response as temperate. Nevertheless, the financial crisis and 
recession has virtually wiped out all declines in youth unemployment that were won since youth 
unemployment last peaked in the early 1990s. We are nearly back to the highest youth 
unemployment levels seen in the past 40 years (see also Bell and Blanchflower, 2010). However, 
we also see that at present unemployment seems to have reached a peak, as signs of economic 
recovery appear in a number of countries. Again, we observe a much more pronounced response 
to crisis on the youth labor market. With the exception of Spain, adults seem little affected. 
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Figure 2.9 Unemployment January 1992 to May 2010, % unemployed in labor force 
unemployed, by age 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 
We should bear in mind that in 2010 we have moved further along in terms of favorable 
supply side shifts, i.e. youth cohorts are still shrinking and becoming ever more educated. In the 
future, we are less and less able to rely on these supply shifts to mitigate the situation on the 
youth labor market. Moreover, we have already experienced a persistent erosion of job security 
on the youth labor market. In the aftermath of the unemployment crisis in the 1980s and early 
1990s, job insecurity grew to unprecedented levels without a sign of trend reversal, and now we 
again face nearly record youth unemployment levels. 
A crucial question will be whether governments can further rely on “passive stabilizers”, 
such as youth dropping out of the labor market to obtain further education, thereby temporarily 
taking the pressure from the youth labor market. Tertiary enrolments have risen persistently in a 
number of European countries throughout the 1990s. Overinvesting into tertiary education carries 
immediate costs for individuals and tax-payers, and it brings down the returns on investment 
(Dolado et al., 2000). Another crucial issue concerns demands for fiscal austerity, which are 
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spreading across Europe. A sudden decrease of state spending and interest rate increases are 
likely to weaken aggregate demand, which directly impacts youth labor market chances, and 
would prolong recovery. 
Figure 2.10 Unemployment January 1992 to March 2010, 
Western countries, by age 
 
Note: Unweighted averages for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States 
Source: Eurostat 
Unless Europeans have become a lot more capable in managing crisis on the youth labor 
market, we are bound to see the worst youth labor market conditions in recent history for the 
years to come. If the Swedish/Finnish response to crisis in the early 1990s is any guide (see 
Figure 3), we should expect to see further rises in temporary employment on European youth 
labor markets. As investors and employers lack confidence in macroeconomic recovery, hiring 
5
10
15
20
Jan92 Aug95 Mar99 Oct02 May06 Mar10
Adults, ages 25-74
Youth, ages 15-24
The Changing Labor Market 
 
37 
 
employees on a temporary basis becomes more attractive, and lacking better offers, young people 
have no other choice but to accept (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002). 
2.5. Summary and Discussion 
Before the onset of the recent financial crisis, youth unemployment across Western Europe has 
been on a path of recovery. However, the emergent structure of employment on the youth labor 
market is fundamentally different from the situation in early 1970s. Despite favorable trends on 
the supply side, young people are increasingly less likely to hold a full-time, permanent job, and 
more likely to be employed on a temporary or part-time basis. At risk of over-generalizing, the 
basic trends fits with a doubly modified version of the original Krugman hypothesis. Liberal 
Anglo-Saxon countries (esp. UK and the U.S.) have witnessed rising earnings inequality, where 
income gaps have grown both between education and experience groups (Gottschalk, 1997; 
Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000; Ryan, 2001). Wages have been somewhat more stable in 
Continental and Southern Europe, as well as Scandinavia. While we did not observe the predicted 
uniform rise in unemployment rates among the less educated, we have seen a clear decline in job 
security, which occurred partly among the less educated (Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005), but as 
we have shown here, we have seen substantial growth in job insecurity among young people, in 
absolute terms and relative to adult men. Thus, young people and less educated youth in 
particular have borne a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment to structural change. 
While strong age-differentials have been a well-known feature of Southern European labor 
markets, the data presented here also indicates signs of strain in some of the Continental and 
Northern corporatist countries. The Swedish youth labor market seems to have never quite 
recovered from the crisis in the early 1990s. The 1990s and early 2000s, were also marked by a 
simultaneous rise in unemployment and temporary employment in Germany and Austria. We 
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thus observe some tendencies towards dualization in these corporatist countries. Shifting labor 
market risks onto young people appears to have been a solution that both left and right 
governments in these countries could agree too, as it meets demands from the right for more 
flexibility, while not cutting into the rents of what left parties seem to perceive as their politically 
relevant constituents. 
The recent crisis has created an even more pressing need to address the labor market situation 
of young people, but will governments on strained budgets be able to manage the crisis? The still 
ruling economic consensus by default advocates deregulation/privatization as low cost solutions 
that supposedly pay for themselves in the long run. Given that financial crisis seems to have 
precipitated a crisis of confidence into market-based solutions to social problems, it will be 
interesting to see if and to what extent governments resist deregulatory pressures. In Spain, for 
example, the left government has recently implemented a reform that lowers dismissal costs on 
permanent employment contracts, while imposing tougher constraints on the usage of temporary 
contracts.13
The record of deregulatory reform over the past decades is mixed at best: Before the recent 
financial crisis, youth unemployment rates had recovered in Western Europe, but the decline in 
unemployment has been outpaced by the growth in atypical jobs, which are limited in terms of 
duration, hours and benefits. It is not clear whether deregulation of employment protection has 
actually contributed to the recovery in unemployment. Youth labor markets in some European 
countries bordering the Mediterranean still appear dysfunctional, while the traditional corporatist 
top performers also show increasing signs of strain. Fueled by the recent crisis, the search for 
 However, we should ask at this point, again, do these reforms really work for young 
people? 
 
13 The Spanish parliament approved the reform bill on June 22, 2010. 
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viable answers to young people’s labor market problems will certainly remain on the scientific 
agenda, but it is less certain whether policy makers are able or willing to deliver solutions. While 
we have witnessed violent outbursts of youth discontent in France and Greece, the shift of job 
insecurity onto young people has not been mobilized in the political arena. 
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2.6. Appendix 
Table 2.2 Unemployment rates by age and gender, 2008 
 
Men, 
ages 45-54 
Men, 
Ages 15-29 
Women, 
Ages 15-29 (2) - (1) (3) - (1) 
Australia 2.55 7.14 7.17 4.59 4.62 
Austria 2.95 6.37 6.91 3.42 3.96 
Belgium 4.75 10.48 10.13 5.73 5.38 
Canada 5.03 10.40 8.21 5.37 3.18 
Czech Rep. 3.07 5.99 6.96 2.93 3.89 
Denmark 1.39 4.76 6.46 3.36 5.06 
Finland 4.14 11.21 12.25 7.06 8.11 
France 4.84 13.06 13.55 8.22 8.71 
Germany 6.64 9.86 9.07 3.22 2.42 
Greece 2.35 11.48 20.69 9.13 18.34 
Hungary 6.33 12.39 13.55 6.06 7.22 
Ireland 4.41 10.05 5.76 5.65 1.36 
Italy 3.09 13.51 17.70 10.42 14.61 
Japan 3.05 6.98 6.07 3.93 3.01 
Mexico 2.06 5.43 7.24 3.37 5.19 
New Zealand 2.05 8.82 8.54 6.76 6.48 
Netherlands 2.19 4.34 4.44 2.16 2.25 
Norway 1.57 6.42 5.31 4.85 3.74 
Poland 5.16 10.66 13.54 5.50 8.38 
Portugal 5.25 10.34 16.50 5.09 11.25 
Slovakia 7.31 13.05 15.54 5.75 8.23 
South Korea 2.22 8.63 5.85 6.41 3.63 
Spain 7.23 18.02 18.88 10.80 11.65 
Sweden 3.70 13.31 14.36 9.61 10.66 
Switzerland 2.06 5.38 5.99 3.32 3.93 
Turkey 8.08 16.31 18.64 8.24 10.56 
UK 3.51 11.60 8.95 8.09 5.44 
USA 4.24 11.03 8.93 6.79 4.69 
Average 3.97 9.89 10.61 5.92 6.64 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics 
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Table 2.3 Characteristics of atypical jobs, young people aged 15-29 
 
% of temporary 
employment that is 
involuntary 
% of temporary 
contracts shorter than 
12 months 
% of temporary 
contracts longer than 12 
months 
% of part-term employment that is 
involuntary 
 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006 1983 1995 2006 
Austria 7.35 6.72 22.05 30.04 72.40 69.96  11.73 15.08 
Belgium 74.79 79.37 68.85 79.60 31.15 20.40 50.94 50.06 33.05 
Denmark 35.51 42.81 54.53 44.44 43.87 50.65 14.68 17.04 14.23 
Finland 41.13 50.16 53.69 69.18 25.41 22.56  37.66 18.80 
France  52.11  71.08  28.92  58.86 39.52 
Germany 3.57 7.41 22.54 31.02 73.08 67.38  10.65 21.30 
Greece 67.21 63.58 68.76 62.67 31.24 37.33 35.10 53.80 52.72 
Ireland 31.11 15.80 63.84 25.33 26.14 72.85 47.97 45.26 13.91 
Italy  42.48  58.36  33.25 46.21 50.55 51.74 
Netherlands 39.30  76.17  17.43   13.09 5.36 
Portugal 39.56 78.27 82.73 52.58 17.27 47.42 43.31 33.47 50.87 
Spain 70.15 58.28 89.46  10.54  46.85 26.55 36.62 
Sweden 51.32 50.50 78.99 41.60 17.75 44.60  37.06 43.34 
UK 28.47 24.49 36.88 29.47 21.26 15.23 17.43 16.76 12.41 
Average 40.79 44.00 59.87 49.61 32.30 42.55 37.81 33.04 29.21 
Note: Involuntary temporary (part-time) employed are those claiming to hold a temporary (part-time) job, because they could not find a permanent (full-time) job. Figures 
regarding part-time employment for the UK unreliable because of missing data 
Source: EULFS, own calculations 
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3 
3. Employment Protection and Job Insecurity 
In this chapter, we survey key theoretical arguments about the relationship between employment 
protection legislation and labor market outcomes, in particular unemployment and temporary 
employment, two key dimensions of job insecurity. While earlier research has linked 
employment protection legislation to the unemployment crisis on European labor markets 
(OECD, 1994; Siebert, 1997), deriving unambiguous predictions from theory and detecting 
robust effects in empirical research has been difficult. Scientists have responded by shifting the 
focus of the critique from aggregate to distributional consequences of employment protection 
(Esping-Andersen, 2000; OECD, 2004, 2006; Breen, 2005; Bertola et al. 2007; Kahn, 2007; 
Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2007). Young people entering the labor market, women returning from 
child care breaks, individuals who lost their jobs, or migrants, may suffer if their employment 
prospects are restricted by job security provisions, while incumbent workers, adult men in 
particular, are shielded from job loss.  
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While job security provisions on regular (permanent) employment contracts have been the 
target of criticism, actual reforms instead often reduced barriers to the use of temporary contracts 
as an alternative way to grant employers more flexibility. We have seen in Chapter 2 that 
temporary employment has grown across European countries and in particular among young 
people. A number of authors have drawn a causal connection between strict dismissal regulations 
on regular contracts and the incidence of temporary employment (Polavieja, 2006; Kahn, 2007). 
Strict regulations on dismissing permanent employees may induce employers to substitute 
permanent with temporary work to obtain greater flexibility. They may also raise the bargaining 
power of incumbent employees, which facilitates their extraction of rents, including job security: 
In particular, incumbent employees have an incentive to raise the temporary workforce, to a 
certain extent, to act as a buffer to market shocks. 
By now, the idea that employment protection is both behind high unemployment and 
temporary employment among young workers represents a consensus spanning disciplines, 
despite occasional dissent (e.g. Nickell, 1997). It is based on the notion that advanced economies 
require flexibility to survive against global competition and accommodate new technologies and 
that employment protection fundamentally interferes with this process. Implicitly or explicitly, it 
advocates deregulation of employment protection, a shift of economic risks from employers 
(back) to workers. In this chapter, we want to analyze the theoretical arguments linking 
employment protection to the distribution of unemployment and temporary employment. Our 
theoretical survey suggests that strict job security provisions and regulations on using temporary 
contracts should be linked to the incidence of temporary employment among young people. 
However, contrary to the consensus, the effect of both types of regulation on youth 
unemployment is indeterminate. The commonly accepted view that the effect of employment 
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protection on aggregate unemployment is indeterminate should also hold for the youth 
unemployment rate.  
3.1. Employment protection: origins and overview 
At the level of individual actors, job security provisions impose costs on employers when 
dismissing workers, usually in the form of severance payments and/or procedural 
inconveniencies. 14
 
14 Employers may be able to "contract around" firing costs and transfer all costs through wage cuts to 
employees, if employees accept such wage cuts in return for protection against job loss (Lazear, 1990; Autor et 
al., 2006). While this may be more plausible in the U.S. case, we assume in keeping with much of the literature 
on European labor markets that firing costs represent sunk costs to employers which cannot be fully transferred 
to employees (for example, Blanchard and Landier, 2002).  
 Firing costs are normally imposed on regular (permanent) employment 
contracts, while temporary contracts upon expiration do not impose dismissal costs on 
employers. In a standard matching theoretic framework (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2007), firing 
costs lower the productivity threshold until which the productivity of an employer-employee 
match may decline for the employee to be dismissed. The cause for dismissal is usually modeled 
as a possibly temporary decline in the productivity of a match. Productivity shocks may result 
from worker behavior or external factors, such as a decline in demand on product markets, and 
cannot be fully foreseen by employers. If a productivity shock occurs, employers are forced to 
trade off the loss resulting from that shock against the firing costs resulting from dismissal. 
Productivity shocks only lead to dismissal if the loss due to the productivity shock exceeds the 
firing costs. Thereby, firing costs constrain employers in their flexibility to adapt if a match is hit 
by a productivity shock and forces them to keep unproductive workers in employment 
(Blanchard and Katz, 1997). Lower firing rates in turn imply a lower need for new hiring. By 
reducing both (un)employment inflow and outflow, firing costs smooth employment over the 
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business cycle, as employers fire fewer workers during downturns and hire fewer workers during 
upturns (Bertola, 1999). 
Employment protection legislation can be interpreted as a concession by employers to 
workers demands for job security (see Saint-Paul, 2000, for a discussion). It requires employers 
to give up flexibility in the short run and forces them to internalize some of the costs of 
dismissal, while workers obtain some protection against market fluctuations. This insulation 
against market forces at the same time strengthens incumbent workers bargaining power, which 
they may in turn use to obtain wage increases in excess of productivity increases or to shift layoff 
risks to less protected groups, like low seniority, part-time or temporary workers (Blanchard and 
Katz, 1997, Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Polavieja, 2003).  
Employers are more likely to concede employment protection to employees if incumbent 
workers enjoy high bargaining power. Many of the current job security rights have been won in 
times of high economic growth, where flexibility was less of a concern for employers (Blanchard 
2006) and tight labor markets increased worker bargaining power. Strong or militant labor 
movements have also been a key factor in the extension of employment protection legislation 
(Berger and Piore, 1980), as have been left wing parties seeking to protect the rights of 
incumbent workers (Botero et al. 2004; Rueda, 2005). Botero et al. (2004) also point to the role 
of legal tradition, contrasting civil vs. common law origins, in explaining the emergence of 
statutory employment protection legislation in some countries. Algan and Cahuc (2006) develop 
a cultural explanation, linking religion and traditional family values to job security provisions 
that protect male breadwinners, for example in Southern European countries. 
With the end the postwar boom and the profound macroeconomic and institutional changes 
that followed, past bargains over workers status rights (Streeck, 1986) or employment rents 
(Sorensen, 2002) have become renegotiated. A consensus has emerged stating that after the peak 
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of industrial capitalism and with the end of postwar super-growth, flexibility has become an 
economic imperative. Economies need to be flexible to constantly adjust to an environment that 
has become permanently more turbulent. They need to constantly adapt in order to incorporate 
technological innovations, react to sometimes unforeseen changes in the market and survive 
against global competition (Blanchard, 2006, Blanchard and Katz, 1997). On this presumption, 
different authors have argued that job security provisions violate the objective of flexibility, 
because they constrain employers "too much" in their ability to hire and fire their employees at 
will. Employers are forced to keep low productivity workers, which lowers average productivity. 
Employment protection also lowers turnover to unhealthy, sclerotic levels, delaying necessary 
adjustments to a constantly changing environment, which further constricts productivity growth. 
European employment protection regimes therefore have to become more flexible to speed up the 
reallocation of labor from declining to expanding employers and industries, which should lead to 
economic growth and stimulate demand for labor. Job security provisions are therefore to blame 
for weak job creation and high and persistent unemployment (OECD 1994; Siebert 1997, 
Blanchard and Katz, 1997; Pontusson, 2005). 
While the idea of flexibility (and the related concept of 'flexicurity') and the critique of 
employment protection have become extremely influential in public policy over the past decades, 
their scientific basis always has been and still remains shaky, both theoretically and empirically. 
First, early theoretical work has shown that the effect of employment protection and 
unemployment is indeterminate (Lazear, 1990; Bertola, 1990), and by now different authors 
agree that the accumulated empirical evidence suggests that there is no association between 
employment protection and aggregate unemployment or employment rates (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg, 2007; Howell et al., 2007; Baccaro and Rei, 2007). Also the empirical link between 
employment protection and job turnover appears fragile. Rates of job creation and job destruction 
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appear remarkably similar across countries (Bertola and Rogerson 1997; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 
2007) irrespective of the extent of employment protection. Third, the relationship between 
employment protection and productivity appears to be more complex, since employment 
protection also provides incentives for employers and individuals alike to invest into specific 
skills (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). 
Conceding that the effect of employment protection on aggregate labor market outcomes is 
more complex and that robust evidence of its effects on aggregate outcomes are hard to come by, 
the critique of employment protection has shifted its focus. A new consensus appears to have 
emerged arguing that employment protection does not affect the level, but the distribution of 
aggregate labor market outcomes (Esping-Andersen, 2000; OECD 2004; Breen, 2005; Addison 
and Texeira, 2003; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2007). By protecting tenured insiders against 
dismissal and constraining job opportunities for those entering the labor market, employment 
protection legislation may systematically work against certain demographic groups less strongly 
attached to the labor force and more likely to be unemployed, in particular women, young people, 
less educated and migrants. 
Although much of the critique of employment protection focused on dismissal regulations on 
regular contracts, reforms often left these provisions unaltered. Instead, flexibility has been 
obtained by introducing or deregulating the usage of temporary contracts (OECD, 2004), which 
have become significantly more common in a number of European countries, in particular among 
young people. In contrast to permanent employment contracts, temporary contracts by definition 
end after a pre-specified period, and impose no firing costs on employers upon expiration. A 
recent concern has been that this form of partial deregulation may have in fact made things worse 
by providing employers with incentives to destroy permanent and replace them with temporary 
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jobs, increasing turnover and potentially increasing unemployment (Blanchard and Landier, 
2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). 
Firing costs, which we also refer to as dismissal regulations or job security provisions on 
regular contracts as well as regulations on the usage of temporary contracts are two sides of 
employment protection in European countries that we need to consider separately. We will first 
discuss the impact of firing cost and then the effect of regulation on temporary contracts on both 
absolute and relative youth labor market outcomes. A key point we wish to make is that a both 
types of regulation affect absolute and relative outcomes through different channels, making their 
overall impact on either absolute or relative outcomes ambiguous. At last, we will consider 
potential interactions or complementarities between both types of regulations. 
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of employment protection and its reforms, using the 
corresponding OECD indicators of employment protection legislation (see Venn, 2009). Both 
indicators vary on a scale from 0 to 6. The OECD indicator on job security provisions aggregates 
information on firing costs accruing to employers when dismissing an employee on a regular 
employment contracts. These include procedural inconveniencies, advance notice periods, 
severance payments and other factors affecting the difficulty and potential costs of dismissal. The 
indicator for regulations on the usage of temporary contracts aggregates information on the 
economic context, in which temporary contracts are permitted, as well as the maximum 
cumulated duration and the number of successive contracts an individual can have with the same 
employer (see also Section 4.1.3, p. 81f. and Section 4.7.1, p. 106f.). Other dimensions of 
employment protection include regulations on temporary agency work and collective dismissals, 
which we do not consider in this study.  
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Figure 3.1 Employment protection regimes in Western countries, 1992-2006 
 
Source: see Data Appendix in Chapter 4, Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
ATAT
BE
BEBE
DE
DE
DE
DKDK
ES
ESES
ESES
FIFIFI
FRFRGR
GR
IE
IE
IT
IT
IT
NL
NL
NO
NO
PT
PT
SE
SE
UKUK
UK
US0
1
2
3
4
5
R
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 o
n 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 c
on
tra
ct
s
0 1 2 3 4
Dismissal regular contracts
AT
BE
DE
DK
ES
ES ESFI FI
FR GR
NL
PT
UK
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
1990 1995 2000 2005
Dismissal regular contracts
BE
DE
DE
ES ES
GR
IE
IT
IT
NL
NO
PT
SE
UK
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
1990 1995 2000 2005
Regulations temporary contracts
Changes in employment protection legislation
Employment Protection and Job Insecurity 
 
50 
 
We have restricted the data to 15 Western European countries and the U.S. for the years 1992 
to 2006, which will be the focus of the multivariate analysis. In the upper panel, we observe that 
both indicators vary quite independently from each other, which analyses aggregating both 
dimensions would miss. The right panel graphs the 28 individual reforms, 14 on each dimension, 
falling within our window of observation. Were we to extend the window of observation to the 
1980s, we would still see that the bulk of reforms occurred in the second half of the 1990s, which 
was a period of recovery, at least in terms of declining unemployment, in many European 
countries.15 We also observe a number of up-regulations on both indicators, but the average 
change across countries is downwards (only barely so, in case of job security provisions on 
regular contracts). We observe larger reform steps in case of deregulations of temporary contracts 
compared to job security provisions for regular employees. 16
At last, we briefly want to consider the correlates of employment protection reform. On the 
one hand, this analysis provides an insight into the institutional and structural factors that are 
associated with employment protection reform. On the other hand, accounting for the factors that 
predict reform is a crucial step for ruling out endogeneities when estimating the effects of 
 In absolute terms, the median 
reform of job security provisions was a meager 0.15 movement on a scale from 0 to 6. This is 
important for the empirical analysis, where we usually interpret unit effects of reforms, but we 
have to bear in mind that actual reforms were of much smaller magnitude. For regulations on 
temporary contracts, the median reform was a 0.63 unit movement on the corresponding 
indicator. 
 
15 It is maybe no coincidence that the bulk of reforms is observed post-1994, when the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued an influential call for deregulation across advanced 
economies to reign in labor market crisis (OECD, 1994). 
16 We observe a number of outlying observations, which will become crucial for the multivariate analysis 
(Spain for regulations on permanent contracts; Belgium, Germany and Italy for regulations on temporary 
contracts). 
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reforms on labor market outcomes (see Section 4.3, for more discussion). Table 3.1 reports the 
results from fixed effects analysis using two samples that differ in countries and years covered.17
Regarding regulations on temporary contracts, we observe that stricter job security provisions 
on regular contracts, generous unemployment benefits, and intermediate/sectoral level wage 
bargaining institutions are associated with lower regulations on temporary contracts. Moreover, 
product market regulations are influential factors as well. The analysis thus suggests that 
globalization indeed seems to erode, while left parties in government protect the position of 
incumbent workers. There is no partisanship effect on the regulation of temporary contracts, 
since presumably both left and right governments can agree to this type of deregulation: Right 
parties obtain more flexible legislation, while left parties consent to ostensibly sensible economic 
policy while protecting their core constituents at the same time. Maintaining high levels of 
unemployment benefits (for which particularly workers with a longer job history qualify) and 
insider protection, while deregulating temporary contracts, can be interpreted as an attempt to 
redistribute labor market risks towards specific demographic groups perceived to be politically 
less relevant. 
 
Starting with job security provisions on regular contracts (EPR), we see that left parties when in 
government appear to protect incumbent workers, as suggested by Botero et al. (2004) and Rueda 
(2005). This effect is only present in the restricted sample. We find no government partisanship 
effect on the regulation of temporary contracts. Higher levels of economic globalization also 
seem associated with less strict job security provisions. 
  
 
17  The restricted dataset corresponds to the data used to estimate the causal effects of employment 
protection reforms using differences-in-differences. 
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Table 3.1 OLS fixed effects regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the 
determinants of employment protection legislation 
 21 OECD countries, 1985-2007  16 Western countries, 1992-2006 
 EPR EPR RTC RTC  EPR EPR RTC RTC 
RTC 
 
-0.08 
  
 
 
-0.07 
   (0.05)  (0.05) 
EPR 
   
-0.86**  
   
-1.18*** 
 (0.38)  (0.38) 
Left 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.01  0.03* 0.03** -0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) 
GenRR -0.00 -0.00 -0.04* -0.04**  -0.00 -0.00 -0.04* -0.05* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.02) 
TradeU -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04  -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) 
Wage1 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07  -0.08 -0.08* -0.00 -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.12) 
Wage2 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.09  -0.01 -0.04 -0.41** -0.43** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.19) (0.18) 
ALMP 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.10  -0.09 -0.12 -0.52 -0.63 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) (0.23)  (0.11) (0.11) (0.49) (0.48) 
PMR -0.00 0.04 0.56** 0.55**  -0.01 0.02 0.56* 0.54* 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.23) (0.22)  (0.04) (0.06) (0.30) (0.30) 
Glob -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.03 0.01  -0.01* -0.01 0.05 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.04) 
TTS 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.00  0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
CohS 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01  -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) 
OutG -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00  0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
R-sq 0.29 0.34 0.28 0.33  0.25 0.31 0.35 0.40 
N 448 448 448 448  212 212 212 212 
Note: *** p<0.01, *** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts. Main independent variables: indicators for the generosity of unemployment benefits (GenRR), trade 
union density (TradeU), two indicators for the coordination of wage bargaining (Wage1, Wage2), indicator for the cabinet 
power of left parties (Left), expenditure on active labor market policies (ALMP), product market regulations (PMR), 
economic globalization (Glob.), terms-of-trade shocks (TTS), output gap (OutG), the youth cohort size (CohS), country and 
year fixed effects. 
Source: see Data Appendix in Chapter 4, Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
Employment Protection and Job Insecurity 
 
53 
 
3.2. Firing costs and unemployment 
Economic theory has had difficulty deriving unambiguous effects of firing costs on aggregate 
unemployment rates. By reducing both the ins and outs of unemployment, they prolong 
employment and unemployment spells, but their effect on aggregate unemployment rates is 
ambiguous, at least without further assumptions (see Ljungqvist, 2002, for a discussion of the 
different modeling approaches in economics and their underlying assumptions). While 
unambiguous effects on aggregate unemployment rates are difficult to derive, a number of 
authors have concluded that the distributional effects are unambiguous (Esping-Andersen, 2000; 
Addison and Texeira, 2003; OECD 1999, 2004; Breen, 2005; Kahn, 2007; Bertola et al., 2007; 
Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2007): In particular, employment protection shifts unemployment risks 
from adult to young workers, raising unemployment rates among young workers in absolute 
terms and/or relative to adults. Drawing on Gangl (2006: p. 990), we distinguish two related 
theoretical perspectives to conceptualize the link between firing costs and age-inequalities in 
unemployment risks. First, firing costs affect the structure of the labor market, by lowering 
employee turnover and vacancy rates ("structural effects"). Second, firing costs may alter the 
behavior of labor market participants, in particular employers, in more subtle ways ("behavioral 
effects"). In the following section, we will show that within neither perspective can we deduce 
unambiguous effects of firing costs on the distribution of unemployment. 
3.2.1. Structural effects 
Starting with the structural perspective, by lowering turnover, firing costs limit the number of 
vacancies and therefore diminish job opportunities for labor market entrants. In particular, firing 
costs should lower the transition rate from unemployment to the first job for labor market 
entrants, and thereby raise youth unemployment (Breen, 2005). At the same time, employed, 
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tenured workers are protected against job loss and face lower risks of dismissal. Firing costs 
should therefore shift the distribution of unemployment risks towards young people, and we 
should expect that unemployment rates decline with age, and this decline should be more 
pronounced in countries with high firing costs.  
However, this prediction is difficult to reconcile with the countervailing effects of firing costs 
on both hiring and firing rates. For the aggregate labor market, many authors now accept that the 
joint effect of firing costs, via hiring and firing rates, on the aggregate unemployment rate is 
indeterminate (see discussion in Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2007: p. 748f.). If we consistently apply 
this result to the youth labor market, firing costs make it more difficult for young people to find a 
job, but once they find a job, they are also less likely to lose it. While the first effect raises youth 
unemployment, the second effect lowers youth unemployment, which is consistent with the 
available empirical evidence that has considered both effects (see Wolbers, 2007, for a direct 
test). 18
 
18 Using longitudinal micro-data from 11 European countries, Wolbers (2007) shows that strict employment 
protection legislation lowers both the rate of the transition into the first job, but also the risk of becoming 
unemployed again, once a first job has been found. Comparing the U.S. to Portugal, Blanchard and Portugal 
(2001) show that unemployment duration is three times longer in Portugal, but worker flows into 
unemployment are also three times lower, leading to similar aggregate unemployment rates.  
 Unless we are willing to make further assumptions, the effect of firing costs on individual 
flows should be homogenous across age groups. Sometimes, unambiguous prediction have been 
obtained by disregarding the effect of firing costs on the outflow rate from first employment and 
only focusing on their effect on the transition rate into first employment (Russell and O’Connell, 
2001; Breen, 2005). We maintain here that the theoretical result, which is largely accepted for the 
adult labor market, also holds for the youth labor market: Firing costs affect labor market 
dynamics, but not unemployment levels. Higher firing costs lower turnover on the youth just as 
on the aggregate labor market, and given their joint effect on hiring and firing rates, their overall 
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impact on the youth unemployment rate is indeterminate and can only be resolved by empirical 
analysis. 
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 illustrate this argument with some descriptive evidence. Figure 3.2 
plots the relationship between job security provisions on regular contracts, which we take as a 
measure of firing costs, and labor market outcomes for young people aged 15-29 in 15 Western 
European countries. Data on employment protection is taken from the OECD, and the labor 
market outcomes are calculated from the microdata of the European Union Labor Force Survey 
(see Section 4.1.3, p. 81f., for more details). The left panel of Figure 3.2 graphs the median 
number of months that young people employed on a permanent contract have spent with their 
current employer. We clearly see a strong and positive relationship that grows weaker at very 
high levels of employment protection, which we take as an indication that high firing costs on 
permanent contracts indeed prolong employment spells in permanent contracts. This is partial 
support for the argument that turnover on the youth labor market is lower if firing costs are high. 
Contrary to our expectations, we detect a weak negative association between firing costs and 
long-term youth unemployment (measured as the percentage of unemployed who have been 
unemployed for more than 12 months). We should be cautious, however, since in the LFS data, 
short unemployment spells are under-sampled. Moreover, young people may avoid prolonged job 
search by dropping out of the active labor force or taking temporary jobs instead of permanent 
jobs. Facing prolonged unemployment spells, they have the option to avoid prolonged job search, 
especially by entering higher education to update their skills and improve their job-market 
chances. Young people may also stay enrolled in the education system or in active labor market 
policies until they find a matching job, hence diminishing the risks of (long-term) 
unemployment. Or, they may drop into inactivity. Such substitution of labor market states in 
response to expected difficulties in finding a job are alternate explanations that may account for 
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the absence of an effect of employment protection on youth unemployment, an issue we will take 
up in the empirical analysis. 
Figure 3.2 Median tenure and long-term unemployment on the youth labor market 
 
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey, own calculations. 
If firing costs lower both the transition rate into as well as out of first jobs, it becomes more 
difficult to sustain the prediction that firing costs raise the youth relative to the adult 
unemployment rate. To further illustrate this point, Figure 3.3 compares two European countries 
with arguably the most liberal and the most restrictive protection of incumbent employees, the 
United Kingdom and Portugal. The data represent aggregates of age-group specific 
unemployment rates for both countries for the period from 1986 to 2006. While the dynamics 
generating the aggregate outcomes differ fundamentally (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001), age-
specific unemployment rates are rather similar. Men at all ages, and the youngest age group in 
particular, are even better off, while women, younger women in particular, seem to suffer 
disadvantages in the highly regulated Portuguese labor market. This illustrates our argument that 
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firing costs – by lowering both outflow from unemployment to first employment and outflow 
from first employment to unemployment – are unrelated to age-based inequalities in 
unemployment risks, at least among men.  
Figure 3.3 Age-unemployment profiles, United Kingdom and Portugal, 1986-2006 
 
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey, own calculations. 
3.2.2. Behavioral effects 
A number of recent theoretical contributions have pointed at a more complex linkage between 
firing costs and economic outcomes. Firing costs may provide incentives for on-the-job training 
which benefits young workers and lowers their dismissal rates. At the same time, firing costs may 
also lead to hiring discrimination, both against experienced workers who lost their job, as well as 
against young workers, which are more risky to hire. However, again we face the difficulty of 
making a clear prediction regarding age-based inequalities, since the mechanisms work in 
opposing directions. 
5
10
15
20
20 30 40 50
Age
Men
5
10
15
20
20 30 40 50
Age
Women
UK PT
Employment Protection and Job Insecurity 
 
58 
 
From a human capital perspective, by stabilizing employment relationships, firing costs 
provide an incentive to invest into skills, both for employers and employees. By lowering 
turnover, firing costs increase the likelihood that both employers and employees reap the benefits 
of skills investments (Becker, 1964; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Employers may even invest into 
their employee's general skills, if they can be more certain of the continuation of the employment 
relationship (Fella 2005; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). 19
From a screening perspective, the uncertainty associated with hiring a young worker may 
cause risk-averse employers to prefer hiring experienced, older workers rather than younger 
inexperienced workers. It is more difficult to forecast the expected profit from hiring a young 
person, since productivity can be observed less reliably. Especially in the case of young people, 
who just left school, employers lack reliable indicators of performance like job history and 
previous employer recommendations (Rosenbaum et al., 1990; Breen, 2005). Hence, compared to 
hiring a more experienced worker, employers face greater uncertainty about the profit outlook of 
a new match when hiring a young worker. In the presence of firing costs, hiring becomes risky 
since employers incur a loss if they select somebody less productive than expected. At the 
 A higher training intensity makes 
young employees more valuable to employers, which further stabilizes the employment 
relationship. Thus, firing costs may lead to more investment into both general and specific skills, 
which should lower the risk for young people to be dismissed. Moreover, by smoothing 
employment over the business cycle, employment protection also facilitates the maintenance of 
specific skills. While in the short run, employers may reduce staffing levels in times of crisis, this 
may be inefficient in the long run because of the human capital that is lost. Firing costs therefore 
not only protect individual workers, but also the skills of the workforce. 
 
19 Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) develop a model of employer behavior that puts the information gains 
from screening at the heart of the explanation of employer provided apprenticeship training in some European 
countries. 
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margin, risk-averse employers therefore hire individuals for whom they can make a more precise 
assessment of future productivity. Hence, they are more likely to hire (employed or unemployed) 
workers with previous job experience, or fill a vacancy from among the already employed 
(Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004). As a result, firing costs lower relative hiring rates for young 
people without job experience. 
Furthermore, firing costs may raise the stigma associated with dismissals (Canziani and 
Petrongolo, 2000). Because firing costs lower the dismissal threshold, the higher the firing costs, 
the lower the productivity of those actually dismissed. Hence, if dismissal occurs in the presence 
of high firing costs, it signals particularly low productivity. Firing costs thereby amplify the 
stigma attached to dismissal, and may make dismissed older workers worse off compared to 
young people fresh out of school. Furthermore, experienced workers who are dismissed risk 
losing their skills in prolonged unemployment spells, in particular if employment protection 
restricts their re-employment opportunities, which should further reduce their advantage relative 
to inexperienced younger workers. 
Finally, another employer response that may offset the negative effects of firing costs is an 
intensification of screening (Marinescu, 2009). If hiring becomes more risky in the presence of 
firing costs, employers may commit more resources on screening prospective employees, which 
raises costs, but also improves match quality and diminishes the risks and potential costs 
associated with hiring. While it is sometimes argued that firing costs, by diminishing mobility 
opportunities, may keep young people in jobs that they do not like, intensified screening as a 
response to firing costs may diminish not only employer but also individual costs from mismatch. 
More intense pre-employment screening thus can potentially improve the allocative efficiency of 
the school to work transition, compared to a situation of trial-and-error job matching, where 
information problems can result in excess turnover (Gladden and Taber, 2009). Acemoglu and 
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Pischke (1998) even argue for the German case that employers are willing to shoulder the costs 
of general skill provision in the context of apprenticeship training because of the screening 
opportunities and information gains they acquire. 
In sum, we can think of structural as well as behavioral implications of firing costs for the 
youth labor market (see Gangl, 2006: 990). First, firing costs lower turnover and vacancy rates. 
Because of the countervailing effects of firing costs on the flows into and out of unemployment, 
firing costs have an ambiguous effect on aggregate unemployment rates. This conclusion also 
applies to the youth labor market, and therefore the relationship between firing costs and the 
distribution of unemployment risks is theoretically ambiguous without further assumptions. 
Second, firing costs may alter the behavior of labor market participants, in particular employers, 
in more complex ways. They create incentives for on-the-job training, which can benefit young 
people, an intensification of screening and improvement of initial match quality, but they may 
also lead to hiring discrimination, which may work for or against young people. Since these 
screening and training mechanisms again have opposing effects on young people’s labor market 
position, they may mutually offset each other as determinants of relative youth unemployment 
rates. Empirical testing has to show whether the underlying mechanisms add up in favor or 
against young people, or whether they cancel each other out, yielding no effects on the 
distribution of unemployment. 
3.3. Firing costs and the deregulation of temporary employment 
Traditionally, the employed workforce across advanced economies has held contracts of 
indefinite duration, which we have referred to as regular employment contracts. In some 
European countries, employment protection legislation imposes substantial firing costs on 
employers who intend to dismiss a worker on a regular contract. Temporary contracts, which last 
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for a contractually specified duration, are usually exempt from such regulations. Upon expiration, 
the employment relationship can be dissolved without further costs, or employers may convert 
the temporary into a regular (permanent) contract. To prevent the erosion of job security 
provisions for workers on regular contracts, regulations on temporary contracts limit the 
economic contexts within which temporary workers may be used, the number of temporary 
contracts an individual may hold with the same employer and the total duration of temporary 
employment with an employer. 20
3.3.1. The incidence of temporary employment 
 While much of the detrimental effects of employment 
protection had been ascribed to high firing costs for regular employees, reform attempts often left 
this type of regulation unaltered. Instead regulations on temporary contracts were eased to raise 
employer flexibility, foster job creation and reduce unemployment. 
Different institutions in European countries are commonly assumed to constrain employers in 
their ability to shift adjustment costs in product markets onto their employees. Collective 
bargaining arrangements, powerful trade unions and generous unemployment benefits are 
assumed to constrain wage flexibility, while employment protection legislation acts as constraint 
on hiring and firing. In particular, these institutional rigidities raise employment costs for less 
skilled workers compared to liberal institutional environments found in Anglo-Saxon countries, 
in particular the United States (Krugman 1994; Blau and Kahn, 2002). However, following 
DiPrete et al. (2006), temporary contracts lower employment costs, and have allowed European 
countries to create jobs in particular for less skilled workers, who would be otherwise priced out 
of the labor market. Temporary contracts reduce or eliminate potential firing costs and therefore 
 
20 For example, before the deregulation of temporary employment in Spain, this type of contract was only 
permitted in certain, inherently seasonal economic activities, such as agriculture and tourism (Bentolila and 
Dolado, 1994; Dolado et al., 2002). 
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make hiring less costly. Polavieja (2003) also points to the cost-effect of temporary contracts: 
Since temporary workers face a heightened unemployment risk compared to permanent workers, 
they accept lower wages in return for potentially being rewarded with a permanent employment 
contracts (see also Guell, 2000). 
From a human capital perspective, temporary contracts are more likely to be used in 
unskilled jobs. Whenever investments into specific skills are made, the incentive to convert a 
temporary into a permanent contract increases. From this perspective, growing skill demand, 
triggered by technological change or globalization, may have even increased the conversion rate 
from temporary to permanent employment among those employees who receive training and 
work in more skill-intensive jobs. Thus, while more skilled (educated) workers may hold 
temporary contracts, particularly in the beginning of their career, temporary employment should 
normally not be a terminal destination as employer require long term employment relationships 
with their skilled workforce. 
In contrast, temporary contracts are attractive in unskilled jobs where workers are more easily 
replaceable. Thus, it is commonly argued that temporary contracts are a source of labor market 
flexibility in the low skill labor market (DiPrete et al., 2006; Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005), 
where macroeconomic changes have led to a decline in demand for low-skilled workers. Given 
constraints on wage flexibility, this decline in demand is translated into a deterioration of job 
security, i.e. unskilled workers are hired into temporary rather than a permanent employment 
contract. Commonly skill gaps in job security are understood as inequalities between education 
or occupation groups (e.g. Maurin and Postel-Vinay, 2005), where skill biased demand shifts 
result in relative gains among highly educated (in skill-intensive jobs) and relative losses among 
less educated (unskilled jobs). However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, much of the growth in 
temporary employment has occurred on the youth labor market, and sizeable inequalities exists in 
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the distribution of temporary employment between youth and adult workers. If we think of age as 
proxy for experience or specific skills, we can interpret this age-gap as a skill-gap, and we can 
also interpret the growth in job insecurity among young people (in absolute terms and relative to 
adults) as the consequence of skill-biased (experience-biased) demand shifts (Ryan, 2001, 2009). 
While the human capital perspective stresses the role of skills in determining job security, the 
concentration of temporary contracts on the youth labor market suggest a second plausible 
interpretation. As we argued above, hiring into a highly protected permanent employment 
position is risky, which makes employers rely on temporary contracts as screening devices in 
entry-level positions. Temporary contracts allow employers to observe potential candidates for 
permanent employment on the job and arrive at a more reliable productivity estimate, which 
minimizes the risk of hiring an unqualified candidate. Because they diminish or eliminate the 
hiring risks associated with filling a highly protected permanent job, we can interpret flexible 
temporary employment in entry level jobs as a complement to protected, skilled permanent 
employment. 
Finally, from a bargaining perspective, youth and adults differ in terms of the power they 
wield within firms and in worker representation and collective bargaining procedures. Incumbent 
adult workers may therefore exploit their bargaining power to lobby for the use of temporary 
contracts as a buffer against employment fluctuations (Polavieja, 2003; Salvatori, 2009). 
Extensive job security provisions may further increase the bargaining power of incumbent 
employees, and their ability to use temporary (young) workers as a buffer. Polavieja (2003) and 
Bentolila and Dolado (1994) argue that this effect may be non-linear: As temporary workers 
become more numerous, the bargaining power of insiders starts to erode and employers may use 
less expensive temporary workers to undercut incumbent workers' bargaining position (Salvatori, 
2009). 
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In sum, we would expect that the deregulation of temporary contracts has led to a growth of 
temporary employment in Continental and Southern Europe as well as Scandinavia, where 
employers gain flexibility by using temporary contracts. Temporary employment should be 
higher particularly in the presence of strict regulations on dimsissal from regular contracts. 
However, job security provisions are only one of the potential constraints on flexibility; wage 
setting institutions and strong trade unions may be other relevant factors increasing demand for 
temporary employment. The effects of deregulating temporary contracts on the growth of 
temporary employment should be minor if regular contracts already grant sufficient flexibility. 
3.3.2. Temporary contracts and unemployment 
Employers usually face no dismissal costs when temporary job contracts expire. They may renew 
the contract again on a temporary basis21
Nevertheless, two types of scenarios have emerged that stress the potentially virtuous or 
detrimental consequences of temporary employment. On the virtuous side, flexible temporary 
contracts may be seen as complements to secure permanent employment. Without destroying job 
, hire the employee on a permanent basis, chose to close 
the position or fill the job with an outside applicant. Thus, temporary contracts imply more flows 
into and out of employment, which implies higher turnover and shorter employment and 
unemployment spells (Dolado et al. 2002). Just like a reduction in firing costs on permanent 
contracts, deregulating the usage of temporary contracts should have no effect on aggregate 
unemployment. And, extending the conclusion from the preceding discussion on firing costs, if 
deregulating temporary contracts increases both the ins and outs from unemployment, the 
distribution of unemployment should also be unaffected. 
 
21 A number of European countries have enacted regulations on the number of successive temporary 
contracts an individual may hold with the same employer. 
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security for the core workforce, temporary contracts are used to screen entrants to the workforce 
and represent stepping stones to permanent employment (McGinnity et al., 2005). Since hiring 
into permanent employment is risky if firing costs are high, temporary contracts allow employers 
to screen prospective employees before they hire them permanently, diminishing hiring risks and 
turnover costs. By increasing flexibility and low cost screening opportunities, temporary contract 
may add jobs where there was (high) unemployment before, especially among the low skilled and 
young people. Rather than engaging into prolonged, potentially discouraging job search, 
temporary work allows individuals to gather job experience, which employers may value as more 
reliable indicators of productivity than educational degrees, and which should therefore improve 
their subsequent employability. 
However, deregulating temporary contracts may induce employers not to offer more jobs, but 
to destroy existing permanent jobs and replace them with flexible temporary jobs. This incentive 
is particularly strong where permanent contracts are subject to severe dismissal regulations. As 
employers substitute permanent for temporary jobs to obtain more flexibility, turnover increases 
but no new jobs are added. Workers lose some of their job security rents, employers gain 
flexibility, but unemployment or employment remains unchanged. However, given that 
incentives to provide training for temporary employees are lower (Arulampalam et al., 2004), a 
rise in temporary employment may depress worker productivity growth (Dolado et al., 2002), 
which may be detrimental to employment in the long run.  
Moreover, if firing costs on permanent contracts are high, deregulation of temporary 
contracts may even raise unemployment, particularly among young people who are more likely 
to hold that type of contract. Firing costs raise the productivity threshold for a temporary job to 
be converted into a permanent one, since expected dismissal costs on permanent contracts need to 
be compensated for by a higher level of productivity. Moreover, if firing costs are high, 
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employers lose more bargaining power when promoting employees from temporary to permanent 
status, which should also lower the conversion rate (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and 
Postel-Vinay, 2002). Thus, deregulation of temporary contracts while keeping permanent 
contracts highly protected leads to a segmentation of the labor market, where particular 
demographic groups cycle in and out of temporary jobs and unemployment with low probabilities 
of escaping into a permanent job. Under some circumstances, the growth of temporary jobs may 
therefore not lower but rather raise unemployment. 
However, the link between segmentation, heightened turnover and unemployment is subtle. 
The calibration exercises for the theoretical models presented by Blanchard and Landier (2002) 
and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) only give limited support to the implication that partial 
deregulation would raise unemployment rates. In the Blanchard-Landier model, the effect of 
partial deregulation (a decrease in firing costs for temporary contracts) is ambiguous.22
 
22 The effect of deregulating temporary contracts while keeping firing costs in permanent contracts high is 
non-linear in the distribution of the match productivities in regular jobs, such that in some parts of the 
distribution, partial deregulation increases unemployment, while it decreases unemployment in other parts 
(F226-7). While the authors leave open, how to apply this result to concrete labor market situations, they 
suggest that the French experience shows the dark side of deregulation in particular for young people. As they 
acknowledge, however, their empirical analysis leaves many questions open. For example, France experienced 
very rapid educational expansion, which is one of the most pronounced trends that Blanchard and Landier 
observe (see their Figure 7). As more and more young people enter higher education, the age-group Blanchard 
and Landier study, 20-24 year olds, has quite likely undergone compositional changes, which may partly 
account for some of the declines in outcomes observed. At the same time, higher enrolment in education may be 
a result of poor labor market prospects, which points to the importance of assessing substitution effects. 
 Similarly, 
in the Cahuc-Postel-Vinay model, firing costs on permanent contracts lower unemployment, but 
this effect diminishes if the labor market share of temporary contracts increases. However, only 
at large values for firing costs does the spread of temporary contracts actually have a (small) 
positive effects on the unemployment rate (Cahuc and Postel-Vinay: 83). Deregulating temporary 
contracts when firing cost on permanent contracts are "average" or low, should therefore not 
change anything. Altogether, this suggests that the "perverse effects" of partial deregulation, if 
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present, are likely to manifest themselves in those few countries where firing costs on permanent 
employment contracts are very high. Moreover, partial deregulation should affect in particular 
the less educated workers (DiPrete et al., 2009; Gebel and Giesecke, 2009b), as well as young 
people to the extent that they are overrepresented in unskilled positions. 
Figure 3.4 Age-temporary-employment (% of total employed) profiles, United Kingdom and 
Portugal, 2003-2006 
 
Source: European Union Labour Force Survey, own calculations. 
Figure 3.4 (see above) illustrates the role of temporary contracts in the UK and Portugal 
using EULFS data from 2003-6, graphing the percentage of employed on temporary contracts 
across age groups. In both countries, the incidence of temporary contracts is higher among young 
people. Comparing both countries, the percentage employed on temporary contracts in Portugal 
is more than four times higher than in the UK among younger people. This is consistent with the 
expectation that if permanent contracts are highly regulated, employers are more likely to use 
temporary contracts, particularly in entry level positions. We may interpret the British and 
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Portuguese approaches as two alternative flexibility strategies, where Britain relies on 
deregulated permanent contracts, and Portugal relies on temporary contracts at entry levels and 
regular, protected contracts elsewhere. The key difference, however, is that older workers enjoy 
much higher job security in Portugal than in Great Britain. Furthermore, we see that the high 
incidence of temporary employment in Portugal is not associated with higher unemployment, or 
higher age-based inequalities in unemployment. 
In sum, we again face some difficulty in deriving clear predictions. If deregulation effectively 
reduced employment costs, employers may have responded by expanding employment 
particularly in the low skill sector. Moreover, temporary jobs may reduce hiring risks and lead to 
increased hiring across the skill distribution. These mechanisms may have contributed to net job 
creation and a decline in (youth) unemployment. At the same time, employers may have simply 
substituted permanent for temporary employment, which implies that deregulation did not reduce 
unemployment. Even worse, excessive turnover generated by "partial deregulation" may have 
even raised youth unemployment, in particular among the less skilled.  
3.4. Discussion and Summary 
Researchers have had difficulty in squaring the often cited need for flexibility with the 
constraints that employment protection imposes. The impact on public policy notwithstanding, 
this issue is not resolved. Employment protection regimes seem to affect worker flows and labor 
market dynamics, but their link to job flows is less clear. It is also less clear whether or to what 
extent reduced worker flows are necessarily inefficient and diminish productivity and economic 
growth. They do not seem to affect aggregate unemployment and employment growth, two 
crucial indicators of economic performance. Moreover, it seems that empirically (Bertola and 
Rogerson, 1997; Bauer et al., 2007, Hunt, 2000) employment protection is less of a constraint on 
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employment adjustment and job turnover than theorists assume (Blanchard and Katz, 1997), and 
its effects on productivity are also difficult to detect (Autor et al. 2007). The argument that lack 
of flexibility carries efficiency costs, which then translate into inferior employment performance, 
requires further elaboration and testing.  
A forceful defense of employment protection legislation stresses its role in productivity and 
skill formation, in particular in the formation of specific skills which sustain global 
competitiveness in manufacturing industries (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Employment protection 
may therefore be part of the comparative advantage that allows some countries to maintain a 
highly skilled manufacturing workforce, which may to some extent pre-empt the need to generate 
low quality service sector jobs. Employment protection may facilitate investment into both 
general and specific skills (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001), while high 
worker turnover is associated with underinvestment in skills, particularly among non-college-
bound youth (Stevens, 1996; Layard et al., 1994). In the absence of employment protection, 
excess turnover is associated with substantial losses of specific skills (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; 
Gangl, 2004). The potential adverse effects of deregulation may therefore be a reduction in skills 
investment, which would exacerbate already existent scarcities of skilled labor. Given that 
temporary workers receive less training, the deregulation of temporary employment may have 
exacerbated skill scarcities and diminished productivity growth (Dolado et al., 2002), which may 
have serious consequences for economic performance and labor demand. 
Up to now, few studies have attempted to identify the causal effects behind employment 
protection, training and labor productivity (but see MacLeod and Nakachavara, 2007; Bassanini 
et al., 2005). Neither do we have a clear idea just how much turnover is efficient (for an empirical 
assessment, see Gladden and Taber, 2009). Furthermore, we may miss important institutional 
factors, when focusing on the impact of firing costs only. Turnover may depend on a number of 
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institutional factors that may be complements to or interact with job security provisions on 
regular contracts. The previous discussion has pointed to the role of temporary contracts as 
potential complements to dismissal regulations on permanent jobs. Moreover, institutions such as 
the German dual system may be viewed as complements to highly protected jobs by providing a 
low-cost screening opportunity for employers (Breen, 2005). Active labor market policies may 
perform a similar function, too. Bertola and Rogerson (1997) have pointed to the consequences 
of wage compression for raising job turnover in the presence of employment protection. 
Moreover, corporatist bargaining structures may be capable of undoing detrimental effects of 
insider bargaining for aggregate employment outcomes. Comparative research can clearly be 
helpful in resolving this issue empirically, especially in terms of potential interactions and 
complementarities between institution that vary only across countries. However, given the 
limited number of comparable advanced countries where employment protection is an issue, 
degrees of freedom problems remain. 
While institutional complementarities and interactions are crucial for our understanding of 
employment protection and for devising effective and efficient reforms, the goal of this study is 
more modest. We are mainly concerned with assessing the average effects of employment 
protection regimes across countries, and assessing their impact across education groups. The only 
institutional interaction we test relates to the interaction between both dimensions of employment 
protection. Nevertheless, reducing our focus in this way hopefully sharpens the analysis and 
delivers more credible estimates of the average effects of employment protection. In the 
empirical chapters, we will test the following hypotheses: 
Deregulating temporary contracts should have raised temporary employment among young 
workers, in particular if job security provisions on regular contracts constrain employer 
flexibility. Strict job security provisions should by themselves be associated with higher 
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temporary employment. Regarding unemployment or employment, we cannot arrive at clear cut 
predictions. We argued that the overall effect of job security provisions on youth unemployment 
is indeterminate, and this conclusion also extends to the effect of deregulating the usage of 
temporary contracts. To the extent that job security provisions or insecure temporary contracts 
are perceived to reduce youth labor market chances, this may translate into higher rates of non-
participation, which may partly account for the absence of an effect on 
unemployment/employment. 
"Partial deregulation", i.e. removing restrictions on the usage of temporary contracts while 
maintaining extensive job security provisions on regular contracts, may have effectively lowered 
employment costs in the low skill sector. This may have resulted in job growth and lower youth 
unemployment; but it may have also led to substitution of permanent with temporary jobs, which 
may have even raised youth unemployment. The adverse effects of partial deregulation are most 
likely to present themselves among the least educated, who normally work in jobs requiring few 
specific skills. In contrast, the positive effects of partial deregulation may manifest themselves 
particularly among the highly skilled (the most educated), for whom temporary contracts 
represent a screening period, a stepping stone to permanent employment.  
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4 
4. Data and Methods 
In this chapter, we outline the analytical design we have chosen to evaluate the effects of 
employment protection on the youth labor market. Like many analyses in this field, we have to 
rely on observational data, and we face the known pitfalls of observational data analysis (see 
Morgan and Winship, 2007; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
However, we try to improve on past empirical work in several respects to make more confident 
statements about causal relationships. In the following, we outline in some detail how we arrive 
at the tables that contain the core results in the next chapters. The Data Appendix at the end of 
this chapter contains additional details on the data sources and control variable definitions. 
In this study, we pool data on group-specific labor market outcomes and employment 
protection legislation data for many countries and years. We rely on two principal data sources 
for labor market outcomes. First, we use data on aggregate labor market outcomes, broken down 
by gender and age group, for 21 OECD countries for the period from 1985 to 2007. Second, we 
draw on microdata from labor force surveys for 15 Western European countries and the United 
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states from 1992-2006. The latter data set covers key European countries, which have been at the 
center of debate about employment protection legislation and experienced several reforms in the 
period of observation. Using microdata allows us to calculate outcomes for specific groups at a 
more disaggregate level, using data on respondents’ age, gender and education, which yields 
further insight into distributional effects of employment protection. 
We adopt two analytical designs: As a starting point, we use variation both across countries 
and across time to estimate the association between employment protection and labor market 
outcomes. We refer to the first type of analyses as “cross-sectional analyses” to emphasize that 
the bulk of the variation stems from variation across countries. Second, we use only variation 
within countries across time, disregarding all cross-sectional variation. We implement this 
approach using both conventional fixed effects estimation as well as differences-in-differences 
(DiD) estimation. Since our goal is to draw causal inference about the effects of employment 
protection legislation, the latter design has clear conceptual advantages which we discuss below. 
A number of studies have emerged that look at specific reforms of employment protection in 
different countries (Kugler et al., 2005; Autor et al., 2006; Kugler and Pica, 2008; Bauer et al., 
2007) using a DiD approach. While these studies are informative about the impact of specific 
reforms, it is not clear whether their results can be generalized, in particular if the impact of 
changes in employment protection is conditional on the macro-economic or institutional 
environment. By studying reforms in many countries and over extended time periods jointly23
 
23 In the period from 1992 to 2006, we study the effect of 14 changes in regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts and 14 changes in job security provisions on regular contracts. 
, 
we hope to be in a better situation to assess the existence and size of reform effects and the 
conditions, under which reforms are effective (although space limitations prevent us from 
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addressing this issue extensively here)24
When performing both cross-sectional and DiD analyses, we hope to improve upon prior 
research in several ways. First, prior studies have sometimes attempted to identify the effects of 
employment protection in the cross-section, and these studies are frequently cited as support for 
the consensus about the distributional effects of employment protection. Given the political 
relevance and the theoretical indeterminacy, we should probe the robustness of cross-sectional 
results and attempt a more rigorous design for causal inference. Second, we use the most 
authoritative data on employment protection to date, drawing on the latest revision of the OECD 
indicator (Venn, 2009). Third, many past studies have estimated linear regression models with 
many parameters, and implicitly or explicitly assigned a causal interpretation to the various 
parameters estimated (Nickell et al., 2005; Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Blanchard and Wolfers, 
2000; Bertola et al., 2007). Here, we focus on estimating the effects of two variables, job security 
provisions on regular contracts and regulations on using temporary contracts. Limiting our focus 
in this way allows us to take greater care in the analysis, by discussing the underlying 
mechanisms more thoroughly, and by doing extensive specification checks to probe the 
robustness of our findings and achieve more credible, causal estimates. Finally, we follow the 
clear recommendation in the literature and adjust our standard errors for arbitrary correlation 
within observations from the same country. 
. We also gain more degrees of freedom to adjust for 
time-varying confounders that are a threat to causal inference in single-country studies. 
To make identification of causal effects more plausible, we try to use control variables more 
effectively. In both cross-sectional and DiD design, we have to assume that we have accounted 
for all observed and unobserved factors that determine both outcome variable and employment 
 
24 Future work will further assess interactions between different institutions. In this study, we only assess 
the interaction between the both dimensions of employment protection legislation. 
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protection regimes. To make this assumption more plausible, we propose several conditioning 
strategies. Based on recent critiques of regression analyses (see Morgan and Winship, 2007), we 
propose a conditioning strategy that uses a more flexible specification of the control variables, 
and thereby relax the restrictive and often implausible linearity assumptions that are frequently 
used in the analysis of aggregate data: Following the logic of matching analysis, we try to detect 
quadratic or interaction terms generated from the control variables that model treatment 
assignments (i.e. the choice of employment protection regime) and attempt to balance the data in 
this way. In addition to the main effects of the control variables, we add these "powerful" 
quadratic/interaction terms generated from the control variables that predict treatment 
assignment. Using this more flexible control variable specification, we try to more effectively 
adjust for confounders that conventional linear specification fail to account for. 
Finally, we often arrive in situations where we need to make decisions that may be very 
consequential for the results. We try to defend here the multiplicity of consequential choices we 
have to make even before we specify estimation models. In particular, when performing 
regression analyses, we have considerable freedom in deciding which model we eventually 
present for publication. Young (2009) has recently pointed to the enormous asymmetry between 
researchers and reviewers in terms of the results that different model specifications produce and, 
consequently, the need for reporting more extensive, sensible specification checks: “Results that 
depend on an exact specification, and unravel with sensible model changes, are not reliable 
findings” (Young, 2009: p. 394). For this reason, we try to pin down at least some objective rules 
that we commit ourselves to throughout the analysis to reduce opportunities for "partisan model 
selection".  
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4.1. Data 
We rely on two data sources on labor market outcomes: the OECD Labor Force Statistics 
database (online) as well as individual data from the European Union Labour Force Survey 
(EULFS). The separation between aggregate and individual data is somewhat artificial here. The 
OECD labor force statistics database allows for calculation of “aggregate” labor market 
outcomes broken down by gender and five-year age groups. The only additional grouping 
characteristic that the EULFS adds is the level of education. The latter distinction is crucial, 
however, because educational inequalities are at the heart of the academic debate. As such, the 
EULFS it is the best data source we currently have to assess changes in the demographic 
distribution of employment outcomes, taking account of educational differences. 
In general, this analysis is concerned with the experience of advanced OECD countries 
starting in the early 1970s up until the present. We focus on a period where advanced countries 
were experiencing episodes of severe economic distress, manifesting itself in rising inflation and 
unemployment, as well as economic and financial crisis in Scandinavia. The multivariate 
analysis, however, only covers the period from 1985 onwards and much of the empirical analysis 
focuses on Western European countries in the early 1990s until the mid-2000s. We therefore 
study the consequences of institutional change in a period of (adjustment to) crisis, in periods 
where aggregate productivity and labor demand has fallen beneath levels prevalent in the 1960s. 
In short, the macro-economic environment cannot be considered to be in equilibrium, but we 
have to assess the consequences of employment protection reform in a period of economic 
adjustment. This complicates the analysis by introducing a lot of cyclical and structural variation. 
Our results may therefore not generalize to economically more stable periods. 
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4.1.1. The OECD dataset on labor market outcomes 
From the OECD data, we calculate aggregate outcomes separately for each gender. We usually 
focus on outcomes for 15-29 year olds. The past convention has been to study 15-24 year olds, 
but given rising participation in tertiary education, an increasing number of young people make 
their first, main transition into the labor market after the age of 24. We therefore extend the upper 
age limit to 29 year olds, but also conduct robustness checks where we look at five-year age 
groups separately. The outcomes we study are unemployment, employment and labor force 
participation rates, as well as temporary employment. We restrict the sample to 21 OECD 
countries for the period from 1985 to 2007 and refer to this dataset as the “OECD dataset” (as 
opposed to the “EULFS dataset”, see below). While some of the data series go back into the 
1960s for some countries, we do not use observations before 1985 for the statistical analyses, 
since we only have data on employment protection legislation that differentiates between 
regulations on permanent and regulations on temporary contracts from 1985 onwards. The 21 
countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,  the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Since we lacked information 
on key control variables, we did not analyze the Eastern European countries (the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland) as well as Mexico, Turkey and South Korea. After 
dropping all observations with missing information on dependent and independent variables, we 
are left with an unbalanced panel data set for 21 OECD countries from 1985 to 2007. The time 
series are complete for most countries (see Table 4.1 in the Data appendix, Section 4.7). 
Our data and analyses therefore do not cover the initial increases in unemployment starting in 
the early 1970s, which has been the focus of many preceding analyses (Blanchard and Wolfers, 
2000; Nickell et al., 2005). Instead a substantial part of the longitudinal variation is generated by 
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the decline in unemployment rates observed in a number of countries since the early 1990s. We 
may thus learn less about why unemployment or temporary employment increased, but more 
about why it persisted or declined. Furthermore, the data set is selective in terms of the countries 
covered. Our results may therefore not be generalizable beyond Western European countries. 
At the same time, the critique of employment protections legislation has developed mainly in 
response to the experience of Western European countries. Whichever non-Western-European 
countries we add to our sample, it would be essential to check that our findings also hold up, if 
we focus on Western European countries only. From the perspective of causal inference, we need 
to exercise control over the heterogeneity in the sample. Given the unique history of Eastern 
European countries, and the developmental and cultural differences between Western European 
countries and Mexico, Turkey or South-East Asian OECD countries, we may do more harm than 
good in adding these cases to our analysis. While gaining more cases and variation, the 
experience of these countries is quite different in terms of partly unobserved economic and 
institutional characteristics, making the resulting sample unnecessarily heterogeneous in terms of 
baseline outcomes and treatment effects. 
4.1.2. The augmented EULFS dataset on labor market outcomes 
The second source of data on labor market outcomes is the European Union Labor Force Survey 
(EULFS). The EULFS provides cross-sectional information on individual labor force 
participation and various other aspects of employment. It consists of nationally representative 
labor force surveys that are standardized and harmonized by EUROSTAT. We use data from 
1992-2006 for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and UK. Employment status is 
harmonized based on ILO guidelines (1990). The EULFS allows for distinction of ISCED 0-2 
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(lower secondary education or less), ISCED3-4 (upper and post-secondary education) and 
ISCED5-6 (tertiary) education degrees (cf. UNESCO 1997, for the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997 version). Information on respondents’ age is only 
available in aggregate form for five year age groups. Among the labor market outcomes 
considered are employment, unemployment and labor force participation, as well as part-time 
employment, and temporary employment.  
While the EULFS contains relatively detailed measures of individual employment outcomes 
(but no information on earnings or income in the publicly released data), it only contains sparse 
information on other individual characteristics, especially if we want to use data for a longer time 
series, which is our goal here. At the same time, the EULFS is the only micro-data source 
available that provides harmonized data and allows for calculation of diverse labor market 
outcomes for specific demographic groups, defined by age, gender and education. Sample sizes 
are larger than for many other available surveys, which allows for the reliable calculation of labor 
market statistics for distinct demographic groups. These features make the EULFS the best data 
source we currently have to assess changes in the demographic distribution of employment 
outcomes. 
Table 4.1 (Data appendix, Section 4.7) details the countries and years we use for multivariate 
statistical analyses. While micro data is available for some countries from 1983 onwards, we only 
have information on individual education (three levels) from 1992 on. Moreover, we lack data for 
some years for a number of countries. We enriched the dataset with data from the German 
Microcensus (1996-2005), as well as the American Current Population Survey (IPUMS-CPS, 
King et al. 2010). We thus obtain a homogenous sample of 16 Western countries, with data for 
maximally 15 years of observation per country. If all countries were fully observed, this would 
provide for 240 country-year observations, but our actual sample comprises of 207 country-year 
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observations. For analyses of temporary employment, we have to drop the U.S. because of 
missing data and focus solely on Western Europe. 
For the statistical analyses, we calculate labor market outcomes for specific demographic 
groups. When analyzing the youth labor market, we define six groups by education (three levels) 
and gender. We set the age group corresponding to the level of educational attainment and typical 
graduation ages, so that the groups are similar in terms of potential labor force experience. For 
ISCED 0-2 graduates, we take 15-24 year olds, for ISCED 3-4 graduates 20-29 year olds, and for 
ISCED 5-6 25-34 year olds. This imposes some distortions, but setting age bands according to 
educational attainment is more plausible than imposing a common age range, which would be our 
only alternative given the scarce information in the data.  
The dataset for the analysis of youth labor market outcomes therefore comprises of six 
observations per year and country for which we have data. Given that we have 207 country-years 
at the aggregate level, this yields a sample of 6*207=1242 observations. We view the resulting 
dataset as pooling time-series of labor market outcomes for different groups, nested within 
countries and years. A key problem resulting from this data structure relates to calculation of 
standard errors, which we discuss in Section 4.2.2. 
We disregard the information about the number of observations used to calculate the group 
specific outcomes and assume that these aggregates are estimated without error. If we were to 
correct for uncertainty in the estimates, this would imply penalizing countries for drawing small 
samples for their labor force survey and make the results very sensitive to the inclusion of 
countries drawing large samples/populations, like Germany or the U.S. There is no substantive 
reason why the results should be more sensitive to the relationships found in certain countries. 
We also disregard information about the relative size of the different groups within a country, 
since we again do not see a substantive motivation for such a correction. Our goal is to estimate 
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whether certain broadly defined demographic groups have been more affected by employment 
protection reform, irrespective of the particular size of each group. 
4.1.3. Independent variables 
Our independent variables vary at the country and year level. The Data Appendix (Section 4.7, p. 
106) list in detail sources and definition of our control variables as well the key variables of 
interest, i.e. the measures of employment protection legislation. The control variables are 
standard institutional and macro-economic factors used in analysis of aggregate employment or 
unemployment rates (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Nickell et al. 2005; Baccaro and Rei, 2007): 
indicators for the generosity of unemployment benefits, trade union density, two indicators for 
the coordination of wage bargaining, indicators for the cabinet power of left parties, expenditure 
on active labor market policies, product market regulation, economic globalization, terms-of-
trade shocks, long-term interest rates, the inflation rate, output gap, and youth cohort size. We 
include a “hump” shaped wage bargaining indicator (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988) and left party 
power in government to capture factors that have been linked to determinants of employment 
protection or the incidence of temporary employment (Rueda, 2005; Polavieja, 2006). The 
“hump-shaped” wage bargaining indicator is derived from the indicator measuring the 
centralization of wage bargaining to capture the potentially detrimental effects of wage 
bargaining at intermediate (sectoral, industrial) levels, as opposed to company-level or economy-
wide wage bargaining. Unfortunately, we could not obtain a suitable aggregate indicator for the 
duration of unemployment benefit payment. Our indicator only focuses on the generosity of 
unemployment benefits. 
The key independent variables of interest are the OECD indicators of employment protection 
legislation. We rely on two indicators, one for regulations of dismissal of employees on regular 
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employment contracts, and one for regulations on the usage of temporary contracts. While the 
OECD has published previously this indicator for certain periods, the latest revision comprises of 
nearly complete, annual time-series data for most OECD member countries from 1985 to 2008 
(Venn, 2009). Both indicators are based on individual items measuring different aspects of 
regulation.  
The indicator for regulations governing dismissal of workers on regular (permanent) 
contracts is based on eight individual items: four items on procedural inconveniences employers 
are facing upon starting the dismissal process (notification procedures, delay involved before 
notice can start, length of notice period), the amount of severance pay, definitions of justified or 
unfair dismissal, length of trial period that is exempt from employment protection provisions, and 
two items on repercussions for employers in case of unfair dismissals (compensation, right to 
reinstatement). The indicator on regulations on the usage of temporary contracts is based on three 
items: valid reasons for using a temporary (rather than a regular) employment contract, maximum 
number of successive temporary contracts with the same employer, and the maximum cumulated 
duration of temporary contracts with the same employer. All items are coded by national experts 
into numerical scores varying between 0 and 6. In assigning the scores, experts do not just 
consider employment law, but also judicial rulings that define the de-facto situation. The 
resulting scores are weighted and aggregated. The resulting index varies from 0 (min) to 6 (max).  
Venn (2009) shows that the aggregate index (combining all dimensions of employment 
protection) is fairly insensitive to alternate weighting strategies used when aggregating the items 
(for further discussion, see Venn, 2009: 11f.). However, when translating legal text and practices 
into numerical codes, some information is certainly lost. Severance pay could be measured on a 
cardinal scale, instead of aggregating the variation into six groups. Also, severance pay is 
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probably highly contingent on individual work situations, especially tenure25
However, severance pay is not the only mechanism through which employment protection 
legislation makes firing costly. The OECD indicator is clearly more comprehensive in accounting 
for dismissal costs besides severance pay, by explicitly including administrative and judicial 
costs. The latter distinction is also theoretically important: While severance pay may be partly 
transferable to employees (“limited bonding”, Lazear, 1990), this becomes more difficult with 
judicial and administrative costs, which are more likely to be sunk costs to employers (Blanchard 
and Landier, 2002: 216). Venn (2009) shows that there is a high and statistically significant 
positive correlation between country rankings derived from the OECD indicators and alternative 
measures of employment protection, which are more limited in focus. However, the OECD 
indicator is preferable to the Heckman and Pages (2004) or Lazear (1990) indicator, since it 
represents a more comprehensive attempt to measure dismissal costs. 
, and taking one 
aggregate measurement almost invariably leads to a loss of information. Both Lazear (1990) and 
Heckman and Pages (2004) rely on severance pay measured on a cardinal scale as the aggregate 
measure of employment protection. 
To my knowledge, the OECD indices represent the most comprehensive and transparent 
attempt to measure employment protection legislation. Also, I am not aware of another indicator 
measuring regulations on the usage of temporary contracts besides the OECD indicator. The 
OECD indices have received a high level publicity, are often used in social science research and 
have been subject to at least a decade of review by the scientific community. This has resulted in 
three major revisions and updates in 1999, 2004 and 2009 (OECD, 1999, 2004; Venn, 2009). Of 
course, the construction of indicators involves decisions that are to some extent arbitrary, but the 
 
25 The OECD index does consider the relevance of tenure for notification periods and severance pay. The 
corresponding items take the average for the corresponding regulations in case of 9 months, 4 years and 20 
years of tenure. 
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current indicator is more comprehensive and captures more variation than those used by past 
research (Lazear, 1990; Heckman and Pages 2004).  
The OECD indicator most likely also improves on the index published by Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000), which is based on data from Lazear (1990) and the OECD (1999) and also uses 
the OECD coding methodology. The indicator is heavily interpolated and the authors have to 
make a number of other idiosyncratic choices to fill up gaps in the data. This indicator was later 
adopted by Bertola et al. (2007), in a rigorous, longitudinal study that supports the conventional 
view of distributional effects of employment protection legislation. However, the question 
remains whether these results hold up using better measurement of employment protection. 
4.2. Preliminaries: Dependent variables and standard errors 
4.2.1. Dependent variables 
A basic question to answer at the outset concerns the nature of our dependent variables. Since we 
are interested in the distributional effects of employment protection legislation. Using relative 
labor market outcomes, such as youth-adult outcome ratios, as outcomes (or the difference of 
outcomes) is an intuitive solution and has been adopted in a number of studies (see, for example, 
Bertola et al., 2002; Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2000). Thus, we 
can model relative youth outcomes which provides a direct answer to the question whether 
employment protection makes youth relatively worse off, as in equation (1), where 𝑈𝑗𝑡𝑌  denotes 
the logged youth unemployment rate and 𝑈𝑗𝑡𝐴  denotes the logged adult unemployment rate in 
country j at time t. 𝛿  is the coefficient of interest and 𝐷𝑗𝑡  a variable measuring employment 
protection. For ease of exposition, we omit other variables, except for a constant 𝛾0  and an 
idiosyncratic error term 𝜀𝑗𝑡. 
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(1)  𝑈𝑗𝑡𝑌 − 𝑈𝑗𝑡𝐴 = 𝛾0 + 𝛿𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
This formulation has been motivated by the argument that the sharpest prediction we can 
theoretically derive about the effect of employment protection is on the distribution of 
(un)employment or relative outcomes (Bertola et al., 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2000). In Chapter 
3, we raised concerns whether this theoretical argument is valid in case of youth unemployment. 
However, we nevertheless follow these authors here, in an attempt to relate our findings to 
published research. We can think of equation (1) simply as a model for relative youth 
unemployment. Looking more closely at the left hand-side, we can think of the adult 
unemployment rate in this model as a proxy variable for time-constant and time-varying factors 
that have an identical impact on both youth and adult unemployment (Bertola et al., 2007: 846). 
However, if employment protection affects both youth and adult unemployment, the adult 
unemployment rate may actually control away some of the effect we try to estimate. Moreover, to 
the extent that adult unemployment is correlated with both treatment and outcome variable, it 
may constitute a "bad control" (see discussion below), introducing rather than solving 
endogeneity problems. Equation (2) represents a more flexible specification of the same model: 
(2)  𝑈𝑗𝑡𝑌 = 𝛾0 + 𝛿𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑈𝑗𝑡𝐴 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
Now, we empirically estimate the relationship between the youth and the adult outcomes, 
instead of constraining this effect to be equal to unity, which we implicitly do in equation (1). In 
either case, we can interpret 𝛿 as the effect of employment protection on youth unemployment, 
net of whatever cyclical variation is captured by the adult unemployment rate. In this 
formulation, we can also think about replacing 𝑈𝑗𝑡𝐴  with other measures of cyclical variation, 
which we discuss below. While empirically more flexible, this formulation also has the inherent 
substantive advantage that it is a model of youth unemployment. Equation (1) leaves open, 
whether the effect of employment protection is generated by changing outcomes for young 
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people or adults or both. While relative formulations (as in equation 1) have been frequently used 
in the literature (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Bertola et al., 2002; Kahn, 2007), they avoid a 
fundamental question that only a direct analysis of youth or adult outcomes can answer. In all 
analyses, we take the natural log of the dependent variable. 
4.2.2. Standard errors 
Another consequential decision we need to make concerns the estimation of uncertainty of our 
coefficient estimates. The key problem that results from our data structure, which has 
observations nested within countries and years, is that observations within the same country tend 
to be very similar on both dependent and independent variables. This within-country correlation 
of observations creates problems for unbiased and consistent estimation of standard errors. If 
unaccounted for, it leads to a strong downward bias in standard errors (e.g. Bertrand et al. 2004, 
Kezdi, 2003; Angrist and Pischke, 2009).  
Different solutions have been used in applied research. The error structure is sometimes 
modeled with additional parameters that are supposed to capture clustering or serial correlation. 
For example, mixed or multilevel models are used to account for clustering of observations, or 
(unit-specific) auto-correlation parameters are estimated from the data to allow for serial 
correlations following a specific correlation structure. Alternatively, variance-covariance 
estimators that allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within panel units (countries, in 
our case) have been proposed as a solution (see Bertrand et al., 2004 and Angrist and Pischke, 
2009, for more discussion and suggestions). 
Bertrand et al. (2004) show for empirical situations similar to the one encountered here that 
parametric models for autocorrelation or serial correlation in the error term perform poorly and 
yield too small standard errors. They argue that parametric corrections should be viewed with 
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caution unless the parametric model imposed on the data is close to the truth (see also Angrist 
and Pischke: Chapter 8). Without knowing the data generating process, the chosen parametric 
correction and the extra parameters we have to estimate are likely to be biased. Bertrand et al. 
(2004) show that a popular correction, especially the first-order autocorrelation model (AR1), 
generally does not succeed in remedying the serial correlation problem. This is true for the 
common as well as the cluster- or unit-specific AR1 correction (Bertrand et al., 2004: 264). 
Given that the AR1 correction is used frequently in analysis of aggregate data (see Bertola et al., 
2007, for example), this casts doubts over the (statistically) significant effects that the authors 
obtain, in this case about the alleged positive effect of employment protection on youth 
unemployment. 
Bertrand et al. (2004; see also Kezdi, 2003; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) instead advocate the 
use of “cluster robust” standard errors as one alternative, i.e. variance-covariance estimators that 
allow for arbitrary correlation of the error term within panel units. Presence of correlation within 
panel units, which is very strong in our application, drastically increases estimated standard 
errors compared to conventional OLS standard errors. Unfortunately, the advantages of the 
cluster robust estimator also decline when the number of clusters (or countries in our case) 
diminishes, but the “cluster robust” estimator still performs better than the AR1 correction even 
with as little as ten clusters. Given that the number of clusters in our study varies between 15 and 
21, Bertrand et al.’s (2004) results suggest that this correction still works well (see their Table IV, 
lines 4 and 6). Moreover, two factors may mitigate the serial correlation problem in our 
application, in particular in the differences-in-differences analysis using EULFS data. First, we 
use relatively short time series. Second, the control variables, in particular the linear time trends, 
may capture some of the within-unit correlation across time. 
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4.3. Conditioning and causal inference 
From the perspective of causal analysis, our goal is to estimate the causal effect of an 
intervention in the labor market, in this case a reform of employment protection, on an outcome 
(see Morgan and Winship, 2007; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Wooldridge and Imbens, 2009). 
Following conventional terminology, we will also refer to this intervention as a treatment, and to 
units (countries) exposed to treatment as treated units and units not exposed to treatment as 
control units. Our goal is to arrive at a statistical model, in which the association between 
exposure to treatment and outcome identifies the causal effect of the treatment on the outcome. 
Following Morgan and Winship's exposition, Figure 4.1 schematizes this issue. 
Figure 4.1 Causal Diagram 
 
We want to estimate the effect of a treatment (a change in employment regulation) on an 
outcome (for example, youth unemployment) in the presence of confounder U. Because U causes 
both treatment (via path a) and outcome (via path b), the effect of the treatment on the outcome 
variable (path c) is not identified unless we account for the influence of the factor U, which may 
be observed or unobserved. Causal inference is possible, however, if we can appropriately 
condition for control variables so that the effect of U (or many U's) on either the outcome or the 
treatment is "controlled away". If we can "block" (Morgan and Winship, 2007) either path a or 
path b, the treatment effect (path c) is identified, i.e. we can estimate the treatment effect in a 
c Treatment Outcome 
b 
a 
U 
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simple regression framework and assign a causal interpretation to the corresponding regression 
coefficient. 
Randomly assigning treatment status is the benchmark approach to achieve identification of 
causal effects, since randomization ensures that treated and control units do not systematically 
differ in their observed and unobserved U's. However, since employment protection reforms are 
not implemented in this fashion, we need to worry about the presence of unobserved or observed 
U's. In this context, we can think of two strategies to rule out the influence of U. We either use a 
set of control variables W that model treatment assignment and block path a. This approach 
underlies statistical matching analysis. The goal is to model assignment to the treatment status 
using control variables in order to "balance" the U's between treated and control groups, leaving 
no systematic differences between both groups.26
For both cross-sectional an longitudinal analysis, we employ an extensive set of control 
variables, which were selected both because they predict the outcome variables as well as 
treatment assignment. While only few quantitative studies exist that discuss the causal factors 
behind the assignment of employment protection regimes (for example Rueda, 2005, 2007; 
Botero et al., 2004), there has been much research on the determinants of aggregate employment 
outcomes (for example, Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Baccaro and Rei, 2007; Bertola et al., 
 Alternatively, we could use a set of control 
variables X that account for the direct influence of U on the outcome variables, and hence block 
path b. In the following, we propose a conditioning strategy using the control variables that 
essentially tries to accomplish both, adjusting for factors that determine treatment assignment as 
well as adjusting for causes of the outcome. 
 
26  Instrumental variable analysis, by relying on exogenous variation in treatment assignment, can be 
similarly interpreted as an attempt to rule out an effect of U via path a. While instrumental variable 
specifications have been suggested to estimate the effect of employment protection (Allard and Lindert, 2006), 
we could not find credible instruments in this application. For an interesting approach to identify institutional 
effects in the cross-section using instrumental variables, see Acemoglu et al. (2002). 
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2007). From this research, we distilled a list of control variables (see Data Appendix at the end of 
this chapter). 
While representing a fairly comprehensive set of control variables typically used in this field 
of research, they may not fully capture the unobserved confounders. Published research has often 
entered them as linear effects into regression models and often implicitly or explicitly claimed to 
achieve identification of causal effects in this way. However, we can use the information 
contained in the control variables more effectively. Following the logic of matching analysis, we 
can try to detect the set of W control variables that model treatment assignments and attempt to 
balance the data in this way. In particular, in addition to the main effects of the control variables, 
we add "powerful" quadratic/interaction terms generated from the control variables that predict 
treatment assignment (the choice of employment protection regime). We are not interested in 
interpreting these interactions/non-linear terms, because their sole purpose is to balance the data. 
To select the quadratic/interaction terms, we use a data driven approach. Based on Imbens' 
and Rubin's (2008) suggestions for specifying a propensity score model, we propose an algorithm 
that selects all "powerful" quadratic and interaction terms generated from the control variables 
that predict treatment assignment. When estimating the effect of employment protection 
legislation, we then control for these quadratic/interaction terms to explicitly capture some 
additional factors unaccounted for by the conventional linear specifications. If these non-
linear/interaction terms matter, omitting them from the specification would constitute a 
specification error. How exactly the algorithms were designed is discussed in the following 
section. 
Implicitly, we try to accomplish the same goal as in propensity score matching analysis, but 
without estimating and adjusting for a propensity score. Instead, we use the variables that predict 
treatment status (or treatment intensity, since our treatment variable is continuous) and include 
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them directly in the outcome equation. Angrist and Pischke (2009: 86) point to the similarity 
between first estimating than adjusting for the propensity score and regression model that uses a 
flexible specification of the variables used to model at the propensity score. Instead of estimating 
a balancing score and then conditioning on it, we directly control for the observed covariates 
used to predict the treatment variables and therefore attempt to block path a in Figure 4.1 above. 
We also apply the same reasoning, when modeling the U's that affect the outcome (path b in 
Figure 4.1). Again, published research usually constrains the effects of control variables to be 
linear, which is not plausible. For example, institutions modify the impact of macroeconomic 
shocks, but institutions may also interact with each other. Indeed, a number of contributions have 
focused on precisely these questions (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Bassanini and Duval, 2006). 
Unfortunately, published research is a poor guide in detailing the functional form of control 
variables and which interactions to include, particularly when studying the youth labor market (or 
other specific demographic group). Instead one strategy has been to use nonlinear least squares, 
where sets of institutions are allowed to interact with many observed macroeconomic variables 
(e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, 2002), leading to the 
estimation of a large number of parameters while avoiding any statement about just which 
interactions/nonlinearities matter. 
Similar to modeling treatment assignment using additional non-linear terms, we therefore 
also use a data-driven approach to detect non-linear terms that predict the respective outcome 
variable (path b in Figure 4.1). If these non-linearities are present and we omit them from the 
model, we commit a specification error. The risk of this approach is that we include an irrelevant 
term in the model that is just significant by chance. Essentially, we are caught between two 
potential sources of specification error. An advantage of the data-driven approach is that it 
reduces the opportunities for "partisan model selection" (see Ho and Imai, 2007, and Young, 
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2009, for a discussion of the pitfalls of model dependence), and replaces the subjectively 
preferred specification with a specification that is determined on the basis of objective criteria. 
Because we let an algorithm decide about the functional for of the control variables, this 
precludes specification searches on the basis of the treatment effect. "Partisan model selection" is 
a particular concern in this setting, because we deal with relatively small sample sizes, in which 
robustness to specification changes is a considerable problem and gives a lot of room that 
researchers may exploit to arrive at a preferred result. By delegating the decision about how the 
functional form of the control variables to an algorithm, we effectively preclude some model 
selection on the basis of estimated treatment effects.  
Finally, while Imbens and Rubin (2008) recommend a partly data-driven approach to balance 
the vis-à-vis the treatment variable, applying the same procedure vis-à-vis the outcome variable 
may seem questionable. However, repeating the analysis where we just include the non-linear 
terms that predict the treatment variable (and omit the non-linear terms that predict the outcome 
variable) yielded virtually identical results. In the following analyses, we generally use both sets 
of non-linear terms.  
4.4. Cross-sectional analysis 
For the cross-sectional analysis, we estimate multivariate OLS regression models of the 
following form: 
(3)  𝑈𝑗𝑡𝑌 − 𝑈𝑗𝑡𝐴 = 𝛾0 + 𝛿1𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋𝑗𝑡′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 , 
where 𝑈𝑗𝑡𝑌  represents the (natural log) youth and 𝑈𝑗𝑡𝐴 is the (natural log) adult unemployment 
rate in country j and year t. 𝛾0 is a (common) intercept, 𝑋𝑗𝑡′ 𝛽 is a vector of control variables and 
𝜀𝑗𝑡 is an i.i.d. error term. By differencing the left hand side in equation (3), we implicitly control 
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for country- and year-specific shocks that affect youth and adults symmetrically (Bertola et al., 
2007: 846), i.e. that they change youth and adult unemployment by the same amount. The 
coefficients of interest are 𝛿1 and 𝛿2 , which measure the association between (relative) youth 
unemployment and the measures of employment protection, i.e. dismissal regulations on 
permanent contracts (𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑗𝑡 ) and regulations on the usage of temporary contracts (𝑟𝑡𝑐𝑗𝑡 ). For 
example, a one unit change in the rtc index would be associated by a change in the difference 
between youth and adult unemployment rates by 𝛿2 percent. Given the sensitivity of results to 
specification changes, we report the results of several control variable specifications. 
4.4.1. Conditioning strategies for cross-sectional analysis 
We propose three different specifications to control for the influence of potential confounders in 
the cross-sectional analysis. Apart from the measures of employment protection legislation, the 
"basic specification" contains the k control variables (listed above) as linear terms as well as year 
fixed effects. The "basic specification" is a point of reference, since it represents the workhorse 
of much published research in this area. The "full specification" adds to the "basic specification" 
all interaction/quadratic terms that predict significantly the outcome variable or either measure of 
regulation. The "restricted specification" only adds the most powerful interaction/quadratic terms 
from the "full specification". In addition, we report a bivariate specification that contains only the 
measures of regulation as regressors. While much published research relies on variants of the 
"basic specification", i.e. specifications that are linear in the control variables, we prefer the 
"restricted specification" that permits nonlinearities in the control variables.  
The intuition behind the algorithm used to select the nonlinear/interaction terms is derived 
from Imbens and Rubin (2008: Chapter 11) who propose a data-driven algorithm to estimate the 
propensity score for statistical matching analysis. Their goal is to achieve in-sample balance of 
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the treated and control groups with respect to the pre-treatment control variables using a flexible 
propensity score specification that was obtained using an algorithm similar to the one described 
below. They caution against relying on automatic procedures only, and encourage the use of 
substantive information to arrive at propensity score specifications. We follow their advice in 
selecting control variables on this basis, considering explicitly those that matter for treatment 
assignment. 
To "balance" the data on the observed control variables, we use the following algorithm for 
each of the regulation measures and the outcome variable (adapted from Imbens and Rubin 2008, 
Chapter 11): Using k control variables, we generated all possible k*k interaction/quadratic terms. 
The algorithm begins by running k*k OLS regressions of the outcome variable on the k control 
variables and year fixed effects (starting specification), adding just one of the k*k 
quadratic/interaction terms at a time and recording their respective t-statistic. The term with the 
highest absolute t-value is then added to the starting specification of k control variables and year 
fixed effects. The algorithm continues by running k*k-1 regressions, testing, one at a time, the 
k*k-1 remaining quadratic or interaction terms. The one with the largest t-value is again added to 
the base specification. The algorithm continues until, after running k*k-m regressions, the term 
with the highest absolute t-value fails to exceed an a priori set critical value, which we set 
corresponding to the 5% significance level (two-tailed test). We thus obtain a set of m interaction 
and quadratic terms. We run this algorithm for each of the measures of regulation, as well as for 
the respective outcome variable, obtaining three (potentially overlapping) sets of interaction and 
quadratic terms. After removing duplicates, we enter all three sets as control variables into the 
"full specification", containing p interaction/quadratic terms. The full specification then includes 
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the (main) linear effects of the k control variable, the p interaction/quadratic terms, year fixed 
effects, and the two measures of regulation.27
Based on the "full specification", we also propose a "restricted specification" that only uses a 
subset of the interaction/quadratic terms used in the "full specification". We again use an 
algorithm that selects the strongest interaction/quadratic terms from the set of 
interaction/quadratic terms arrived at in the "full specification". The algorithm begins by running 
p OLS regressions of the outcome variable on a starting specification which contains both 
measures of employment protection legislation, the k control variables, year fixed effects, adding 
one of the p interaction/quadratic terms that were determined according to the procedure used to 
arrive at the "full specification". We record the t-statistic of each interaction/quadratic term; the 
interaction or quadratic term with the strongest t-statistic enters the starting specification, and we 
repeat the exercise with the remaining p-1 interaction/quadratic terms. We keep on adding 
interaction/quadratic terms until the "strongest" remaining interaction/quadratic term fails to 
exceed an a priori specified value, set at the 5% significance level (two-tailed test). 
 
The goal of the extended specifications here is to maximally use the information contained in 
the control variables to balance the data vis-à-vis both treatment and outcome, and hence to block 
both paths a and b in Figure 4.1. However, we may not succeed, if we lack an important control 
variables, if the control variables are poorly measured or if they induce rather than solve 
endogeneity issues (for a discussion of "bad" control variables, see Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 
64; Morgan and Winship, 2007: Chapter 3).28
 
27 When running the algorithm for the outcome variable, we include the measures of regulation among the 
controls, but we do not include or test their interactions and quadratic terms, since such "effect heterogeneities" 
should be part of the substantive analysis. 
 
28 We excluded productivity growth as a control from the outset, since here the endogeneity/simultaneity is 
relatively obvious: Young workers are inherently less productive than older workers, and should employment 
 
Data and Methods 
 
96 
 
Moreover, some may be suspicious that at the aggregate level many of the control variables 
become associated in a process of mutual causation. Moreover, the measures may not capture 
well the actual processes at the level of individual actors. Taking this stance to its extreme, we 
may be generally suspicious about the conditioning strategy based on observed control variables 
in an aggregate data analysis. In the absence of a source of exogenous variation in employment 
protection (which we do not have), this stance would make causal inference from aggregate data 
a lost cause from the outset, a position we would consider too extreme.  
A central pitfall of cross-sectional analysis is that we may be left with remaining unobserved 
U's that our measured covariates fail to account for. Given that we dispose of longitudinal data, 
we can account for all unobserved time-constant factors that are unique to a particular unit or 
groups, which is accomplished in fixed effects analysis (Wooldridge, 2002). Identification then 
hinges on the assumption that there exist no unobserved, time-varying confounders. In the 
context of differences-in-differences (DiD), this assumption is often stated as "parallel 
counterfactual trends": We have to assume that the trends in the dependent variable for both 
treated and control group would have been the same in the absence of treatment. We discuss this 
method, as well as available strategies for conditioning on control variables in the following 
sections. 
4.4.2. Cross-sectional versus longitudinal analysis 
Even though cross-sectional analyses are principally problematic from the perspective of causal 
inference, they have several merits. 29
                                                          
protection lowers youth relative to adult employment it would naturally raise aggregate productivity (Gordon 
and Dew-Becker, 2008). 
 First, cross-sectional analyses allow us to test simple 
29 We use the term “cross-sectional analysis” for analyses that do not control for country or group fixed 
effects, i.e. analysis that rely on variation both across countries and across time to estimate the association 
between employment protection and labor market outcomes. “Longitudinal analyses” control for country or 
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descriptive hypotheses that are frequently found in the literature, such as that strict dismissal 
regulations on regular employment contracts are associated with higher youth unemployment. 
We can test whether such associations are at all present in the data and robust to the inclusion of 
different sets of control variables. Second, cross-sectional analysis uses more information, both 
longitudinal and cross-sectional, in estimating the associations. When focusing only on 
longitudinal data, we sacrifice a lot of variation. Using the OECD dataset, country fixed effects 
soak up 95% percent of the variation in the regulation of permanent contracts and 80% of the 
variation in the regulation of temporary contracts. This information loss is drastic, and one may 
question the merits of fixed effects analysis in this case (see discussion in Angrist and Pischke, 
2009). However, at the very least, adjusting for fixed effects represents an important specification 
check if we have longitudinal data available. If we obtain a clear and highly significant 
association in the cross-section, and controlling for fixed effects yields a similarly signed, but 
weaker effect that falls just beneath conventional thresholds for statistical significance, this may 
be judged as inconclusive. We may just lack enough longitudinal variation, or whatever 
longitudinal variation we have may be too noisy, to identify the effect of interest. However, if the 
associations remain statistically significant but switch sign, for example, when they turn from 
positive significant to negative significant, we interpret this as evidence that the cross-sectional 
results do not hold. 
Finally, a number of influential studies on this issue (Esping-Andersen, 2000; OECD, 2004; 
Breen, 2005; Polavieja, 2006; Kahn, 2007) fully rely on inferences from cross-sectional data. We 
therefore begin our analyses by using a more recent and extensive database to repeat some of the 
published cross-sectional analyses. This allows us to assess whether past results are robust to 
                                                          
group fixed effects and therefore only consider longitudinal variation in the data, disregarding all cross-
sectional variation across units. 
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changes in data sources, control variables, unit-specific fixed effects (i.e. country fixed effects). 
Ultimately, it gives us an idea, whether we should trust cross-sectional analyses of the effects of 
employment protection legislation on the distribution of labor market outcomes. 
4.5. Differences-in-Differences (DiD) 
While cross-sectional data is sometimes the only data available, this situation is no longer true for 
the specific questions we study here. We therefore consider it important to adopt a rigorous 
longitudinal approach, using differences-in-differences, to obtain more credible estimates of the 
causal effects of employment protection legislation. An important gain from using DiD is 
conceptual in nature, because we phrase our analytical question in terms of a timed intervention, 
a treatment, and observations exposed to treatment and control observations. By tying in with 
recent literature on counterfactual causal inference, this approach improves upon standard fixed 
effects regression analysis (e.g. Bertola et al., 2007), where removing fixed effects and adding 
linear control variables is considered sufficient to achieve identification.  
A reform in employment protection legislation usually occurs as a discrete, economy-wide 
change in the legal environment. A growing number of studies have used such discrete policy 
changes to assess the consequences of reform for the labor market (Autor et al., 2006; Kugler et 
al., 2005). In this setting it is natural to assess the effect of reform by comparing outcomes 
between "treated" and "control" observations before and after the reform. More precisely, one 
compares the before-after difference in the treatment group to the before-after difference in the 
control group. By subtracting these two differences, we obtain the differences-in-differences 
(DiD) estimator of the effect of reform. 
Because it compares changes over time within the same units, DiD is as immune to bias as 
fixed effects estimators (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). By including unit-specific fixed effects, we 
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can effectively rule out all time-invariant unobserved factors that may otherwise lead to omitted 
variable bias. In addition, we also eliminate biases that are due to trends in the outcome variable 
that are common to both groups.30
In this application, we use data from the European Union Labor Force Survey, where we 
group individuals by country, year, gender and education group, restricting the sample to young 
people, and calculate the average of the outcome variable for each group. We thereby obtain six 
observations per country and year (two genders times three education groups). With data on 
groups g nested in j countries and t time periods, we can obtain the differences-in-differences 
estimate of the effect of a binary policy change on the (log) outcome variable 𝑌𝑔𝑗𝑡  with the 
following linear model, which can be estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
 One crucial assumption we still need to make is that the trends 
in the outcome variable would have been the same for both groups in the absence of treatment. 
This assumption is implausible if treatment and control group differ with respect to unobserved 
variables that generate trends in the dependent variable (Ashenfelter and Card, 1985). We try to 
address this issue by using different control variable specifications (see below). 
(4) 𝑌𝑔𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇𝑔 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑔𝑗𝑡 , 
where 𝜇g  represent group fixed effects (country fixed effects would suffice), λt are time fixed 
effects (year dummy variables) and 𝐷𝑗𝑡 represents a dummy variable equal to 1 in countries and 
years affected by a policy change and zero otherwise. 𝛿 is the DiD estimate of the reform.  
Following Autor et al.'s (2006) study, we enrich this specification in several ways. The key 
challenge we face given our data structure is that units experience treatment in different years and 
some units experience treatment repeatedly. We therefore do not use all observations before and 
all observations after a change in regulation to estimate the effect of a reform. Instead, we focus 
 
30 The same can be achieved by including common time effects in a standard fixed effects regression 
model. 
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on the change around the year in which the reform is implemented, i.e. two years before (t-2) to 
three years after (t+3) the change in legislation occurred.31
(5)   𝑌𝑔𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇𝑔 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑗𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑔𝑗𝑡 , 
 We will test different specifications 
for this window of observation, which allows us to assess the dynamics of the impact of the 
reform. At the same time, this specification implies that a country experiencing reform may 
contribute both treatment and control observations. To allow for a post-treatment period before a 
treated country can contribute "regular" control observations, we add a post-treatment dummy 
variable. Third, we exploit our knowledge about the intensity of reform, as measured by the 
respective change in the OECD index, and pool positive and negative changes in regulation into 
one indicator of treatment intensity. We thus arrive at the following specification. 
where 𝜇𝑔  and 𝜆t  are group and year specific fixed effects. 𝛾1𝑗𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑡  models baseline 
outcomes for treated countries, where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑡  switches from 0 to 1 for each reform for the 
duration of the specified window of observation (the default being t-2 to t+3, reforms are 
implemented at t=0). We estimate this baseline outcome separately for each reform. 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡 is the 
change in the index of employment protection legislation for a specific reform. 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡  is the 
difference in the corresponding OECD index 𝐼𝑗𝑡 calculated as 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡 = 𝐼𝑗,𝑡=0 − 𝐼𝑗,𝑡=−1. 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡 takes 
on this value for the period from t=0 to t=3 following reform, and is equal to zero otherwise. The 
coefficient of interest δ estimates the deviation of the outcome variable from the country and 
reform specific baseline outcome over the period t=0 to t=3, as a function of the direction 
(negative/de-regulation or positive/up-regulation) and magnitude of change. We will test for 
heterogeneity of this coefficient across gender, education groups and institutional conditions. 
 
31 This should also diminish the problem of serial correlation (see below). 
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𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for countries that experienced reform for the 
period from t=4 to t=5 in the default specification. 
In contrast to our design, most DiD studies identify the DiD effect with a dummy variable as 
in equation (4). Similar to equation (4), we assume that the DiD effect is linear additive, but we 
also model observed heterogeneity in the treatment effect (Card, 1992). We model this 
heterogeneity by using the information contained in the OECD indicators of employment 
protection. In particular, we assume that all reforms can be mapped into movements in either 
direction of a uni-dimensional scale ranging from 0 (highly liberal) to 6 (highly regulated). 
4.5.1. Conditioning strategies for differences-in-differences analysis 
Whether we can assign a causal interpretation to δ depends, among other things, on the 
assumption that trends in the outcome variable for treated and non-treated units would have been 
the same in the absence of treatment. We use two conditioning strategies to make this assumption 
more credible. First, we use the "restricted specification" as discussed, which adds a linear set of 
control variables, including the non-treatment measure of employment protection32
As an alternative, instead of using covariates, we simply add country-specific linear trends. 
This specification is an intuitive way of accounting for unit-specific, non-parallel trends, but risks 
controlling away part of the treatment effect if the treatment generates the underlying trend. 
Furthermore, we add the respective adult outcome variable to the country-specific linear trend 
, as well as a 
set of interactions generated from the control variables that are significant predictors of outcome 
and treatment variable. This specification attempts to achieve balance across units affected and 
not affected by employment protection reform in terms of observed time-varying covariates.  
 
32 For example, if we assess the effect of a reform in the regulations on temporary contracts, we use the 
indicator of employment protection on regular contracts as a control variable. 
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specification (Angrist and Pischke 2009: 233). The adult outcomes variable may succeed in 
capturing short run cyclical variation, while the linear trend captures longer running trends in the 
dependent variable, which may have already been present in the data, before the treatment 
occurred.  
To illustrate the relative success or failure of different conditioning strategies, Figure 4.2 
graphs the smoothed residual from a regression of log youth (ages 15-29) unemployment using 
different control variable specifications (21 OECD countries, n=436). We graph the results for 
Italy and Sweden, which both experienced deregulations of the usage of temporary contracts. 
Specification (1) includes country and year fixed effects only. In (2), we add country-specific 
macroeconomic shocks.33
After eliminating country and year fixed effects (specification 1), the residuals still show both 
cyclical variation and a trend. In Italy we observe a recovery from very high values in the early 
1980s, while in Sweden we observe the consequences of the economic and financial crisis in the 
early 1990s. In either case, the 42 parameters (year and country fixed effects) included in model 
1 unfortunately leave considerable cyclical variation and country-specific trends unaccounted for. 
If we stopped here, fixed effects regression analysis would suggest that deregulation has made 
young people better off in Italy and worse off in Sweden, while clearly the results seem to be 
driven by strong underlying trends in the dependent variable. 
 In (3), we add to (1) country-specific linear trends. (4) is the "restricted 
specification" adding to (1) control variables and some interaction/quadratic terms. In (5), we add 
to (1) the (logged) unemployment rate for adult men, aged 45-54. In (6), we add to (1) country-
specific linear trends and the (logged) unemployment rate for adult men, aged 45-54. 
 
33 We fit for each country two interaction terms between the country fixed effects and two measures of 
macroeconomic changes, the output gap and the inflation rate. 
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Figure 4.2 The effect of using different conditioning strategies, youth unemployment 
 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics (own calculations) 
Adding country-specific shocks in specification (2), we fit a model with altogether 92 
parameters, but do not seem to accomplish very much, as considerable cyclical variation and 
trends remain. Specification (3) succeeds in removing the trend from the data, which is 
encouraging. Specification (5), which only adds the logged adult unemployment rate to 
specification (1), seems to capture some cyclical variation, but a trend remains in the Italian data. 
Using both country-specific trends and the logged adult unemployment rate, we succeed in both 
removing trend and some cyclical variation, but some cyclical variation also remains. Compared 
to this, specification (4), which is the "restricted specification", seems to yield comparable results 
using a similar number of extra parameters.  
Generally, we would expect that the linear trend specification is more credible for shorter 
time series, as in the EULFS data set, which we rely on in the differences-in-differences analysis, 
comprising maximally 15 years per country. Longer time series may require non-linear trend 
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specifications, which demand a lot more parameters to be fit to the data. Nonetheless, we should 
be wary about the remaining cyclical variation in the data. In either specification, if we were to 
only consider the two years before and two years after the Swedish reform, we may erroneously 
attribute an effect to this reform, which is really due to unaccounted macroeconomic factors. An 
important specification check will therefore be not to consider the immediate before and after 
observations, but extend the window of observation to include more pre- and post-reform 
observations.  
4.5.2. Which results do we present? 
At last, we want to briefly discuss how we decide which results to present in the DiD analysis. 
Quantitative research of this kind suffers from a huge information asymmetry between the 
amount of regressions (or other statistical) models that researchers estimate, the results of these 
models and what is eventually selected for publication (Young, 2009). Researchers can never 
show all specifications, but should conduct sensible specification checks and try to specify clear 
rules according to which they have selected the final models for publication. 
Following the specification labels in the previous section, we routinely estimate the basic 
DiD specification, as well as three specifications using control variables, one containing country-
specific linear trends, one containing country-specific linear trends and the adult outcome, and 
one specification containing linear control variables as well as non-linear terms generated from 
the control variables ("restricted specification"). Because of space limitations, we will only report 
the "restricted specification" based on control variables and the specification including country-
specific linear trends and the adult outcome variable. If we obtain conflicting results in the more 
basic specifications, this is mentioned in the text. In any case, if we find an effect in the basic 
specification, the crucial question is whether this effect survives adjustment for confounding 
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factors using either conditioning strategy. For example, if adjusting for country-specific linear 
trends would destroy the effect found to be present in the basic DiD specification, we would have 
to conclude that we cannot rule out that the results are generated by non-parallel trends in the 
treated and control countries (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). While both the "restricted" and the 
trend specifications are plausible, each has its drawbacks and we would hope for consistent 
results across the specifications.34
The DiD setup used here requires us to chose a window of observation around the reform, 
within which we estimate the effect of the reform. The default window chosen starts two years 
before and ends three years after reform (as in Autor et al., 2006), but we also routinely re-
estimate all analysis with a larger window, starting three years before and ending five years after 
reform. This allows us to assess the sensitivity of the results, but also indicates whether effects 
grow stronger or weaker if we consider a longer time period. We do not report the results, but 
refer to them in the text in case they differ from the findings of the default observation window 
specification. 
 
Another specification check we routinely conduct is to drop one country at a time, and re-run 
the analysis. We perform this check on both the trend and the control-variable based specification 
(“restricted specification”). As we have shown in Section 3.1 (p. 44f.), some countries 
implemented reforms that according to the corresponding OECD indicator were much more 
extensive than reforms in other countries. Also, some countries have witnessed more than one 
reform. In particular, Spain (on the indicator for job security provisions on regular contracts) as 
well as Belgium and Italy (on the indicator for regulations on temporary contracts) may be 
 
34 We refrain from using lagged dependent variable specifications (see discussion in Angrist and Pischke, 
2009). Using unit fixed effects is a substantial advantage in this design, and adding lagged dependent variables, 
while principally possible, requires instrumental variables strategies and further assumptions about the error 
term for identification. In particular, the presence of serial correlation in the error, which clearly is an issue in 
the type of data we use here, then threatens identification. 
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outliers. In any case, we would not want our results to depend solely on the presence of one 
country. If dropping any particular country destroys an effect, we should conclude that there is no 
general reform effect. There may be an effect in the outlying country, but not a general effect, the 
detection of which is the goal of our analysis. 
4.6. Data appendix 
4.6.1. Dependent variables 
We relied on two data source for labor market outcomes. The OECD data comes from the online 
OECD Labor Force Statistics database, which provided data on unemployment, employment, 
labor force participation, and populations size broken down by gender and age groups, as well as 
data on temporary employment for youth (15-24 year olds) and adults (25-54), also broken down 
by gender. Data on tertiary enrolment is taken from the World Bank (World Development 
Indicator Database, 2010). Tertiary enrolment rates are gross enrolment rates, i.e. the number of 
students enrolled in tertiary institutions divided by the population at the typical age for tertiary 
students, which is defined according to the country-specific situation. The key database for the 
differences-in-differences analysis is the European Union Labor Force Survey (EULFS, Eurostat 
2005), which we augment with IPUMS-CPS data for the U.S. (1992-2006) and data from the 
German Microcensus (1996-2005).  
Table 4.1 displays the countries and years covered for each of the data sources considering 
unemployment as an outcomes. For temporary employment, the OECD data has more gaps. For 
the augmented EULFS dataset, we also recorded the total number of observations that went into 
the calculation of the youth labor market outcomes for multivariate analysis. The information on 
the year coverage refers to the situation after dropping individual years because of missing 
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information on any of the control variables. In particular, we lose observations from Greece 
before 1997, because of a lack of data on interest rates. In the differences-in-differences analysis, 
some specifications do not use control variables, for which we gain back these observations.  
Table 4.1 Data coverage OECD and EULFS 
 
OECD, 
available years 
EULFS, 
available years 
EULFS, 
sample size 
Australia 1985-2007 
  Austria 1994-2007 1995-2006 139,472 
Belgium 1985-2007 1992-2006 150,525 
Canada 1985-2007 
  Denmark 1985-2007 1992-2005 46,314 
Finland 1985-2007 1995-2006 89,998 
France 1985-2007 1993-2006 370,116 
Germany 1991-2007 1996-2005 260,198 
Greece 1997-2007 1997-2006 184,231 
Ireland 1986, 1991, 1994-2007 1994-2006, no data 1998 320,800 
Italy 1985-2007 1992-2006 551,300 
Japan 1985-2007 
  Netherlands 1987-2007 1996-2006 169,568 
New Zealand 1990-2007 
  Norway 1985-2007 1996-2006 56,083 
Portugal 1985-2007 1992-2006 139,706 
Spain 1985-2007 1992-2006 464,571 
Sweden 1985-2007 1995-2006 136,834 
Switzerland 1991-2007 
  United Kingdom 1985-2007 1992-2006, no data 1998 276,028 
United States 1985-2007 1992-2006 480,520 
Notes: OECD and EULFS data coverage for unemployment rates, no data on temporary employment for 
U.S. in augmented EULFS dataset. 
4.6.2. Independent variables 
To obtain a dataset that is as complete, comprehensive and up-to-date as possible, we had to 
impute and extrapolate some information, in particular for observations in the 1980s and in the 
year 2007. This particularly affects the analyses relying on the OECD data, but the analyses 
based on the EULFS data are, with two exceptions, not affected at all. In the following, we list 
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information on definition and calculation of all independent variables used in the analyses, as 
well as their sources. 
Employment protection regular contracts (EPR) 
OECD index of regulations governing dismissal off individual workers with regular contracts. 
The index used here is based on eight individual items: procedural inconveniences employers are 
facing upon starting the dismissal process (notification procedures, delay involved before notice 
can start, length of notice period), severance pay, definitions of justified or unfair dismissal, 
length of trial period that is exempt from employment protection provisions, and repercussions 
for employers in case of unfair dismissals (compensation, right to reinstatement). All items are 
coded into numerical scores varying between 0 and 6, weighted and aggregated. The resulting 
index varies from 0 (min) to 6 (max). 
Source: OECD Indicators of Employment Protection, downloaded October 3, 2009 from 
www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
RTC - Regulations on the usage of temporary (fixed-term) contracts 
Subindex of the OECD index on regulation. The index is based on three items: valid reasons for 
using a temporary (rather than a regular) employment contract, maximum number of successive 
temporary contracts with the same employer, and the maximum cumulated duration of temporary 
contracts with the same employer. The items are coded into numerical scores varying between 0 
and 6, weighted and aggregated. The resulting index varies from 0 (min) to 6 (max). 
Source: OECD Indicators of Employment Protection, downloaded October 3, 2009 from 
www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
Generosity of unemployment benefits (GenRR), 
Definition: OECD summary measure of generosity of unemployment benefit entitlements (gross 
replacement rates), average of the gross unemployment benefit replacement rates for two 
earnings levels, three family situations and three durations of unemployment. 
Note: Data available only for uneven years. Data for missing years imputed as the average of the 
two adjacent years. 
Source: OECD Tax-Benefit models, downloaded October 20, 2009 from 
http://www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives 
Expenditure on active labor market policies (ALMP) 
Definition: Ratio of total public expenditures on active labor market policies divided by the gross 
domestic product. Data expressed in percentages. 
Missing: Greece 2006/7, imputed the value from 2005; Denmark 1985, imputed the value from 
1986; Italy 1985-9, imputed the average value for the period 1990-4; Japan 1985-9, imputed the 
average value for the period 1990-4. 
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Source: OECD.Stat Online Database ("Social and Welfare Statistics - Social Protection - Social 
Expenditure - Aggregated data"), downloaded October 28, 2009 from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Trade union density (TUD) 
Definition: Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, divided by the total 
number of wage and salary earners. Data expressed in percentages. 
Note: Value for Portugal 2006 taken from Visser (2009).  
Missing: 2007 data for Austria, Spain, Portugal, New Zealand and Switzerland. 2006 for Greece, 
2005 for Portugal. Missing values imputed by linear extrapolation. 
Source: OECD.Stat Online Database ("Labour - Trade Union"), downloaded July 1, 2009 from 
http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Coordination of wage bargaining (Wage1) 
Index, varying from 1 (no coordination) to 5 (economy-wide bargaining). 5 = economy-wide 
bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central organizations of unions and 
employers affecting the entire economy or entire private sector, or on b) government imposition 
of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling; 4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) 
central organizations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key 
unions and employers associations set pattern for the entire economy; 3 = industry bargaining 
with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organizations and limited 
freedoms for company bargaining; 2 = mixed industry- and firm level bargaining, with weak 
enforceability of industry agreements; 1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at 
company level. 
Name of variable in source data: WCoord 
Source: Visser (2009), ICTWSS Database, Version 2 
"Hump-shaped" wage bargaining indicator (Wage 2) 
Recoded from Wage1 (Coordination of wage bargaining) so that the resulting indicator increases 
as the level of bargaining moves towards the industry level. The resulting index varies from 0 
(economy-wide / company-level bargaining) to 2 (industry-level bargaining). 0 = 1 or 5 on 
Wage1 (economy-wide or company-level bargaining), 1 = 2 or 4 on Wage1, 2 = 3 on Wage1 
(industry-level bargaining). 
Cabinet power of left parties (Left) 
Definition: Schmidt-Index of cabinet composition. The index varies from 1 to 5, where 1 = 
hegemony of right-wing (and centre) parties, 2 = dominance of right-wing (and centre) parties, 3 
= balance of power between left and right, 4 = dominance of social-democratic and other left 
parties, 5 = hegemony of social-democratic and other left parties. 
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Missing: Italy 1995 (caretaker government), imputed a value of 1, since no left/social democratic 
parties were represented.  
Name of variable in source data: govparty 
Source: Armingeon et al. (2006), Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2007 
Product market regulations (PMR) 
Index for regulatory conditions in seven non-manufacturing sectors: airlines, telecommunication, 
electricity, gas, post, rail, and road freight. The indicator used here is also referred to as ETCR 
(energy, transport and communication) indicator. The ETCR indicator has a pyramidal structure, 
where individual items measuring aspects of anti-competitive regulations (for example, barriers 
to entry, public ownership and price controls) in different sectors are normalized over a scale 
ranging from 0 to 6, weighted and aggregated. The resulting indicator varies between 0 
(minimum) and 6 (maximum).  
Note: Some of the sub-items contained missing data for specific countries, which were imputed 
using linear interpolation. 
Source: Conway and Nicoletti (2006) 
Dual System 
Definition: % of students enrolled in upper and post-secondary (ISCED 3-4) programs that 
combine school-based vocational education with workplace-based training. 
Note: Only available from 1996 onwards. Codes n (negligible amount) and a (not applicable) 
were assigned a value of 0. Data for Norway 1996 taken from OECD (1998). 
Missing: no data for 1997, imputed the average of adjacent years for each country. Missing data 
for Ireland 1998-2004, the Netherlands 1999 and 2001, Norway 1998-2004. Imputed by linear 
interpolation.  
Source: OECD Education at Glance, various issues. 
Economic globalization (Glob) 
Summary indicator based on the following components: trade (percent of GDP), foreign direct 
investment (flows, percent of GDP), foreign direct investment (stocks, percent of GDP), portfolio 
investment (percent of GDP), income payments to foreign nationals (percent of GDP), hidden 
import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade (percent of current revenue), capital 
account restrictions 
Source: Dreher (2006) 
Real interest rate 
Definition: Nominal returns on long-term government bonds minus the inflation rate for the 
following year 
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Missing: Greece did not issue comparable bonds before 1997. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook December 1998 Dataset, OECD Economic Outlook December 
2009 Dataset, downloaded March 31, 2010 from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Change in inflation rate 
Yearly changes in the consumer price index (CPI), calculated for each country as CPIt – CPIt-1 
Source: OECD Reference Series, downloaded March 31, 2010 from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Terms-of-trade shocks 
The log-difference of the terms of trade multiplied by trade openness. Trade openness is defined 
as the ratio between import plus exports divide by GDP (at constant prices). 
Source: Imports/exports from OECD International Trade (MEI) Dataset, trade openness from 
OECD Macro Trade Indicators Dataset, downloaded March 31, 2010 from http://stats.oecd.org/ 
Youth Cohort Size 
Flexibly defined as ratio of young people divided by the number of adult men, aged 45-54. The 
denominator corresponds to the group, whose labor market outcomes are being analyzed and is 
calculated from the corresponding data source on labor market outcomes. 
Output Gap 
Definition: the difference between actual and potential gross domestic product (GDP) as a per 
cent of potential GDP 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook December 2009, downloaded March 31, 2010 from 
http://stats.oecd.org/ 
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5 
5. Employment Protection and Youth 
Unemployment 
In Chapter 3, we argued that the effect of employment protection legislation on youth 
unemployment is theoretically indeterminate. Job security provisions on regular employment 
contracts diminish both inflows and outflows from youth unemployment. It is an empirical 
question, which of these mechanisms dominate, or whether they cancel each other out to yield no 
effect at all. Apart from the effect on unemployment, we will also assess the effect of job security 
provisions on youth labor force participation and employment in this chapter. To the extent that 
job security provisions make the transition from school to work more difficult, young people may 
anticipate such difficulty and delay their entry into the labor force. Compared to adult workers, 
young people may have lower economic opportunity costs to staying out of the workforce, 
especially if they spend the time out acquiring higher levels of education in an attempt to 
improve their future career chances. Regarding employment effects, it may be the case that by 
hindering reallocation of labor and delaying necessary adjustments, job security provisions 
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depress productivity, which should translate into lower labour demand (Blanchard and Katz, 
1997; Bassanini and Duval, 2006). This effect may manifest itself particularly in terms of lower 
employment levels. 
For each outcome, we will also test whether the effect varies by levels of education and 
gender, although it is again difficult to make clear cut predictions. Less skilled in particular may 
be priced out of the labor market by high dismissal costs, but compared to more educated young 
people, they also have relatively low opportunity costs for acquiring further education and are 
therefore more likely to drop out of the labor force. Highly educated may suffer, since it is 
particularly risky to hire a high skilled worker, if dismissal costs are high (Wolbers, 2007). Thus, 
to the extent that job security provisions lead to a more difficulty transition, we may expect that 
particularly less educated are more likely to withdraw from the labor force. 
Constraints on using of temporary contracts were lifted particularly in countries with strict 
regulations on dismissal from permanent jobs. However, the relationship between unemployment 
and regulations on or the incidence of temporary employment is theoretically ambiguous. "Partial 
deregulation", i.e. removing restrictions on the usage of temporary contracts while maintaining 
extensive job security provisions on regular contracts, may have effectively lowered employment 
costs in the low skill sector. This may have resulted in job growth and lower youth 
unemployment, but it may have also led to substitution of permanent with temporary jobs, which 
may have even raised youth unemployment. The adverse effects of partial deregulation are most 
likely to present themselves among the least educated, who normally work in jobs requiring few 
specific skills. In contrast, the positive effects of partial deregulation may manifest themselves 
particularly among the highly skilled (the most educated), for whom temporary employment 
represent a screening period, a stepping stone to permanent jobs. 
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We build our answer to these questions in three steps. First, we begin with a cross-sectional 
analysis, as cross-sectional designs have been frequently used to support the argument of adverse 
effects of employment protection on youth labor market outcomes (Esping-Andersen, 2000; 
Breen, 2005; Kahn, 2007). The cross-sectional analysis allows us to test simple descriptive 
questions: Are young people relatively worse off when permanent jobs are highly protected? 
And, are young people relatively worse off, when temporary contracts are deregulated? In this 
section, we also take some analytical choices that are similar to the ones taken in these studies, 
for example using OECD data for youth labor market outcomes and studying youth-adult 
unemployment rate ratios as dependent variables. We also assess the robustness of findings from 
the cross-section to inclusion of control variables, and discuss why our results may differ from 
published research. 
In the second step, we assess the robustness of findings to inclusion of country fixed effects. 
This analysis provides a stricter test of whether the association between employment protection 
legislation and youth labor market outcomes is causal or not. If we are to believe our cross-
sectional estimates, the effects should survive the inclusion of fixed effects. If fixed effects 
completely wipe out or reverse the sign of the effect estimated in the cross-section, we should 
interpret this as strong evidence for omitted variable bias and that findings from the cross-section 
should not be interpreted as causal relationships. The key purpose of the cross-sectional and fixed 
effects analysis is to relate our findings to published research and use similar approaches and data 
to get a feeling how strong of a case we can build for or against employment protection 
legislation in these frameworks.  
The third step of our analysis, however, is the decisive one: Here, we perform a 
comprehensive assessment of the distributional effects of employment protection reform on key 
youth labor market outcomes: unemployment, employment and labor force participation. We 
Employment Protection and Youth Unemployment 
 
115 
 
assess whether there is an interaction between both types of employment regulations, and we 
assess whether their reform has had unequal impacts on different groups on the youth labor 
market defined by education and gender. 
5.1. Results from cross-sectional analysis 
As a starting point, Figure 5.1 plots the difference of the logged youth minus logged adult 
unemployment rates against the OECD measures of employment regulation. Youth are defined as 
age groups 15-29, adults are 45-54 year old men. We use OECD data for all the available 
countries and years. We also plot the linear regression line and the lowess smoother as a non-
parametric measure of association. The clearest positive relationship emerges between the 
regulation of temporary contracts and the relative unemployment rates of young women. Young 
women seem to be relatively better off, if temporary contracts are deregulated. The other 
relationships appear relatively weak. In particular, there is no indication that stricter regulation of 
permanent employment contracts makes young men relatively worse off. 
To test the robustness of the associations in the data, we run OLS regressions of the 
difference of the logged unemployment rates on the two measures of employment protection 
legislation as well as control variables. We report the results of four different specifications. 
Specification (1) only contains the two measures of regulation as regressors. Specification (2) 
contains the control variables as linear terms and year fixed effects. Specification (3), which we 
referred to as the "full specification" in Section 4.4.1 (p. 93f.), adds to specification (2) any 
interaction/quadratic terms that predict significantly the outcome variable or either measure of 
regulation. Of these interaction/quadratic terms, specification (4), referred to as "restricted 
specification", only retains the strongest ones. We generally prefer the "restricted specification" 
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that permits nonlinearities in the control variables. Information on data sources and control 
variable definitions is available in Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
Figure 5.1 Employment protection and relative youth (ages 15-29) unemployment rates, 21 
OECD countries, 1985-2007 
 
Notes: The dependent variables is the difference of the natural log youth (ages 15-29) and natural log adult (men, ages 45-
54) unemployment rates. 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports the results for young men and young women separately. Consistent with the 
impression gained in Figure 5.1, we find that tighter regulation of temporary contracts is 
associated with higher relative unemployment rates among young people. 35
 
35 Both measures of employment protection are not strongly correlated in the cross-section (ρ=0.38), which 
should diffuse concerns about multicollinearity.  
 The estimated 
coefficient for women is around twice as large as that for men. Moreover, we find that if 
employment protection for regular contracts has an effect, it tends to lower, not raise, relative 
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youth unemployment rates. Regarding the regulation of temporary contracts, the results are 
consistent across the different model specifications used. The negative effect of the regulation of 
permanent contracts only becomes significant, once we add control variables. Table 5.20 in the 
Appendix repeats the analysis in Table 5.1, separately analyzing 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29 year 
olds. The results are very similar, except that associations between measures of regulation and 
relative unemployment are somewhat weaker among 25-29 year olds. 
Table 5.1 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection legislation and relative youth (ages 15-29) unemployment rates, 21 
OECD countries, 1985-2007 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR -0.08 -0.11* -0.15* -0.10  -0.02 -0.09 -0.18** -0.14** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
RTC 0.11** 0.10** 0.09** 0.09**  0.21*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
R-sq 0.16 0.42 0.62 0.56  0.33 0.57 0.82 0.80 
N 436 436 436 436  436 436 436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts. Control variables used in specifications (2), (3) and (4): indicators for the generosity of unemployment 
benefits, trade union density, two indicators for the coordination of wage bargaining, indicators for the cabinet power of left 
parties, expenditure on active labor market policies, product market regulation, economic globalization, terms-of-trade 
shocks, long-term interest rates, the inflation rate, output gap, the youth cohort size, and year fixed effects. 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, see Data Appendix in Chapter 4, Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
The analyses reported in Table 5.2 focus on the effect of employment regulations on relative 
employment and labor force participation rates, where the dependent variables are the difference 
between the logged youth and the logged adult outcomes (adult men aged 45-54). We report only 
the results from the fourth, "restricted" model specification. The results suggest that if temporary 
contracts are highly regulated, both relative youth employment and labor force participation rates 
are lower, where the relationships between employment protection and the labor force 
participation rate tend to be somewhat stronger. The regulation of permanent contract is only 
associated with relative unemployment rates, not with the other two outcomes. 
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Table 5.2 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection legislation and relative youth (ages 15-29) unemployment (U), 
employment (E) and labor force participation (L) rates, 21 OECD countries, 1985-2007, results 
from model specification (4) 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (U) (E) (L)  (U) (E) (L) 
EPR -0.10 -0.01 -0.02  -0.14** -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) 
RTC 0.09** -0.04*** -0.03***  0.16*** -0.07*** -0.03*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
R-sq 0.56 0.74 0.77  0.80 0.76 0.76 
N 436 436 436  436 436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
To see how exactly the associations between employment protection legislation and age 
inequalities in the distribution of unemployment are generated, we directly estimate the 
association between EPL and logged youth and adult unemployment rates (Table 5.3). There is 
no evidence of any association between either measure of regulation and the adult male 
unemployment rate. However, we observe a positive association between the regulation of 
temporary contracts and youth unemployment, which is roughly twice as large among young 
women, and a weak and insignificant association between dismissal regulations on permanent 
contracts and youth unemployment. Thus, it appears that observed associations between 
employment protection and age-inequalities in the distribution of unemployment are driven by 
the association between employment protection and youth unemployment. Table 5.21 
(Appendix) reports the full results for the relative and absolute unemployment rate regression 
analyses, using specification (2), which is linear in the control variables (year fixed effects not 
shown). Except for regulations on the usage of temporary contracts, there is little evidence for 
strong institutional effects, while the macroeconomic variables have strong effects. However, 
Employment Protection and Youth Unemployment 
 
119 
 
more strongly centralized wage bargaining seems to be associated with lower unemployment 
among youth and adults.36
Table 5.3 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection legislation and youth and adult men's unemployment rates, 21 OECD 
countries, 1985-2007 
  
 A. Men, ages 15-29  B. Women, ages 15-29  C. Men, ages 45-54 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR -0.07 -0.08  -0.00 -0.05  0.01 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.07)  (0.09) (0.07)  (0.09) (0.04) 
RTC 0.09* 0.11***  0.18*** 0.20***  -0.02 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04)  (0.05) (0.04)  (0.06) (0.03) 
R-sq 0.06 0.70  0.23 0.70  0.00 0.72 
N 436 436  436 436  436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
5.1.1. Robustness checks 
We conduct several robustness checks of the results reported in Table 5.2. We repeated the 
analysis for a subsample of Western European countries only (EU15 minus Luxembourg, plus 
Switzerland and Norway). By restricting the sample to Western Europe only, our units of 
observation should become more similar on unobservables. The results regarding unemployment 
rates appear to be sensitive to the country composition. The negative association between 
dismissal regulations on regular employment contracts becomes even stronger if we focus on 
Western European countries only. At the same time, the association between regulations on 
temporary contracts weaken in the restricted sample.  
 
36 Moreover, we obtain somewhat unexpected results that should caution us against causal interpretation of 
the findings. First, expenditure on active labor market policies is positively correlated with unemployment, 
presumably since in times of high unemployment, more is spent on such policies. Second, we also observe that 
more generous unemployment benefits are associated with lower unemployment among young men. It may be 
that in countries experiencing economic crisis, the absence of unemployment benefits motivates drastic 
exclusionary behavior on the side of incumbent employees, leading to reductions in outflows from employment 
and reductions of worker turnover (see Section 2.1.3, p.18). 
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Table 5.4 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection legislation and relative youth (ages 15-29) unemployment (U), 
employment (E) and labor force participation (L) rates, 16 Western European countries, 1985-
2007, results from model specification (4) 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (U) (E) (L)  (U) (E) (L) 
EPR -0.25** 0.04* -0.00  -0.30*** 0.05 0.02 
 (0.09) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) 
RTC 0.06* -0.04*** -0.04***  0.09** -0.08*** -0.03*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
R-sq 0.68 0.79 0.77  0.84 0.80 0.78 
N 326 326 326  326 326 326 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
We conduct two further robustness checks (results not shown). First, we aggregate the yearly 
data into period averages, where each periods is four years long (three years, in case of the last 
period). We thereby smooth out some cyclical year-to-year variation and may better reveal 
medium to long-run associations. The analysis are otherwise identical to those reported in Table 
5.2 and the results are nearly identical as well. This may not be very surprising since, by 
differencing the dependent variable, we already remove considerable cyclical variation. Second, 
we repeated the analysis in Table 5.2 within two sub-periods: 1985-1995 and 1996-2007. For the 
more recent period, we additionally control for the share of young people enrolled in upper and 
post-secondary vocational education programs that combine school-based education with 
employer-provided training; the existence of such 'dual system' arrangement is consistently 
associated with low absolute and relative youth unemployment and a rapid integration of young 
people into working life (Müller and Shavit, 1998; Breen, 2005; Wolbers, 2007). Including this 
control variable does not change our conclusion about the effect of the regulation of temporary 
contracts on relative youth unemployment rates. Supplementary analyses (not reported) show that 
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the estimated coefficients of employment protection legislation become even stronger (larger 
estimated coefficients, smaller standard errors) once we add this control. 
Finally, we analyze the relationship between relative youth unemployment and employment 
protection legislation using the augmented European Union Labor Force dataset for 16 Western 
countries from 1992-2006. Using this dataset, we can assess the association between employment 
protection and relative youth unemployment at a more disaggregate level, distinguishing by 
respondents' levels of education. To make the youth samples more homogenous in terms of 
potential labor force experience, we select different age bands according to levels of education: 
ages 15-24 for those who completed only lower secondary education or less (ISCED 0-2), ages 
20-29 for those with upper secondary / post-secondary degrees (ISCED 3-4), and ages 25-34 for 
those with tertiary degrees (ISCED 5-6). Results are reported in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection and relative youth unemployment rates by education (ISCED-97) levels, 
15 Western European countries and the U.S., 1992-2006, results from model specification (4) 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 0-2 3-4 5-6 aggr.  0-2 3-4 5-6 aggr. 
EPR -0.23*** -0.37*** 0.04 -0.19***  -0.22** -0.43*** -0.21 -0.16* 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.18) (0.09) 
RTC 0.14*** 0.08** 0.15*** 0.11***  0.25*** 0.26*** 0.14* 0.17*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) 
R-sq 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.89  0.74 0.92 0.75 0.87 
N 207 207 207 207  207 207 207 207 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are the differences of the (logged) unemployment rates for youth 
and adults (men, ages 45-54), calculated separately by levels of education. See notes to Table 5.1 
Source: EULFS data (own calculations), see Data Appendix in Chapter 4, Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
The results are broadly consistent with what we observed in the macro-data (the fourth 
column presents the corresponding analyses aggregating over education groups). However, there 
is some variation in associations across education groups. The effects of employment protection 
legislation appear stronger at lower levels of education. Among those with less than tertiary 
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education, we observe strong, negative effects of employment protection legislation on relative 
unemployment rates. For tertiary educated, stricter regulation of temporary contracts seems to be 
associated with higher unemployment risks. 
5.1.2. Summary, discussion and further analyses 
The results in the previous section contradict findings obtained from cross-sectional analyses by 
Esping-Andersen (2000: 85f.), the OECD (2004: Table 2.4), Breen (2005) and Kahn (2007). 
While Kahn (2007) uses micro data from the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), the 
other three studies use OECD macro data; all studies use different versions of the OECD 
indicators of employment protection.37
In fact, the results point to nearly opposite conclusions. While dismissal regulations on 
permanent contracts are expected (and have been shown by the aforementioned studies) to lead to 
higher relative and absolute youth unemployment, we find the opposite effect in bivariate 
analyses, as well as in analyses using different specifications for control variables, country 
samples and data sources. Moreover, while a number of authors have tended to emphasize the 
potential dark sides of deregulation of temporary contracts (OECD, 2004; Blanchard and 
Landier, 2002) we find that youth unemployment is in fact lower in absolute and relative terms 
wherever temporary contracts are less regulated.
 These (empirical) studies are often cited in support of 
claims for the alleged compositional effects of employment protection on the composition of 
unemployment. Here, we have shown their results to be non-robust. 
38
 
37 None of the studies focuses on both types of regulations simultaneously. Breen (2005) and Kahn (2007) 
use only the indicator for regulations on regular contracts. 
 We therefore conclude that, first, youth 
unemployment in both absolute and relative terms is not higher in countries with stricter 
38 A proper test of the potential dark side of deregulating temporary contracts would specify an interaction 
between both types of regulation, which we do in subsequent analyses. 
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employment protection. The evidence rather suggests it to be lower in particular if we focus on 
Western European countries only. Second, stricter regulation of temporary contracts is associated 
with higher youth unemployment, as well as lower relative youth employment and labor force 
participation rates. These associations tend to be stronger for women and less educated. 
* * * 
Why do our findings differ from other published research? To shed some light on this 
question, we replicate the analysis published in Breen (2005). Column 1 in Table 5.6 are the 
results published by Breen (2005), column 2 is a replication using current OECD data for the 
same years and countries as well as identical specifications of dependent and independent 
variables. While the data sources of Breen's and this analysis are principally identical, we use 
most recently published data, especially the recently updated annual OECD indicators of 
employment protection legislation. 
The results in Table 5.6 indicate that the OLS estimate of the association between the 
regulation of permanent contracts (EPR) and relative youth unemployment weakens and becomes 
more uncertain when using more recent data. Column (3) shows that the effect is of EPR is 
negative and statistically insignificant, while educational institutions (VOC) and the regulation of 
temporary contracts (RTC) matter. Column (4) shows that when controlling for RTC, the 
interaction EPR_VOC is also no longer statistically significant. The latter results suggest that the 
results are also sensitive to the inclusion of additional, relevant variables, pointing to omitted 
variable bias. 
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Table 5.6 Replication of Breen (2005), Table 4. OLS regression estimates 
("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between employment 
protection legislation and relative youth unemployment, 23 OECD countries, 
1995-1999 
 Breen 2005 Replication (3) (4) 
EPR 0.111** 0.085 -0.014 0.016 
 (0.047) 0.057) (0.055) (0.066) 
EPR_VOC -0.003*** -0.004**  -0.001 
 (0.001) 0.001)  (0.003) 
UA 0.950*** 0.922*** 0.859*** 0.866*** 
 (0.082) 0.091) (0.101) (0.100) 
RTC   0.067** 0.064* 
   (0.031) (0.034) 
VOC   -0.007* -0.004 
   (0.003) (0.007) 
Constant 0.787*** 0.903*** 1.084*** 1.019*** 
 (0.178) 0.178) (0.201) (0.191) 
R-sq 0.84 0.83 0.85 0.85 
N 113 113 113 113 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Youth are here defined as age groups 15-24. UA is the logged 
aggregate unemployment rate (ages 25-54). EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC 
- Regulations on the usage of temporary contracts. VOC - Share of students at ISCED level 3-4 
enrolled in vocational programs combining school-based vocational education with workplace 
based training. EPR_APP - multiplicative interaction between EPR and APP. 
Source: See notes to Table 5.1, column 1 reproduced from Breen (2005: Table 4) 
Closer inspection of the underlying data reveals that changes in the dependent and 
independent variables between OECD data releases are key factors behind the changes in results. 
In Table 5.22 (Appendix to this chapter), we tabulated the youth/adult unemployment rate ratios 
as calculated by Breen from OECD Employment Outlook data and the OECD Index for 
employment protection for regular contracts (OECD 1999), and compare it to more recent OECD 
data releases for both employment protection legislation and unemployment rates. We see 
discrepancies on both dependent and independent variables. In a number of cases, we see that 
relative unemployment "diminished" between data releases in more regulated countries (e.g. 
Sweden) or "increased" in less regulated countries (e.g. Australia). Moreover, on the index of 
employment protection, there have also been some changes. For example, Italy, a country with 
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high youth unemployment, has been downgraded by a full unit, making it similar to Ireland or 
Denmark, where it previously had the same value as Sweden or Germany. OECD (2004: 107f.) 
details some of the changes that were made to the employment protection indices published by 
the OECD in 1999 (OECD 1999, see also Venn, 2009, for the most recent update). If we assume 
that the OECD indicator has become more accurate with subsequent releases, this would imply 
that past indicators were mismeasured, which may have resulted in biased inferences. 
In Table 5.7 (see below), we report the results of bivariate regression analyses, using both old 
and new data as tabulated in Table 5.22. Changes in both the dependent and independent 
variables contribute to the weakening of the association between relative youth unemployment 
and the regulation of permanent contracts. The change in the EPR index is decisive, destroying 
the association fully. Even though the old and new measure tabulated in Table 5.22 are highly 
correlated (ρ = 0.93), the small changes on the index suffice to destroy whatever association is 
present, or even change the sign of the association. 
One would have imagined that two highly correlated indices yield the same result, but this is 
not the case. Even though we are working with cross-sectional data, which, as we saw above, are 
quite robust to changes in specification, we are still very vulnerable to measurement error. This 
may be an issue other studies in sociology and economics that have used the OECD (1999); but it 
also is a general reminder that the multilevel designs can very vulnerable to measurement error in 
the higher level, contextual variables. While here we use observations on 23 countries and our 
indicators are highly correlated, many multilevel analyses (using individual level data from a 
cross-section of countries) rely on fewer country observations and use proxy indicators generated 
from the same micro data source, which should make the problem of measurement error even 
more severe.  
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Table 5.7 Bivariate associations between old and new data on relative 
unemployment rates and dismissal regulations on regular contracts. OLS 
regression estimates and standard errors. 
 UY "old" UY "old" UY "new" UY "new" 
EPR "old" 0.044  0.027  
 0.052  0.050  
EPR "new"  0.005  -0.010 
  0.051  0.048 
R-sq 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 
N 27 27 27 27 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Data from columns 1, 2, 4, and 5 in Table 5.22. Dependent 
variables: UY "old" - logged youth unemployment ratio (column 1), UY "new" - logged youth 
unemployment ratio (column 2). Independent variables: EPR "old" (column 4) and EPR "new" 
(column 5). 
Source: Table 5.22 
The replication analysis also alerted us to the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of 
different control variables. We also saw that the (unexpected) negative association between 
regulations on permanent contracts is more likely to be statistically significant, if we include 
control variables into the analysis. While much comparative research uses cross-sectional data, 
we are frequently reminded that this type of design is inherently vulnerable to omitted variable 
bias. In some situations, cross-sectional data is all that is available for comparative research and 
in this situation, cross-sectional analysis can still generate useful insights; but often, we can and 
should try to adopt a better design if the goal is – as it usually is – causal inference. 
5.2. Results from fixed effects analysis 
The following section repeats some of the preceding analyses, adjusting for country specific, 
time-invariant ("fixed") effects. The main purpose of this section is “procedural” to show the 
vulnerability of cross-sectional inference to this type of unobserved heterogeneity and to relate 
our work to other published studies using similar methods. As we will show, in this application, 
almost none of the results from cross-sectional analyses are robust to the inclusion of country 
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fixed effects. Moreover, a number of studies have been published using fixed effects models such 
as the ones used here. We summarize their results and discuss some of their shortcomings. The 
main analysis is done using difference-in-differences in the subsequent section. 
Adjusting for fixed effects comes at a steep price: Using the full OECD dataset from 1985 to 
2007, country fixed effects soak up 78% of the variation in relative unemployment rates for 
young men (85% in case of young women), and 96% of the variation in the index for the 
regulation of permanent contracts (85% for the index of regulations on temporary contracts). 
While some of the eliminated between country variation is due to unmeasured factors that could 
bias the results, we also eliminate some useful variation. This is the often encountered trade-off 
between bias vs. efficiency. Furthermore, after eliminating all between country variation, we are 
left with only the within-country variation, i.e. the year-to-year changes in the variables, and we 
become more vulnerable to measurement error. Thus, both effect size and significance are likely 
to diminish. Given that we have already been alerted to potential measurement error, we should 
exercise caution when interpreting the fixed effects results. 
To illustrate whether and how the inclusion of fixed effects altered the results from cross-
sectional analysis, we have repeated the analyses reported in Section 5.1. Analogous to Figure 
5.1, Figure 5.2 graphs the association between employment protection and relative youth 
unemployment after country fixed effects have been removed from the data. We notice that the 
variation in the data has diminished considerably as most point cluster in the center of the graphs. 
Little variation is left on the indicator for EPL on regular contracts, and Spain strikes us as an 
outlier. We observe considerably more within variation in terms of the regulation of temporary 
contracts; Belgium and Italy in particular show substantial variation, raising concerns for 
potential outlier status. The remaining associations look similar to those reported above. We 
again observe the strongest association between the regulation of temporary contracts and 
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relative youth unemployment for young women, while no such association appears to be present 
for young men. The association between EPL on regular contracts and relative youth 
unemployment seems to be positive for both genders. 
Figure 5.2 Employment protection and relative youth (ages 15-29) unemployment rates, 21 
OECD countries, 1985-2007, country-demeaned data 
 
Notes: The dependent variables is the difference of the natural log youth (ages 15-29) and natural log adult (men, ages 45-
54) unemployment rates. Dependent and independent variables are country-demeaned, i.e. we subtracted from each 
observation on each variable the country mean of the corresponding variable. 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics 
In the following, we assess whether these association are robust to the inclusion of control 
variables. We adopt the same model specification strategies as above, but include country and 
year fixed effects into all specifications.39
Table 5.1
 Compared to the cross-sectional analysis reported in 
, the absolute size of the estimates diminish considerably, probably not least due to 
 
39 We reran the algorithms for specifications (3) and (4) also controlling for year and country fixed effects. 
Thus, the nonlinear terms differ between the cross-sectional and the fixed effects specification.  
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attenuation bias (see Table 5.8). Nevertheless, we still observe a significant negative effect of 
stricter regulations on the usage of temporary contracts on relative unemployment among young 
women. Young men seem to be affected by neither regulation.40
Table 5.8 OLS fixed effects (LSDV) regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the 
association between employment protection legislation and relative youth (ages 15-29) 
unemployment rates, 21 OECD countries, 1985-2007 
 There is no indication that 
regulations on permanent contracts matter for either gender. 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR 0.11 -0.07 0.01 -0.01  0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) 
RTC 0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.00  0.12** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) 
R-sq 0.80 0.86 0.90 0.90  0.87 0.91 0.94 0.94 
N 436 436 436 436  436 436 436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
Considering relative employment and labor force participation rates, Table 5.9 reports the 
results of analysis similar to those in Table 5.2. Adjusting for country fixed effects, stricter 
regulation of temporary contracts is now positively associated with relative employment and 
labor force participation rates among young women men and women. For both genders and 
dependent variables, the sign of the association has switched, being significant in both cross-
section and fixed effects analysis. Graphical analysis using added variable plots suggests that 
these results are not driven by outliers. Moreover, we now observe a significant negative effect of 
stricter employment protection on regular contracts on relative youth labor force participation. 
 
40 Looking at different age groups separately, we observe a significant negative effect of regulations on 
temporary contracts for young men aged 15-19. 
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Table 5.9 OLS fixed effects (LSDV) regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the 
association between employment protection legislation and relative youth (ages 15-29) 
unemployment (U), employment (E) and labor force participation (L) rates, 21 OECD countries, 
1985-2007, results from model specification (4) 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (U) (E) (L)  (U) (E) (L) 
EPR -0.01 -0.02 0.01  -0.08 -0.04 -0.03** 
 (0.11) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.11) (0.03) (0.02) 
RTC -0.00 0.02*** 0.02***  0.07*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
R-sq 0.90 0.96 0.97  0.94 0.98 0.97 
N 436 436 436  436 436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
Table 5.10 reports fixed effects results, where we directly estimate the association between 
EPL and logged youth and adult unemployment rates. While in the cross-section, regulation of 
temporary contracts (RTC) was not associated with the unemployment rate among prime-age 
men, we now obtain a significant negative effect. The relationship between RTC and relative 
youth unemployment changed, too. While we observed significant positive effects for young 
women in the cross-section, this effect has now disappeared. In the cross-section, the positive 
association between RTC and relative unemployment among young women was driven by the 
effect of RTC on the unemployment rate of young women, while there was no effect for adult 
men. Now, the situation is exactly the reverse. Furthermore, while there was no effect for young 
men in the cross-section, stricter regulation of temporary contracts is now associated with lower 
unemployment among young men. 
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Table 5.10 OLS fixed effects (LSDV) regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of 
the association between employment protection legislation and youth and adult men's 
unemployment rates, 21 OECD countries, 1985-2007 
 Men, ages 15-29  Women, ages 15-29  Men, ages 45-54 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.02 0.06  -0.03 -0.04  -0.10 0.13 
 (0.20) (0.16)  (0.23) (0.13)  (0.22) (0.11) 
RTC -0.10 -0.10***  -0.03 -0.02  -0.15* -0.10** 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.04) 
R-sq 0.67 0.89  0.78 0.93  0.64 0.89 
N 436 436  436 436  436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
5.2.1. Discussion 
The cross-sectional analysis, using the most recent and comprehensive data available and 
conducting extensive specification checks, yielded robust associations which are contrary to 
influential studies that relied on similar cross-sectional analyses. These robust associations, 
however, do not survive once we control for country-specific fixed effects. We interpret this 
result as powerful evidence for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, which we were unable 
to capture in the cross-sectional analysis using any of the rich control variable specifications. 
This shortcoming is highly consequential for the results. While issues with measurement error 
have made us wary of attenuation bias, we observed in several instances that the estimates 
actually moved away from rather than towards zero. 
The cross-sectional associations still provided important insights. In countries with stricter 
employment protection on regular contracts, youth unemployment is not higher as many argue, 
but lower. More consistent with popular belief, but inconsistent with some critiques, tighter 
regulation on temporary contracts are associated with worse youth labor market outcomes. These 
are highly robust associations in the data, and they provide no support whatsoever for the 
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argument that youth unemployment in Southern Europe or some other European countries is so 
high because of high firing costs on regular contracts. None of the models presented hitherto 
supports this conclusion. Nevertheless, we should not assign a causal interpretation to the 
associations found in the cross-section. Instead, the fixed effects analysis suggests that these 
correlations are spurious. There is clear evidence of omitted variable bias that an analysis aimed 
to go beyond statements of association has to remedy. This is the goal of the following section. 
* * * 
Before proceeding, however, we should relate our results to those of published research, 
which has often relied on fixed effects models similar to the ones estimated here. Controlling for 
country fixed effects, Bassanini and Duval (2006: 48f.) find negative effects of the OECD 
summary indicator of employment protection on youth employment rates. Bertola et al. (2002, 
2007) estimate fixed effects GLS models (using a parametric correction for serial correlation in 
the error term) of (relative) youth employment and unemployment rates similar to those reported 
above. They rely on data initially published by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). 
Using two different specifications, Bertola et al. (2002, NBER Working Paper) consistently 
obtain negative effects of employment protection on relative youth employment. Regarding 
relative youth unemployment, they find no significant or inconsistent effects.41
 
41 The effect of employment protection on relative unemployment of young women, is significant in one 
and insignificant in the other specification. There is no effect of employment protection on relative 
unemployment of young men. 
 Bertola, Blau and 
Kahn (2007, Journal of Population Economics) is based on the preceding working paper, but use 
absolute not relative youth employment and unemployment rates as outcomes. The result now 
show that employment protection raises youth unemployment, but does not affect youth 
employment.  
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Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2002) use the same data source, but adopt a different 
modeling strategy that focuses on interactions of institutions with observable and unobservable 
shocks as in Blanchard and Wolfers (2002). They provide some evidence that (absolute) youth 
unemployment rises in response to shocks, if employment protection is stricter, particularly 
among young women. However, the results regarding relative youth unemployment appear non-
robust, which leads them to conclude that employment protection (on regular and temporary 
contracts) does not raise relative youth unemployment rates. 
The results should alert us that findings regarding relative outcomes (where the dependent 
variable is a log ratio of youth divided by adult outcomes) and absolute outcomes (where the 
dependent variable is logged youth outcomes) may differ. On the basis of published research, we 
would thus expect that stricter regulation entails higher youth unemployment (Bertola et al., 
2007; Rodriquez-Palenzuela and Jimeno, 2002) and lower youth employment (Bassanini and 
Duval, 2006), consistent with the common wisdom of negative effects of regulation on youth 
labor market outcomes. 
In contrast to this, our fixed effects analyses could hardly find any effects of either type of 
regulation on youth unemployment. If anything, tighter regulations on the usage of temporary 
contracts lower, not raise unemployment among young men, which would be more consistent 
with a critical reading of the effects of deregulation (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and 
Postel-Vinay, 2002). Our results agree with the OECD (2004) study suggesting that effects of 
employment protection on youth employment present in the cross-section disappear after fixed 
effects are controlled for, although we differ from the OECD in interpreting this result (see 
Section 7.1, p. 177f.). 
We cannot directly compare our results with those published, however, since none of the 
studies differentiate between the regulation on permanent contracts and temporary contracts, 
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although such a differentiation is meaningful. The underlying mechanisms differ, and both types 
of regulations may interact with each other. Moreover, few if any specification checks are 
reported regarding the effects of employment protection, and we are therefore left to wonder how 
robust the results are to changes in specification and sample composition. Moreover, we are 
skeptical about the quality of the measurement of employment protection in the Blanchard and 
Wolfers dataset (see Section 4.1.3, p. 81f.). 
Finally, if this issue is addressed at all, the analyses use parametric corrections for 
autocorrelation, which is likely to underestimate the uncertainty of the parameter estimates, if the 
parametric autocorrelation model is incorrectly specified (Bertrand et al., 2004: 263f.). Unless we 
know the data generating process, we face the risk of such specification errors. Following 
Bertrand et al.'s recommendation (see also Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Kezdi, 2003), we have 
used variance-covariance estimators ("cluster robust" standard errors) that allow for an arbitrary 
correlation of the error term within panel units, instead of imposing a panel-specific, first-order 
autocorrelation structure on the error term as Bertola et al. (2007) do. In Table 5.11, we repeated 
the analysis in Table 5.10 using Bertola et al.'s estimation strategy, i.e. generalized least squares 
with panel specific (i.e. country-specific) first-order autocorrelated error terms. As Bertrand et 
al.'s results suggest, the parametric error correction yields larger t-statistics / smaller p-values 
compared to the "cluster robust" standard errors. If we consistently applied this estimation 
strategy, we would be more likely to detect significant effects of employment protection 
legislation that are really due to serial correlation in the data. However, in this particular instance, 
our qualitative conclusions are not affected. 
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Table 5.11 Comparison of OLS fixed effects ("cluster robust" standard errors) and GLS fixed 
effects (standard errors adjusted for panel-specific, first-order autocorrelation), 21 OECD 
countries, 1985-2007  
  Men, ages 15-29  Women, ages 15-29  Men, ages 45-54 
  (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
O
LS
, c
lu
st
er
 
ro
bu
st
 s.
e.
 EPR 0.02 0.06  -0.03 -0.04  -0.10 0.13 
 (0.20) (0.16)  (0.23) (0.13)  (0.22) (0.11) 
RTC -0.10 -0.10***  -0.03 -0.02  -0.15* -0.10** 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.04) 
G
LS
,  
p.
s. 
A
R
(1
) s
. e
. EPR -0.06 0.03  -0.10 0.00  -0.03 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.06)  (0.10) (0.07) 
RTC -0.06*** -0.07***  -0.02 -0.03*  -0.07** -0.06*** 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
5.3. Results from Differences-in-Differences Analysis 
In this section, we try to arrive at a conclusive empirical answer about the distributional effects of 
employment protection legislation. We rely on the augmented EULFS data set, which allows for 
a more detailed distributional assessment of the effects of employment protection reforms and 
focuses on a core set of Western European countries for the period from 1992 to 2006, during 
which we observe altogether 28 reforms. We implement a differences-in-differences estimator, as 
outlined in Section 4.5 (p. 98f.). We estimate equations of the following form, where 𝑌𝑔𝑗𝑡 is the 
log youth labor market outcome of group g in country j and year t. 
(1) 𝑌𝑔𝑗𝑡 = 𝜇𝑔 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑗𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑔𝑗𝑡 , 
where 𝜇g and 𝜆t are group and year specific fixed effects. 𝛾1𝑗𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑗𝑡  models baseline outcomes 
for each reform over the specified window of observation (t-2 to t+3). 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡 is the change in the 
index of employment protection legislation calculated as 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡 = 𝐼𝑗,𝑡=−1 − 𝐼𝑗,𝑡=0, where the new 
regulation is implemented in t=0. 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑡  takes on this value for the period from t=0 to t=3 
following reform, and is equal to zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest δ estimates the 
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deviation of the outcome variable from the country and reform specific baseline outcome over 
the period t=0 to t=3, as a linear function of the direction (negative/de-regulation or positive/up-
regulation) and magnitude of change. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑡  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
countries that experienced reform for the period two years after the observation window, i.e. from 
t=4 to t=5 in the default specification. 
5.3.1. Results for young people 
As outlined in Section 4.5.1 (p. 101f.), we adopt two specifications for control variables, which 
we add to equation (1). The control variable based specification (C) uses a list of control control 
variables, including the non-treatment indicator of employment protection legislation, as well as 
interactions/quadratic terms generated from the control variables that significantly predict either 
outcome or the treatment variable.42
Comparing both specifications for each outcome, we observe no or inconsistent effects of the 
regulation of temporary contracts. There is also no evidence that employment protection on 
regular contracts has affected youth employment or unemployment rates. However, we observe a 
 The trend specification (T) contains country-specific linear 
trend variables as well as the corresponding outcome for men, aged 45-54 (measured at the 
education-group specific level). Before studying more detailed distributional effects and 
interactions between both types of regulation, we begin with an assessment of average effects of 
employment protection reform. We also routinely estimated the basis DiD specification (equation 
1 above), as well as the country-specific linear trend specification without the adult outcome 
variable. We do not report the results here because of space limitations. However, the results 
usually did not differ from what we obtained in the specifications reported here. 
 
42  We reran all analyses using just interaction/quadratic terms that significantly predict the treatment 
(dropping interaction/quadratic terms that significantly predict the outcome). The results did not differ 
noticeably. 
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strong effect of job security provisions on youth labor force participation. This effect is nearly 
identical using both specifications, and similar in size to the coefficient reported in the fixed 
effects model for women (Table 5.9), using the OECD data for 21 countries from 1985-2007. 
Rerunning this analysis using the OECD dataset, constraining the sample to the countries and 
years included in the EULFS dataset, yields results that are nearly identical to those in Table 5.12 
results and show no evidence of effect heterogeneity between genders (results not shown). 
Table 5.12 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of employment protection on youth unemployment, employment and labor force (LF) 
participation rates, 16 Western countries, 1992-2006 
I. Effect of employment protection on regular contracts (epr) 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δepr -0.018 -0.003  0.004 -0.010  -0.036*** -0.036*** 
 (0.042) (0.048)  (0.007) (0.010)  (0.004) (0.006) 
R-sq 0.60 0.54  0.48 0.45  0.32 0.31 
N 1242 1242  1242 1242  1242 1242 
II. Effect of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts (rtc) 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δrtc -0.025 0.019  -0.002 -0.007  -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.020)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) 
R-sq 0.59 0.57  0.46 0.42  0.30 0.25 
N 1242 1242  1242 1242  1242 1242 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, the R-squared statistic is the "within R-squared", see notes to Table 5.5 
We routinely conduct two specification checks assessing the sensitivity of the effect of job 
security provisions on labor force participation to the country composition and the observation 
window around the reform. We rerun the analyses reported in Table 5.12 dropping one country at 
a time and record the δ coefficient. Furthermore, we vary the window of observation by 
extending either the periods prior to change in legislation from t-2 to t-3 or by extending the 
periods after the change in legislation from t+3 to t+5. These checks suggest that the effects 
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reported in Table 5.12 are robust in sign and significance. There are some indications that 
particularly over the longer run, more generous job security provisions for regular employment 
lower both youth employment and unemployment, but these results are not robust to changes in 
country composition. Regarding regulations on temporary contracts, there is no robust evidence 
of any average effect on any of the outcomes. 
In Table 5.13, we report representative specification checks which we performed for all 
results reported in this section, in this case for the effect of job security provisions on regular 
contracts on youth labor force participation rates. The first row records the estimated effects and 
standard errors for the full country sample. The second row (Max) records the maximum beta 
coefficient that we obtained after dropping any of the countries, as well as the corresponding 
country. Conversely, the third row (Min) records the minimal beta coefficient we obtained after 
dropping any of the countries. We see that using shorter post-reform periods the results are 
sensitive to country composition. In particular, the Spanish case proves influential. If we consider 
longer post-reform periods, this sensitivity disappears and effect sizes increase.  
Table 5.13 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of employment protection on regular contracts on youth labor force participation, 16 
Western countries, 1992-2006, specification checks 
 A. Control (C) Specification  B. Trend (T) Specification 
 t-2 to t+3 t-2 to t+5 t-3 to t+3 t-3 to t+5  t-2 to t+3 t-2 to t+5 t-3 to t+3 t-3 to t+5 
δepr -0.036*** -0.059*** -0.036*** -0.060***  -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)  (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) 
Max -0.039*** -0.063*** -0.040*** -0.066***  -0.046* -0.050*** -0.046 -0.055*** 
 DE US SE SE  ES ES ES DK 
Min 0.021 0.048*** -0.025 -0.054***  -0.032*** -0.023*** 0.032*** -0.048*** 
 ES ES ES FI  SE AT SE NO 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.5 
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We thus conclude that youth labor supply is sensitive to reforms in the rigidity of job security 
provisions, particularly over the longer run: A one unit decrease in the corresponding index 
would raise youth labor force participation by around 4%, which is a sizeable effect. At the same 
time, we do not observe consistent effects on either unemployment or employment rates. How do 
we interpret these findings? Assuming that there are adverse effects of job security provisions, 
we may not observe these effects because young people reduce their labor supply, which may 
lower unemployment and employment rates by amounts that are too small to reach statistical 
significance. In support of this, we did observe long-run negative (positive) effects of stricter job 
security provisions on youth employment (unemployment), which were, however, non-robust to 
changes in country composition. 
The labor supply response is plausible for young people compared to adults. Young people 
are often not entitled to unemployment benefits and still receive support from their parents, 
which makes inactivity more attractive relative to unemployment. They also have a lower 
opportunity cost for returning to the education system. In countries, where higher education is 
publicly financed, staying enrolled in education and prolonging educational careers is a rational 
and socially legitimate response to an anticipated tough transition into employment. Young 
people thereby upgrade their skills and hope to improve their chances. Alternatively, enrolment 
in active labor market policy measures may be a similarly attractive, alternative labor market 
state as a response to unemployment risks, which also lowers labor force participation. 
To sustain this speculation, more analyses would be required. In the following, we offer one 
test that assesses whether job security provisions are associated with tertiary enrolments. 
Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish different inactivity statuses in the EULFS data, and had to 
rely on aggregate tertiary enrolment data published by the World Bank. We run fixed effects 
regressions of aggregate tertiary enrolment rates (number of tertiary students divided by the 
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number in the corresponding age group, as defined by the World Bank) on the OECD indices of 
employment protection, the aggregate male unemployment rate and country-specific linear 
trends. Given the limited number of observations, we could not run the full DiD specification. 
We relied on the linear trends specification, which appears suitable given the relatively short time 
series and the strongly and smoothly trending dependent variable. 
Table 5.14 OLS fixed effects (LSDV) regression estimates ("cluster 
robust" standard errors) of the association between (log) enrolment rates 
in tertiary education institutions and employment protection, 15 Western 
Countries (no data on Germany), 1998-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR 0.121 0.160*** 0.177*** 0.183*** 
 (0.138) (0.033) (0.044) (0.054) 
FTC   -0.008 -0.001 
   (0.013) (0.008) 
UAM   0.045 0.021 
   (0.038) (0.030) 
Trends No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes 
R-sq 0.69 0.97 0.97 0.98 
N 141 141 141 141 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. UAM is the logged unemployment rate for adult men aged 
45-54. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts. Trends are country-specific, linear trends, year FE are year fixed effects. 
Source: Data on tertiary enrolment (number of students / relevant age group) from World 
Bank, see Data Appendix in Chapter 4, Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
The results support our speculation. A 1 unit change in the index of employment protection, 
which corresponds to the observed average size of a reform, is associated with a 18% change in 
enrolment rates, which is a very large effect. We performed extensive specification checks to 
tests for the presence of influential outliers, which suggest that Austria contributes influential 
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observations, but they do not alone generate the strong association we observe.43
* * * 
 We repeated 
this analysis using the log of expenditures on active labor market policy measures as a percentage 
of GDP as a dependent variable. We found stricter job security legislation to significantly 
increase expenditure on such policies, while regulation on temporary contracts had the opposite 
effect. The results proved sensitive to country composition, though, and require further 
exploration. 
Returning to the labor market analysis, we now assess whether reforms had different effects 
on different demographic groups. In Table 5.15, we report results of analyses of the effects of 
reform of job security provisions on regular contracts, where we estimate separate treatment 
effects by levels of education and gender. The effects of reform on labor force participation are 
nearly identical across education groups. Robustness checks suggest a greater sensitivity of these 
results (in terms of statistical significance) to the presence of Spain in the sample, particularly the 
effect on the least educated.44
 
43 Specification (3) turned out to be robust, while specification (4) proved sensitive to the presence of 
Austria. But dropping Austria made the Netherlands and influential observation, and dropping both Netherlands 
and Austria, we again obtain a statistically significant result, but smaller beta coefficients. 
 Moreover, we observe an effect on unemployment among women, 
which, however, does not prove to be robust to dropping Spain from the sample. Increasing the 
post-reform observation period to five years after the reform, we observe stronger negative 
effects on employment in particular among the less educated, but the effects lose statistical 
significance once Spain is dropped from the sample. Regarding labor force participation, 
increasing the post-reform observation period to five years after the reform yields insignificant 
effects for tertiary educated, while the effects for less educated gain in strength and significance. 
44 For young people with either ISCED 3-4 or ISCED 5-6 degrees, we observe the results to be sensitive to 
the exlusion of Spain for either the trend or the control, but not both specifications. 
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Table 5.15 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of job security provisions on regular employment contracts on youth unemployment, 
employment and labor force participation rates, 16 Western countries, 1992-2006, heterogeneous 
reform effects 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
δepr  (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
ISCED 0-2 -0.037 -0.027  0.014 -0.005  -0.033*** -0.032*** 
 (0.056) (0.069)  (0.014) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) 
ISCED 3-4 -0.019 -0.022  -0.002 -0.012  -0.035*** -0.035*** 
 (0.069) (0.064)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.011) (0.013) 
ISCED 5-6 -0.087 -0.047  -0.012 -0.023  -0.037*** -0.037*** 
 (0.041) (0.057)  (0.013) (0.015)  (0.011) (0.013) 
Women 0.059*** 0.058***  0.007 0.007  -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.018) (0.017)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.010) (0.010) 
R-sq 0.60 0.54  0.48 0.45  0.32 0.31 
N 1242 1242  1242 1242  1242 1242 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.5 
While we could not detect average effects of reforms on the usage of temporary contracts, we 
discover some effect heterogeneities "beneath the surface" (see Table 5.16). We see that 
particularly more educated groups may benefit from employment enhancing effects of 
deregulation. In contrast, there is some evidence that women and the least educated are worse off 
after deregulation. Deregulation of temporary contracts may also raise youth labor force 
participation among more educated groups. However, varying the window of observation and the 
country composition, we find that most of the results are sensitive to the country composition, 
particularly the presence of Italy and Belgium, which both experienced extensive reforms. Some 
of the employment effects of deregulation are robust, however: Tertiary graduates benefit from a 
deregulation of temporary contracts, at least over the short run, considering a period up to three 
years after reform. Women are worse off in particular over the long run, considering a period up 
until five years after reform. 
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Table 5.16 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts on youth unemployment, employment 
and labor force participation rates, 16 Western countries, 1992-2006, heterogeneous reform 
effects 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
δftc  (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
ISCED 0-2 -0.025 0.021  0.014* 0.006  0.007 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.007) 
ISCED 3-4 -0.030* 0.013  -0.011** -0.013***  -0.009*** -0.007*** 
 (0.016) (0.018)  (0.005) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) 
ISCED 5-6 0.013 0.059**  -0.020*** -0.023***  -0.011** -0.010** 
 (0.017) (0.024)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Women -0.023 -0.023  0.007* 0.007*  0.002 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.013)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
R-sq 0.59 0.58  0.47 0.43  0.31 0.26 
N 1242 1242  1242 1242  1242 1242 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.5 
Next, we assess interactions between both types of legislation as suggested by Blanchard and 
Landier (2002) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002). We begin by running regressions similar to 
those reported in Table 5.12, assessing whether the effects of changes in the regulation of 
temporary contracts depend on the strictness of job security provisions on regular contracts. We 
thus estimate an interaction between the treatment effect δftc and the strictness of job security 
provisions on regular contracts. The results are reported in Table 5.17. The "control" 
specifications support the hypothesized interaction: If regular jobs are highly protected, 
tightening regulations on the usage of temporary contracts raises youth employment and labor 
force participation and diminishes youth unemployment (not significant). Conversely, 
deregulating temporary contracts if regular contracts are highly protected makes young people 
worse off on all three outcomes.  
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Table 5.17 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts on youth unemployment, employment 
and labor force participation rates, 16 Western countries, 1992-2006, consequence of "partial 
deregulation” 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δftc  -0.028 0.020  0.002 -0.004  -0.001 0.002 
 (0.014) (0.029)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.006) 
epr * δftc -0.016 0.004  0.023** 0.008  0.014** 0.014 
 (0.024) (0.046)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.012) 
R-sq 0.59 0.57  0.44 0.42  0.31 0.26 
N 1242 1242  1242 1242  1242 1242 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.5 
However, these effects disappear completely (or lose statistical significance) once we control 
for linear trends and log adult outcomes. 45
We checked further whether the interaction plays out differently for different demographic 
groups, but found no significant effects. We also checked for sensitivity to country composition 
and varied the window of observation, which did not change the results. Finally, we also assessed 
 It appears that partial deregulation may be an 
ineffective policy that was adopted in countries experiencing a deterioration of the youth labor 
market. We prefer this explanation, particularly since we do not observe significant effects on 
unemployment, where we would expect the potentially negative effects of partial deregulation to 
manifest themselves first. Moreover, the effect on employment rates is contrary to our 
expectation of a substitution of permanent with temporary jobs, which should not lead to a net 
change in aggregate employment. That we observe a negative effect of partial deregulation 
should therefore rather be taken as evidence of a general downward trend on the youth labor 
market, which may have prompted partial deregulation. Partial deregulation in itself then did not 
lead to a divergence from the underlying negative trend on the youth labor market. 
 
45 Adjusting for linear trends only suffices to destroy the effects. 
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the "reverse interaction", i.e. whether the effects of reforms of security provisions on regular 
contracts depend on strictness in the regulations on temporary contracts, but found no evidence in 
support. 
5.3.2. Results for adult men 
In the final step, to further clarify the distributional effects of employment protection, we assess 
its effect on the adult labor market. We focus in particular on the outcomes of men aged 45-54. 
Consistent with theoretical expectations, we find no evidence that employment protection on 
regular contracts affects the labor market outcomes of adult men (Table 5.18). This result is 
similar to what we obtained using a different data set and fixed effects analysis in the preceding 
section (Table 5.10).  
Table 5.18 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of employment protection on adult men's (ages 45-54) unemployment, employment and 
labor force participation rates, 16 Western countries, 1992-2006 
I. Effect of employment protection on regular contracts (epr) 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δepr 0.086 0.053  -0.001 0.001  0.003 0.001 
 (0.052) (0.049)  (0.006) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) 
R-sq 0.50 0.47  0.38 0.40  0.40 0.39 
N 621 621  621 621  621 621 
II. Effect of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts (rtc) 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δrtc -0.130*** -0.083***  0.007*** 0.005***  0.001 0.002* 
 (0.018) (0.022)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
R-sq 0.53 0.47  0.42 0.38  0.43 0.37 
N 621 621  621 621  621 621 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.5 
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Examining the distribution of the effects across education groups suggests no significant effect 
heterogeneity. Robustness checks (including five post-reform years, dropping individual 
countries from the sample) also do not reveal any significant or sizable effects. 
However, the deregulation of temporary contracts appears to have raised unemployment 
among adult men (confirming the results of the fixed effects analysis in Table 5.10), and lowered 
their employment rates, although the latter effect is relatively small. These effects are robust to 
changes in the country composition, but weaken somewhat if we consider longer post-reform 
periods. Thus, we find support for the alleged adverse effects of deregulation for a demographic 
group, where we initially did not expect it to be most prevalent. To further clarify these results, 
we estimate the effects across education groups. We would generally expect that less educated 
would be more vulnerable to the adverse effects of a deregulation of temporary contracts. Results 
are reported in Table 5.19. 
Table 5.19 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts on adult men's (ages 45-54) 
unemployment, employment and labor force participation rates, 16 Western countries, 1992-
2006, heterogeneous reform effects 
 Unemployment  Employment  LF Participation 
δftc  (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
ISCED 0-2 -0.135*** -0.082**  0.011*** 0.009***  0.002 0.003** 
 (0.019) (0.028)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) 
ISCED 3-4 -0.119*** -0.063**  0.004** 0.003  0.000 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.027)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.002) 
ISCED 5-6 -0.135*** -0.105**  0.004*** 0.004**  0.002* 0.003* 
 (0.020) (0.016)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
R-sq 0.53 0.47  0.43 0.38  0.43 0.37 
N 621 621  621 621  621 621 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.5 
Regarding unemployment we do not observe a clear ranking of effects across education 
groups, at least over the short-run. However, when evaluating the effect over the long run (i.e. 
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five post-reform years), the effect on tertiary educated disappears. Regarding employment, the 
adverse effects of deregulation appear to be concentrated among the least educated. The weak 
effects we observe over the short-run among the more educated groups (ISCED 3-4, 5-6) 
dissipate over the long run. Thus, the adverse effects of deregulation seem to be concentrated 
among the less educated, leading to higher inequality in job security among adult men.46
5.4. Summary 
  
Consistent with theoretical expectations, the difference-in-difference analysis indicates no effect 
of reforms of job security provisions on unemployment or employment among either young 
people or adults. This suggests that reductions of job security provisions are not generally 
effective policy levers if the goal is to lower youth unemployment or raise employment rates. 
However, we found some evidence that stricter job security provisions lead to lower labor force 
participation in particular among the less educated youth, and higher enrolment rates in tertiary 
education. 
This result is plausible if there are indeed negative effects of job security provisions on youth 
labor market chances, which young people anticipate and to which they respond by improving 
their competitive position on the labor market through enrolling in or staying enrolled in higher 
education. Job security provisions may push young people into higher education, who would 
otherwise not enter higher education. Thus, job security provisions impose costs on individuals, 
and given that higher education is to a large extent publicly financed in a European context, job 
security provisions are costly to tax payers as well. Moreover, we would expect that young 
people respond differently in anticipation of a tough transition from school to work. Especially 
 
46 We could not find evidence of an interaction effect between job security provisions on regular contracts 
and the regulation of temporary contracts. 
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young people with more privileged backgrounds are more likely to go to university under such 
conditions, while those with less privileged backgrounds find themselves in a tough transition 
from (lower/incomplete) secondary school to work. Finally, an overinvestment into tertiary 
education, particularly if young people with low expected returns are pushed into higher 
education, should lead to a decline in the returns on tertiary degrees, even for those who had high 
expected returns when deciding to enter higher education (Dolado et al., 2000). 
Regarding regulations on temporary contracts, our results differed substantially across 
education groups. This strong effect heterogeneity probably reflects the different functions that 
temporary contracts perform on different segments of the labor market. Our results showed no 
aggregate effects on young people, but we could detect robust, positive effects of deregulation on 
employment chances of tertiary educated youth, at least over the short run. For those with less 
than tertiary education, we did not obtain robust results. We found young women to be worse off 
after deregulation, in particular over the long-run. Moreover, we found that deregulation to be 
associated with lower employment and higher unemployment among adult men, in particular 
among less educated. Thus, both women and less educated young men seem to suffer from the 
negative consequences of deregulation, a destruction of stable employment and an increase in 
turnover. Highly skilled youth in contrast benefit in terms of higher employment rates, which is 
consistent with a screening interpretation.  
Before drawing further conclusions, we will analyze the effects of employment protection 
reform on the incidence of temporary employment, which is the goal of the following chapter. 
However, the results so far do not suggest that lowering job security provisions on regular 
contracts is a particularly effect tool to improve the labor market outcomes of young people. 
Deregulation of temporary contracts seems to have improved the outcomes of tertiary educated 
youth only, and thereby increased inequalities on the labor market suggested by Goux and 
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Maurin (2005) as well as DiPrete et al. (2006). In particular, employment protection reform is 
unlikely to improve the outcomes of less educated youth.  
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5.5. Appendix 
Table 5.20 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection legislation and relative youth unemployment rates, different gender and 
age-groups  
I. Ages 15-19 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR -0.12 -0.08 -0.22** -0.22***  -0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.13 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
RTC 0.13* 0.15** 0.09* 0.11***  0.22*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
R-sq 0.11 0.36 0.73 0.72  0.28 0.52 0.78 0.77 
N 436 436 436 436  436 436 436 436 
II. Ages 20-24 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR -0.07 -0.11 -0.17* -0.11  -0.01 -0.10 -0.13 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06)  (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) 
RTC 0.14** 0.13*** 0.09** 0.12***  0.25*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
R-sq 0.25 0.45 0.59 0.53  0.40 0.60 0.74 0.71 
N 436 436 436 436  436 436 436 436 
III. Ages 25-29 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR -0.05 -0.10 -0.15* -0.11*  -0.01 -0.10 -0.24** -0.18** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) 
RTC 0.11* 0.09* 0.07 0.07*  0.20*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
R-sq 0.19 0.40 0.52 0.46  0.31 0.54 0.77 0.75 
N 436 436 436 436  436 436 436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 5.1 
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Table 5.21 Regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection, relative youth (ages 15-29) unemployment rates (UY / UA), absolute 
youth unemployment rates (UY) and adult men's (ages 45-54) unemployment rate (UA), 21 OECD 
countries, 1985-2007 
 A. Men, aged 15-29  B. Women, age 15-29 
 UY/UA UY UA  UY/UA UY UA 
EPR -0.11* -0.04 0.06  -0.09 -0.02 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.09)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
RTC 0.10** 0.13*** 0.03  0.18*** 0.20*** 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
GenRR -0.01 -0.01*** 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
TradeU -0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Wage1 0.01 -0.10*** -0.12*  0.03 -0.08* -0.12* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Wage2 0.03 -0.04 -0.08  0.08 0.01 -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.11)  (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) 
Left 0.02* 0.04* 0.02  0.02 0.04 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
ALMP -0.06 0.30** 0.36  -0.16 0.19 0.35 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.26)  (0.22) (0.16) (0.26) 
PMR 0.04 -0.02 -0.07  0.10 0.05 -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
Glob. 0.00 -0.00 -0.00  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
TTS -0.00 -0.00 0.00  -0.01** -0.01* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
LTIR 0.05*** 0.02 -0.03  0.06** 0.03* -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Infl. 0.08** -0.02 -0.10**  0.09*** -0.00 -0.10** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
OutG 0.00 -0.12*** -0.12***  0.01 -0.10*** -0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
CohS -0.17 0.90*** 1.07***  -0.20 0.80*** 1.03*** 
 (0.17) (0.20) (0.31)  (0.24) (0.24) (0.30) 
R-sq 0.42    0.57   
N 436 436  436 436 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The "UY/UA" models were estimated using OLS. The "UY" and "UA" models for each 
gender are estimated jointly using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (Wooldridge, 2002). All dependent variables in natural 
logs. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of temporary contracts. Control 
variables: indicators for the generosity of unemployment benefits (GenRR), trade union density (TradeU), two indicators for 
the coordination of wage bargaining (Wage1, Wage2), indicators for the cabinet power of left parties (Left), expenditure on 
active labor market policies (ALMP), product market regulations (PMR), economic globalization (Glob.), terms-of-trade 
shocks (TTS), long-term interest rates (LTIR), the inflation rate (Infl.), output gap (OutG), the youth cohort size (CohS), and 
year fixed effects; see notes to Table 5.1 
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Table 5.22 Discrepancies between previous and most recent OECD data releases on youth 
unemployment and dismissal regulations on regular contracts for the period 1995-1999 
 Youth unemployment rate ratios  Employment protection, regular contracts 
 
Breen 2005, 
Table 3 
see Section 
4.6 (p. 106f.) (2) - (1)  
OECD 1999, 
Table 2.2 
see Section 
4.6 (p. 106f.) (4) - (3) 
Australia 2.30 2.39 0.09  1.0 1.4 0.4 
Austria 1.46 1.56 0.10  2.6 2.9 0.3 
Belgium  2.63 2.64 0.01  1.5 1.7 0.2 
Canada 2.00 1.99 -0.01  0.9 1.3 0.4 
Czech Rep. 2.25 2.25 0.00  2.8 3.3 0.5 
Denmark 1.68 1.79 0.11  1.6 1.6 0.0 
Finland 2.23 2.21 -0.02  2.1 2.3 0.2 
France 2.46 2.45 -0.01  2.3 2.3 0.0 
Germany 1.14 1.12 -0.02  2.8 2.7 -0.1 
Greece 3.80 3.80 0.00  2.4 2.3 -0.2 
Hungary 2.05 2.08 0.03  2.1 1.9 -0.2 
Ireland 1.69 1.65 -0.04  1.6 1.6 0.0 
Italy 3.62 3.50 -0.12  2.8 1.8 -1.0 
Japan 2.35 2.36 0.01  2.7 1.9 -0.8 
Korea 3.31 3.23 -0.08  3.2 2.9 -0.3 
Mexico 2.25 2.22 -0.03  2.3 2.3 0.0 
Netherlands 2.05 2.18 0.13  3.1 3.1 0.0 
N. Zealand 2.40 2.43 0.03  1.7 1.4 -0.4 
Norway 3.21 3.49 0.28  2.4 2.3 -0.2 
Poland 2.55 2.56 0.01  2.2 2.1 -0.1 
Portugal 2.42 2.39 -0.03  4.3 4.3 0.0 
Spain 2.04 2.04 0.00  2.6 2.7 0.1 
Sweden 2.55 2.37 -0.18  2.8 2.9 0.1 
Switzerland 1.52 1.66 0.14  1.2 1.2 0.0 
Turkey 2.91 2.90 -0.01  2.6 2.6 0.0 
UK 2.15 2.29 0.14  0.8 1.0 0.2 
USA 2.79 2.90 0.11  0.2 0.2 0.0 
Average 2.36 2.39 0.02  2.17 2.13 -0.04 
Notes: Values in column 5 are rounded to the first decimal. Youth unemployment rate ratios are the ratios of the youth (ages 
15-24) divided by the aggregate (ages 25-54) unemployment rate. 
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6 
6. Employment Protection and Temporary 
Employment 
In this chapter, we analyze empirically the relationship between employment protection 
legislation and temporary employment on the youth labor market. While we argued in Chapter 3 
that the relationship between employment protection and youth unemployment is theoretically 
indeterminate, we can derive clear expectations about the effect of employment protection on the 
incidence of temporary employment on the youth labor market. We generally expect that stricter 
job security provisions on regular contracts should raise the incidence of temporary contracts 
(Polavieja, 2006; Kahn, 2007, 2010). If employees on regular employment contracts enjoy some 
degree of job protection, which is the case in all Western European countries analyzed here, 
employers stand to gain from using temporary contracts. Thus, we expect that deregulating 
constraints on the usage of temporary contracts should lead to a higher incidence of temporary 
employment. This effect should be particularly pronounced in countries with strict job security 
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provisions on regular contracts, where employers should gain the most from using temporary 
contracts.  
From a human capital perspective, employers should rely on temporary contracts for 
unskilled jobs, where individuals are most easily replaceable (DiPrete et al., 2006). Since 
employers have no economic interest in long-term employment relationships, we would expect a 
substitution of permanent with temporary jobs, to the extent that regulations permit. In contrast, 
in the high skill labor market, employers partly finance training of newly hired and therefore 
have incentives to maintain a long-term employment relationships. Temporary contracts are still 
attractive in order to screen employees, before hiring them on a permanent basis, in particular if 
strict dismissal regulations make hiring risky. Thus, we would argue that deregulation of 
temporary contracts should lead to growth in temporary employment across the skill distribution, 
although the function of temporary contracts in the different skill segments is very different. 
Temporary jobs are likely to substitute for permanent jobs in the low skill segment, which may 
raise turnover and unemployment risks among less educated. In the high skill segment, they 
represent screening devices and stepping stones to permanent employment, which may lower 
unemployment and raise employment rates among tertiary educated. 
As in the preceding chapter, we build our analysis in three steps, starting with a cross-
sectional analysis of the association between temporary employment and the two dimensions of 
employment protection legislation as well as their interaction. Most comparative analyses 
published  on this question rely on cross-sectional data (Booth et al., 2002; Polavieja, 2006; 
Kahn, 2007; Baranowska and Gebel, 2010; but see Kahn, 2010, for a longitudinal analysis). We 
use different definitions of the dependent variable, different control variable specifications and 
both the OECD and EULFS dataset to test the robustness of the associations. In the second step, 
we assess whether the associations found in the cross-section hold up if we control for country 
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fixed effects. This step is mainly to illustrate the sensitivity of cross-sectional estimates as well as 
the sensitivity of fixed effects estimates to different control variable specifications. The third step 
of our analysis uses differences-in-differences estimation to assess the effects of reforms of 
employment protection legislation on temporary employment on the youth labor market. This is 
the decisive step of our analysis. We assess whether there have been aggregate reform effects as 
well as whether demographic groups have been differentially affected, and whether reform in one 
dimension of employment protection depended on the extent of regulation in the other 
dimension. 
6.1. Results from cross-sectional analysis 
While conventions exist on how to define unemployment and inactivity, we lack similar 
conventions for temporary employment. Past comparative research has tended to focus on 
temporary employment as a proportion of the employed (e.g. Dolado et al., 2002), which also 
corresponds to frequently published OECD statistics as used by Booth et al. (2002) and Polavieja 
(2006). In the following, we will use different definitions that vary the reference quantity, i.e. the 
percentage of individuals holding a temporary contract among the employed, in the active labor 
force and in the population. Focusing on the employed or active population already introduces 
sample selectivity, restricting the sample to individuals who chose to become active or succeeded 
to obtain a job, which both may be influenced by job security provisions. Indeed, Chapter 5 has 
provided robust evidence that participation is influenced by job security provisions. It therefore 
appears preferable to define temporary employment as the number of individuals holding a 
temporary contract in the population, which we refer to as the “temporary employment rate”. 
Particularly, if we perform longitudinal analysis, using the population as a reference quantity 
appears preferable, because it is less vulnerable to unobserved, time-varying factors that are 
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causal antecedents to both temporary employment and employment protection, particularly in the 
short and medium run. However, we nevertheless consider the alternative definitions, both as 
robustness checks and because they are commonly used in the literature. For all statistical 
analyses, we take the natural log of each dependent variable. Information on data sources and 
control variable definitions is available in Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
As a first look at the evidence, we plot the incidence of temporary employment on the youth 
labor market (young people aged 15-29). We use data from 15 Western European countries for 
the period from 1985 to 2006. We define the incidence here as the number of young people in 
temporary employment among 15-29 year olds. The results are very similar if we use different 
definitions of the dependent variable, or if we look at the ratio of youth to adult temporary 
employment. We also plot the linear regression line and the lowess smoother as a non-parametric 
measure of association. 
We observe that temporary employment is indeed more prevalent on the youth labor market, 
if dismissal from regular contracts is highly regulated, although this relationship becomes weaker 
at higher levels of regulation. These results concur with Booth et al. (2002) and Polavieja (2006) 
who analyze the aggregate incidence of temporary employment on Western European labor 
markets. Similar to Booth et al. (2002), we also find no linear association between regulations on 
the usage of temporary contracts and their incidence. Instead the effect appears to be non-linear, 
although we have no reason to expect a non-linearity: Stricter regulations are associated with 
higher incidence of temporary contracts for low values of regulation, while at high value of 
regulation, we observe the expected negative association. In the following section, we will assess 
the robustness of these associations. 
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Figure 6.1 Employment protection and temporary employment (as % of the population) among 
15-29 year old men and women 
 
Source: EULFS 1985-2006, own calculations 
We use OLS regression and adopt different conditioning strategies to assess the robustness of 
the associations depicted in Figure 6.1. Specification (1) just contains the two regulation 
indicators. Specification (2) adds a set of control variables as well as year fixed effects. 
Specification (3) adds all interaction/quadratic terms generated from these control variables that 
significantly predict either the outcome or the regulation indicators. Specification (4) retains only 
significant interaction/quadratic terms (see Section 4.4.1, p.93f.).  
Table 6.1 presents the results using an unbalanced panel dataset for 20 OECD countries from 
1985-2007. The dependent variable here is the log percentage of 15-24 year old dependent 
employees, who are on a temporary contract. We see that the effect of job security provisions on 
permanent contracts diminishes upon inclusion of control variables, but it remains sizeable and 
statistically significant. There is no linear association between the regulations on the usage of 
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temporary contracts and their incidence. Given the absence of a substantive reason, we generally 
do not include a quadratic term for regulations on temporary contracts, but will test for non-
linearities below. 
Table 6.1 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection and temporary employment (% on temporary contract among dependent 
employees), young people aged 15-24, 20 OECD countries, 1985-2007 
 A. Men  B. Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR 0.31** 0.17* 0.15*** 0.15***  0.30** 0.19** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
RTC 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
R-sq 0.25 0.58 0.81 0.81  0.28 0.57 0.77 0.77 
N 323 323 323 323  323 323 323 323 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts. Control variables used in specifications (2), (3) and (4): indicators for the generosity of unemployment 
benefits, trade union density, two indicators for the coordination of wage bargaining, indicators for the cabinet power of left 
parties, expenditure on active labor market policies, product market regulation, economic globalization, terms-of-trade 
shocks, long-term interest rates, the inflation rate, output gap, the youth cohort size, and year fixed effects. 
Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, see Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
Table 6.2 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection and temporary employment, young people aged 15-29, 15 Western 
European countries, 1992-2006 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts in 
population 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.37*** -0.02  0.39*** 0.06  0.41*** 0.24*** 
 (0.11) (0.03)  (0.12) (0.03)  (0.14) (0.04) 
RTC 0.11* 0.05**  0.05 0.04*  -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.02) 
R-sq 0.24 0.51  0.25 0.54  0.23 0.61 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 6.1 
Source: EULFS data (own calculations), see Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
In Table 6.2 (see above), we repeated the same analysis using the augmented EULFS dataset 
for 15 Western European countries (1992-2006), which we also use in the differences-in-
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differences analysis. The effect of job security provisions on regular contracts is less robust than 
in the OECD data. At least for the log temporary employment rate (% of individuals on 
temporary contracts in population), we observe a robust effect that survives inclusion of 
quadratic/interaction terms generated from the control variables.  
In Table 6.3, we have restricted the sample to the years 1996-2006 and added an additional 
control variable to capture variation in the size of apprenticeship systems (% of ISCED 3-4 
students enrolled in programs combining school-based vocational education with on-the-job 
training), which account for a sizeable share of temporary employment in a number of European 
countries. In the upper panel, we see that the effect of job security provisions is now highly 
robust to the inclusion of control variables. The middle panel tests for the existence of a non-
linear relationship between the regulation of temporary contracts and their incidence, which is 
clearly present in the data as suggested by Figure 6.1. It is unclear, however, what this means, 
since we had no theoretical expectation for this effect to be non-linear. It seems implausible that 
tighter regulations should be associated with a higher incidence, unless there may be a policy 
endogeneity such that politicians may unsuccessfully try to restrict the usage of temporary 
contracts to limit their excessive growth. Evidence for such failed reforms exists (see Dolado et 
al. 2002, for the Spanish case), and indeed dropping the Spanish case considerably weakens the 
non-linear effect. The non-linearity may thus be rather due to Spanish exceptionalism in terms of 
temporary employment (see Polavieja, 2006). The lower panel tests for the presence of an 
interaction between both types of regulations. While we expect regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts to have an effect especially when regular employment is highly protected, 
there is no evidence whatsoever for this interaction. 
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Table 6.3 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection and temporary employment, young people aged 15-29, 15 Western 
European countries, 1996-2006 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts 
in population 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.37*** 0.08**  0.41*** 0.20***  0.45*** 0.28*** 
 (0.09) (0.03)  (0.10) (0.02)  (0.14) (0.04) 
RTC 0.16** 0.06***  0.09 0.07***  0.04 0.05*** 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.01)  (0.08) (0.02) 
R-sq 0.27 0.49  0.26 0.51  0.25 0.60 
N 960 960  960 960  960 960 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.26*** 0.06***  0.29*** 0.19***  0.32** 0.27*** 
 (0.07) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.02)  (0.13) (0.04) 
RTC 0.19*** 0.08***  0.12** 0.07***  0.06 0.07*** 
 (0.04) (0.01)  (0.05) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.02) 
RTC2 -0.11*** -0.04***  -0.12*** -0.02*  -0.12*** -0.02* 
 (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.01)  (0.04) (0.01) 
R-sq 0.32 0.49  0.34 0.51  0.33 0.60 
N 960 960  960 960  960 960 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.31*** 0.09**  0.35*** 0.21***  0.35** 0.29*** 
 (0.08) (0.04)  (0.10) (0.03)  (0.15) (0.05) 
RTC 0.14** 0.07***  0.07 0.07***  0.01 0.06** 
 (0.06) (0.02)  (0.07) (0.02)  (0.08) (0.02) 
EPR_RTC -0.11 0.04  -0.12 0.01  -0.17 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.04)  (0.09) (0.03)  (0.11) (0.04) 
R-sq 0.27 0.49  0.27 0.52  0.27 0.60 
N 960 960  960 960  960 960 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 6.1 
Source: EULFS data (own calculations), see Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
Finally, we repeated the analysis reported in Table 6.2 for different education groups (results 
in Table 6.10, Appendix). Focusing on the temporary employment rate (% of temporary contracts 
in population), we observe the strongest effect of job security provisions on the least educated 
and on the most educated, particularly in those models that account for control variables. 
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Our findings thus far concur with research published on Western European countries about 
cross-sectional variation in the aggregate incidence of temporary employment across Western 
countries. Both Polavieja (2006) and Booth et al. (2002) find job security provisions on 
permanent contracts to be associated with a higher incidence of temporary employment. This 
suggests that employers rely on temporary employment as a source of flexibility, if dismissal 
conditions for regular employees are strict. Like Booth et al (2002), we also find no linear effect 
of regulations on temporary contracts and their incidence. Kahn (2007) also finds a positive 
effect of job security provisions on the relative incidence of temporary employment among 
young people. Compared to these studies, we have used a greater number of observations at the 
country-year level and used more demanding control variable specifications, but the results 
proved to be quite robust. In the following, we want to assess how robust they are once we 
include country fixed effects. 
6.2. Results from fixed effects analysis 
Among the studies that have used more rigorous identification strategies, Kahn (2010) uses 
longitudinal data and a fixed effects approach to identify the effect of employment protection 
reforms on overall and temporary employment. The author finds robust evidence that 
deregulating the usage of temporary contracts raises their incidence, but does not lead to overall 
employment gains, which is interpreted as evidence for a substitution of permanent with 
temporary contracts. An earlier study by the OECD (1999: 80), using cross-national data from 
two periods and random effects estimators, finds that stricter regulations on permanent contracts 
are associated with lower temporary employment, which the study dismisses as theoretically 
implausible. 
Employment Protection and Temporary Employment 
 
162 
 
As a first graphical illustration, we have country-demeaned the same data used to generate 
Figure 6.1 and now only focus on the within-country variation of the variables. The observed 
pattern changes considerably (see Figure 5.2). We now observe that increasing jobs security 
provisions on regular contracts is associated with lower incidence of temporary employment, 
which defies theoretical expectations. Moreover, we now observe as one might expect that 
stricter regulations on the usage of temporary employment are associated with a lower incidence 
of temporary employment. For both indicators of employment protection, we observe the 
presence of outlying observations, which in part seem responsible for the negative associations. 
For this reason, it will be an important part of the subsequent analyses to probe the robustness of 
results to changes in country composition. 
Figure 6.2 Employment protection and temporary employment (as % of the population) among 
15-29 year old men and women, country-demeaned data 
 
Source: EULFS 1985-2006, own calculations 
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In the following, we probe the robustness of these associations to inclusion of different 
control variables using the EULFS and OECD datasets. Table 6.4 reports the results. 
Specification (1) just includes the two measures of replication and reproduces the results of the 
cross-sectional analyses in the preceding section. Specification (2) adds country fixed effects, 
which causes the effect of job security provisions on regular contracts to turn from positive 
significant (p<0.05) to negative significant (p<0.01). While we could not observe a linear effect 
of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts in the cross-section, this effect now appears as 
expected.  
Table 6.4 OLS fixed effects regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the 
association between employment protection and temporary employment, EULFS data (young 
people, 15 Western European countries, 1992-2006) and OECD data (young people aged 15-24, 
20 OECD countries, 1985-2007) 
 
EULFS, % on temporary contracts 
in population  
OECD, % on temporary contracts 
 among dependent employees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EPR 0.41** -0.26*** -0.20** 0.06  0.30** -0.18*** 0.07 0.21 
 (0.14) (0.04) (0.08) (0.11)  (0.12) (0.05) (0.10) (0.17) 
RTC -0.00 -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.03  0.04 -0.19*** -0.11*** -0.08** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
CFE No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes Yes Yes 
YFE No No Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Contr. No No Yes No  No No Yes No 
Trends No No No Yes  No No No Yes 
          
R-sq 0.23 0.19 0.36 0.45  0.27 0.32 0.58 0.77 
N 1152 1152 1152 1152  323 323 323 323 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, CFE – country fixed effects, YFE – year fixed effects, Contr. – control variables (see notes to Table 
5.1), Trends – country-specific linear trends. 
Source: EULFS data (own calculations) and OECD Labor Force Statistics, see Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
Specification (3) adds year fixed effects and control variables as main effects (no 
interaction/quadratic terms), while specification (4) adds year fixed effects and country-specific 
linear trends. Adding country-specific linear trends eliminates the effect of job security 
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provisions on regular contracts in both datasets, as does adding control variables and year fixed 
effects in the OECD dataset. Furthermore, in the EULFS dataset country-specific linear trends 
also wipe out the effect of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts. This suggests that in 
the period from 1992 to 2006, Western European countries traveled along specific temporary 
employment growth paths, and after adjusting for these trends, there appears to be no change in 
the growth rate of temporary employment around a reform. Adjusting for trends also destroys the 
effect of job security provisions (EPR) on temporary employment, a result that is unintelligible in 
our theoretical framework, but has also been reported by the OECD (1999: p. 88). 
In Table 6.5 we repeat the analysis using EULFS data for the three different outcomes 
analogous to the analyses reported in Table 6.3, but now control for country fixed effects. The 
theoretically implausible negative effect of job security provisions on temporary employment that 
appears in the specification without any controls (1) disappears once we add control variables (4) 
and turns positive and significant in one instance. The effect of regulations on temporary 
contracts is in the expected theoretical direction and retains a considerable size and significance 
across specifications. The results suggest that tighter regulations on the usage of temporary 
contracts lower temporary employment, as reported by Kahn (2010). 
Nevertheless, the previous analysis reminds us that countries may experience different 
growth trends that our control variables fail to fully capture. If temporary employment is growing 
for reasons unaccounted for by the model, and a number of countries implement deregulatory 
reforms, we would obtain an association in the fixed effects models even if there was no causal 
effect. Hence, we consider the control variable specification that accounts for linear trends an 
important specification to test for this possibility. Finally, we test for an interaction between both 
types of regulation, expecting that a deregulation of temporary contracts leads to growth of 
temporary employment especially in the presence of strict dismissal regulations on permanent 
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contracts. The estimated interaction effect, however, rather attests to the – theoretically 
implausible – opposite at least in the specification where it reaches statistical significance.  
Table 6.5 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection and temporary employment, young people aged 15-29, 15 Western 
European countries, 1996-2006 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts 
in population 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR -0.14** 0.14**  -0.24*** -0.00  -0.26*** -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05)  (0.03) (0.05)  (0.04) (0.04) 
RTC -0.15*** -0.08***  -0.16*** -0.10***  -0.14*** -0.11*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.02) 
R-sq 0.24 0.57  0.25 0.53  0.19 0.50 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR -0.16** 0.13**  -0.26*** 0.02  -0.29*** -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.05) (0.03) 
RTC -0.17*** -0.08***  -0.17*** -0.08***  -0.16*** -0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
EPR_RTC -0.03 -0.00  -0.03 0.04*  -0.06 0.05*** 
 (0.05) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.02) 
R-sq 0.25 0.57  0.25 0.53  0.20 0.49 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 6.1 
Source: EULFS data (own calculations), see Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
The previous analyses, as in Chapter 5, reminded us again of the sensitivity of cross-sectional 
inference to unobserved confounders. While the cross-sectional analysis suggested that stricter 
job security provisions are associated with higher temporary employment, adjusting for fixed 
effects reversed this association or rendered it insignificant. Moreover, the results regarding 
regulations of temporary contracts also changed substantively. The cross-sectional analysis 
attested to a theoretically unexpected non-linearity, where stricter regulations are associated with 
higher temporary employment for low values of regulation, but we found no evidence for the 
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expected interaction between job security provisions and regulations on temporary contracts. In 
the fixed effects analysis, the non-linear main effect of regulations disappears (results not 
shown), and we obtain more theoretically plausible effects similar to those reported by Kahn 
(2010). However, the results do not survive inclusion of country-specific linear trends. Moreover, 
we now have to deal with a theoretically unexpected result regarding the interaction between 
both types of employment protection legislation.  
We thus conclude that the results from cross-sectional analysis cannot be interpreted as 
causal relationships. However, we also view the results of the fixed effects analysis as tentative, 
because of the sensitivity to inclusion of country-specific trends. We also adopted a rather 
restrictive control variable specification that does not allow for non-linearities. To illustrate the 
relative success or failure of different conditioning strategies, Figure 6.3 graphs the smoothed 
residual from a regression of log youth (ages 15-29) temporary employment using different 
control variable specifications (15 Western European countries, 1985-2006, n=265). We graph 
the results for Italy and Spain, which experienced deregulations and reregulation of temporary 
contracts, respectively. 47
 
47 Specification (1) includes country and year fixed effects only. In (2), we add we add country-specific 
macroeconomic shocks, i.e. we fit for each country two interaction terms between the country fixed effects and 
two measures of macroeconomic changes, the output gap and the inflation rate. In (3), we add to (1) country-
specific linear trends. (4) is the "restricted specification" adding to (1) control variables and some 
interaction/quadratic terms. In (5), we add to (1) the (logged) temporary employment rate for adult men, aged 
45-54. In (6), we add to (1) country-specific linear trends and the (logged) temporary employment rate for adult 
men. 
 Adjusting for country and year fixed effects (specification 1), we 
observe still persistent trends in the dependent variable that match the trends observed in the 
unadjusted data quite closely. In the Spanish case, we observe rapid growth in the 1980s and a 
reversal in the early 1990s roughly following macroeconomic trends. In Italy, we observe 
persistent growth, with some cyclical variation. From the Italian case, we would obtain a strong 
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effect of deregulation on temporary employment growth in specification (1), but the data clearly 
show that this growth already commenced more than ten years before deregulation occurred. 
Figure 6.3 The effect of using different conditioning strategies, youth temporary employment 
 
Source: EULFS data (own calculations) 
Adjusting for country-specific trends is thus a crucial specification check, and may change 
our inference significantly. The Spanish case illustrates the need to adjust for macroeconomic 
factors that are strongly associated with the growth of temporary employment (Dolado et al., 
2002; Holmlund and Storrie, 2002). The linear trends alone do not succeed in capturing non-
linear cyclical fluctuation, as specification (3) shows. In specification (4), we succeed in 
removing some of the cyclical variation in temporary employment using control variables, 
including cyclical variables and interactions among these with institutions. However, in this 
application, we need many more degrees of freedom to achieve a cyclical correction. As in the 
case of unemployment (Section 4.5.1, p. 101f.), we therefore consider it reasonable to focus on 
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both trend on control variable based specifications, i.e. specifications (4) and (6). Effects should 
be consistent across specifications. 
6.3. Results from differences-in-differences analysis 
We proceed analogous to the differences-in-differences (DiD) analysis in the preceding chapter, 
exclusively relying on the augmented EULFS dataset. We generally perform the same 
specification checks, varying the window of observation as well as dropping one country at a 
time and rerunning the analysis. Table 6.6 reports results for average effects of employment 
protection reforms on temporary employment on the youth labor market.  
Table 6.6 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of employment protection on temporary employment among young people, 15 Western 
countries, 1992-2006 
I. Effect of employment protection on regular contracts (epr) 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts in 
population 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δepr 0.035 -0.006  0.033 0.024  0.010 -0.012 
 (0.018) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.028)  (0.014) (0.029) 
R-sq 0.58 0.55  0.56 0.53  0.53 0.49 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
II. Effect of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts (rtc) 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts in 
population 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δrtc -0.035 -0.014  -0.023 -0.015  -0.029 -0.017 
 (0.020) (0.032)  (0.024) (0.030)  (0.024) (0.030) 
R-sq 0.58 0.53  0.54 0.51  0.50 0.46 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, the R-squared statistic is the "within R-squared", see notes to Table 2.1Table 6.2 
We observe that there is no effect of job security provisions on regular contracts on the 
incidence of temporary employment. Given the widely varying results that we obtained in the 
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previous section, this result may not be surprising. However, regarding the effect of regulations 
on temporary contracts, we obtain no statistically significant effect either, although the estimated 
effects are consistently negative, which we expected from theory.48
The effect of regulations on temporary contracts is sensitive to the country composition. 
Dropping Italy turns the effect significant for all three dependent variables. However, after 
dropping Italy, all significant results are driven by the presence of Belgium. Without Belgium 
and Italy, none of the results are significant, reproducing the results of the full sample. Since 
Belgium and Italy are outliers in terms of having experienced comparatively large reforms, and 
since each country influences the results in opposing directions, we conclude that there is no 
average effect of reforms of regulations on temporary contracts on the incidence of temporary 
employment on the youth labor market. 
 Changing the window of 
observations does not affect these conclusions.  
Next, we test whether the effect of reforms is heterogeneous across demographic groups. In 
Table 6.7, we report the effect of reforms of job security provisions on regular contracts. As in 
the preceding analysis, reform effects differ across control variable specifications and dependent 
variable definitions. There is no evidence of reform effects for any of the education groups. The 
significant effect for women in the middle column disappears if we drop Spain or prolong the 
window of observation to include five post-reform years. 
  
 
48 The control variable specifications differ from the ones adopted in the fixed effects analysis in the 
preceding section. The control variable based specification in Table 6.4 only contains linear effects, while here 
we also add nonlinear terms. The trend specification in Table 6.4 does not include the adult outcome variable as 
a control. 
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Table 6.7 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of job security provisions on regular employment contracts on temporary employment 
among young people, 15 Western countries, 1992-2006, heterogeneous reform effects 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts 
in population 
δepr  (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
ISCED 0-2 0.014 -0.026  0.017 0.008  -0.003 -0.025 
 (0.027) (0.047)  (0.036) (0.044)  (0.029) (0.046) 
ISCED 3-4 0.033 -0.011  0.021 0.006  -0.001 -0.030 
 (0.033) (0.045)  (0.036) (0.046)  (0.038) (0.054) 
ISCED 5-6 -0.003 -0.043  -0.013 -0.016  -0.036 -0.052 
 (0.019) (0.030)  (0.018) (0.029)  (0.017) (0.034) 
Women 0.041 0.041  0.049** 0.049**  0.046 0.046 
 (0.025) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.020)  (0.029) (0.029) 
R-sq 0.58 0.55  0.57 0.53  0.53 0.49 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, see notes to Table 2.1Table 6.2 
Regarding regulations on the usage of temporary contracts, the results suggest that reforms 
were more effective in regulating temporary employment among tertiary educated, while we 
observe no significant effects among those with less than tertiary education (Table 6.8). 
However, also the effects for tertiary educated are sensitive to the choice of control variables, and 
usually do not survive the inclusion of country-specific linear trends. We also again have to deal 
with sensitivity to sample composition: Dropping Italy yields statistically significant estimates 
across education groups, but only in the control variable based specification. Dropping both Italy 
and Belgium leaves no significant effects whatsoever. 
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Table 6.8 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts on temporary employment among 
young people, 15 Western countries, 1992-2006, heterogeneous reform effects 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts 
in population 
δftc  (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
ISCED 0-2 -0.034 -0.013  -0.013 -0.004  -0.008 0.004 
 (0.029) (0.042)  (0.036) (0.041)  (0.039) (0.045) 
ISCED 3-4 -0.032 -0.011  -0.025 -0.017  -0.037 -0.025 
 (0.022) (0.033)  (0.027) (0.032)  (0.027) (0.032) 
ISCED 5-6 -0.043* -0.022  -0.046* -0.037  -0.059*** -0.047* 
 (0.020) (0.029)  (0.022) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.024) 
Women 0.002 0.002  0.009 0.009  0.011 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
R-sq 0.58 0.53  0.54 0.52  0.50 0.47 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. rtc - Regulations on the usage of temporary contracts, see notes to Table 2.1Table 6.2 
Finally, we assess whether the deregulation of temporary contracts has led to stronger growth 
in temporary employment in countries where job security provisions on permanent contracts are 
particularly strict. The results are reported in Table 6.9. In the basic DiD specification, without 
controls, the interaction effects between reforms of temporary contracts and the level of 
employment protection of permanent employment contracts are generally insignificant. Adding 
control variables, the effect becomes significant in one instance only. However, the effect has the 
opposite sign of what we expected theoretically, suggesting that stricter regulations on temporary 
contracts raise temporary employment especially when regulations on permanent employment 
are strict, a result we already obtained in the fixed effects analysis in the preceding section. We 
further assessed the reverse interaction, i.e. whether reforms of job security provisions on regular 
contracts depend on the level of regulation on temporary contracts, but found no significant 
results. 
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Table 6.9 Differences-in-differences estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the effect of 
reforms of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts on temporary employment among 
young people, 15 Western countries, 1992-2006, consequences of "partial deregulation” 
 
% on temporary contracts 
among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts 
in population 
 (C) (T)  (C) (T)  (C) (T) 
δftc  -0.014 0.001  -0.034* -0.001  -0.018 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.028)  (0.019) (0.027)  (0.021) (0.027) 
epr * δftc -0.000 0.057  0.004 0.053  0.060* 0.068 
 (0.032) (0.036)  (0.026) (0.037)  (0.032) (0.040) 
R-sq 0.58 0.53  0.55 0.52  0.50 0.47 
N 1152 1152  1152 1152  1152 1152 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. epr - Employment protection regular contracts, rtc - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 2.1Table 6.2 
6.4. Summary and discussion 
The preceding chapter has shown that there are hardly any robust associations between 
employment protection legislation and temporary employment on the youth labor market. In 
particular, the differences-in-differences analysis has shown that neither reforming dismissal 
restrictions on regular contracts nor reforming regulations on the usage of temporary contracts 
has affected the incidence of temporary employment. We could reproduce the published result 
that job security provisions are associated with higher temporary employment in the cross-section 
(Polavieja, 2006; Kahn, 2007), but this effect became insignificant or changed sign in the 
longitudinal analysis.  
Effects of regulations on temporary contracts proved to be sensitive to control variable 
specifications and sample composition. While the fixed effects analysis indicated that regulations 
indeed affect the incidence of temporary employment, we could not rule out that the reform 
effect is spurious and may be caused by unaccounted growth trends in temporary employment. 
The cross-sectional and fixed-effects analysis yielded theoretically implausible effects of non-
linear effects. Results from the difference-in-difference analysis were not robust to inclusion of 
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country-specific trends and suffered from sensitivity to country composition. At best, there was 
some evidence that temporary employment among the tertiary educated has been responsive to 
changes in regulation, although results were not really robust. 
The results thus far suggest that reforms in regulations on temporary contracts were 
ineffective in regulating the growth of temporary employment throughout the 1990s. Taken at 
face value, this suggests that regulating or reversing the growth of temporary employment is 
difficult, since reforms have been ineffective. This result is neither implausible nor 
unprecedented. Kugler et al. (2006), for example, point to a failed reform in Spain in 1994 that 
sought to restrict the usage of temporary contracts to seasonal work only, but employers were 
able to circumvent this legislation and use temporary contracts in all types of work, not just 
seasonal jobs. Employers have clear gains from using temporary contracts that they are unwilling 
to give up even in the face of tightening regulation.  
Apart from employer agency, other factors may contribute to the persistence of temporary 
employment. For example, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) as well as Autor et al. (2006) point to 
variable enforcement of employment regulations. Certain regulations on the usage of temporary 
contracts may be difficult to enforce, particularly if the group affected does not resort to 
litigation. If temporary workers have or perceive themselves to have weak political or judicial 
efficacy, they may not challenge employer practice, particularly if high rates of joblessness 
weaken their bargaining power. Moreover, if labor representatives may have a vested interest in 
maintaining temporary employees as a buffer workforce for their core constituents, they have no 
incentive to enforce stricter regulations on the usage of temporary contracts (Bentolila and 
Dolado, 1994; Polavieja, 2003). 
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6.5. Appendix 
Table 6.10 OLS regression estimates ("cluster robust" standard errors) of the association between 
employment protection and temporary employment, young people aged 15-29, 15 Western 
European countries, 1992-2006 
 % on temporary contracts among employed  
% on temporary contracts 
in labor force  
% on temporary contracts in 
population 
 ISCED 0-2 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.38 0.12  0.42* 0.22**  0.54* 0.49*** 
 (0.22) (0.07)  (0.22) (0.09)  (0.25) (0.11) 
RTC 0.05 0.02  -0.03 0.00  -0.15 -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.03)  (0.09) (0.03)  (0.10) (0.05) 
R-sq 0.30 0.77  0.29 0.72  0.29 0.76 
N 384 384  384 384  384 384 
 ISCED 3-4 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.39*** -0.09  0.40*** -0.03  0.33*** 0.12* 
 (0.09) (0.10)  (0.09) (0.09)  (0.13) (0.06) 
RTC 0.15* 0.10**  0.09 0.06**  0.06 0.07* 
 (0.07) (0.04)  (0.07) (0.03)  (0.08) (0.04) 
R-sq 0.36 0.80  0.34 0.81  0.24 0.82 
N 384 384  384 384  384 384 
 ISCED 5-6 
 (1) (4)  (1) (4)  (1) (4) 
EPR 0.34*** 0.00  0.36*** 0.13*  0.37*** 0.30*** 
 (0.08) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.07) 
RTC 0.14** 0.09**  0.10 0.08***  0.09 0.13*** 
 (0.06) (0.03)  (0.06) (0.02)  (0.06) (0.03) 
R-sq 0.35 0.78  0.34 0.73  0.36 0.71 
N 384 384  384 384  384 384 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EPR - Employment protection regular contracts, RTC - Regulations on the usage of 
temporary contracts, see notes to Table 6.1 
Source: EULFS data (own calculations), see Section 4.6 (p. 106f.) 
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7. Revising the Consensus 
The goal of this study has been to evaluate distributional effects of employment protection on job 
insecurity. Across economics and sociology, a consensus has emerged arguing that employment 
protection legislation (EPL) redistributes secure, permanent jobs towards adult (male) workers, 
while shifting labor market risks, like unemployment and temporary employment onto young 
people. We focused on two main dimensions of job insecurity, unemployment and temporary 
employment, and tested the claim that employment protection legislation raises their incidence on 
the youth labor market. We used different analytical designs, different data sets, and conditioning 
strategies to assess effects of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts and job security 
provisions on regular contracts on different labor market outcomes. We assessed interactions 
between both dimensions of regulation as well as heterogeneous reform effects across different 
groups on the youth labor market defined by education and gender. We also considered other 
outcomes, such as total employment, labor force participation and tertiary enrolment rates, to 
gain a broader perspective of the effects of employment protection. Our results indicate no robust 
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relationship between employment protection and either temporary employment or unemployment 
on the youth labor market, which leads us to challenge the prevailing consensus about the 
distributional effects of employment protection legislation. 
Our study does not rule out that deregulating employment protection under specific 
conditions may prove effective, a point we will pick up again below. However, our findings do 
suggest that (partially) deregulating employment protection legislation has proven generally 
ineffective in reducing youth unemployment or regulating the incidence of temporary 
employment across Western European countries during the period from 1992 to 2006. We 
therefore do not see a scientific basis for advocating the deregulation of employment protection 
as a general reform strategy to alter the outcomes we have investigated here. This is not the first 
study to call into question the deregulation of employment protection as an effective reform 
strategy. Our review of the literature suggested that past empirical research on the effects of 
employment protection has been inconclusive in several instances, and we also showed that even 
theoretically the argument that job security provisions raise youth unemployment is not very 
compelling (see Chapter 3). Therefore, before summarizing and discussing the findings of the 
present study, we want to briefly survey the making and maintenance of the consensus about the 
distributional effects of employment protection.  
In this regard, we focus particularly on the work of the Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), a Paris-based research institution and public policy think 
tank. The OECD regularly publishes analyses and policy reviews. Its recommendations for 
reform tend to reflect a scientific consensus that is widely shared among academics, economists 
in particular. By translating scientific research and opinion into salient policy recommendations, 
the OECD wields considerable influence in the public and academic debate. 
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7.1. The making and maintenance of the EPL consensus 
From the influential OECD Jobs Study in 1994 to its reassessment in 2006, loosening job 
security provision and deregulating temporary contracts has, with little adjustments, remained an 
integral part of the OECD's policy recommendations to ailing economies. The 1994 Jobs Study 
was a highly publicized analysis of unemployment in advanced economies and proposed several 
reforms, including the deregulation of employment protection legislation. However, even before 
the original OECD Jobs study was published, existing theoretical work (Lazear, 1990; Bertola, 
1990) pointed to the ambiguity of the relationship between employment protection and 
unemployment. Subsequent theoretical and empirical work has not settled this question (see 
Chapter 3). While it has been accepted that the effect of employment protection on aggregate 
unemployment is indeterminate, the consensus has emerged and been advanced by the OECD 
that employment protection works against groups with weaker labor force attachment, in 
particular young people. 
 
OECD Jobs Study 1994, p. 50 
 
“Establish, via legislation or central-level collective agreements, employment security 
provisions which sanction unfair or discriminatory dismissals, yet allow dismissals which 
are required on economic grounds. More explicit long-term commitments overriding the 
latter provision should be negotiated at decentralised level, rather than imposed on all firms. 
 
Loosen mandatory restrictions on dismissals in countries where current provisions appear to 
seriously hinder economic restructuring and the hiring chances of new labour force entrants.  
 
Permit fixed-term contracts. In order to limit incentive for their use from becoming 
excessively widespread, mandatory protection for regular contracts could be kept relatively 
"light", especially at the beginning of the contract. Further, policies should avoid any 
subsidy to fixed-term employment through the unemployment insurance system. Ways to 
achieve this could include increased rates of employer contribution; or a requirement that the 
employer pay a special bonus at the end of a fixed-term contract.” 
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The influential Lazear study (1990) was among the first to hypothesize that employment 
protection should particularly affect young people: "To the extent that [firing costs] affect the 
various groups, one expects that new entrants are more likely to be hurt than existing workers, 
who may benefit from the law. Young workers are disproportionately new entrants so if [firing 
costs] have effects, they should be more pronounced on young workers" (p. 723). Lazear neither 
offers a formal argument nor do his analyses support this claim, but later studies did find support 
(for example, Scarpetta, 1996). Reviewing past work in the field, Esping-Andersen (2000: p. 67) 
expresses an emergent consensus across economics and sociology that "a nation's strictness of 
employment regulation has very little to do with its levels of unemployment, but probably 
something to do with the composition of unemployment" (emphasis in original). His own 
analysis support the view that it is particularly youth and less skilled who suffer from 
employment protection. 
A major revision of prior research, however, the 1999 OECD Employment Outlook was 
somewhat at odds with this consensus. We quote from this publication more extensively, as some 
results are similar to our findings here: "Simple bivariate associations suggest that stricter EPL 
raises employment for prime-age men but lowers employment for youths and women, with the 
overall effect being a net reduction. Similarly, youths and perhaps women appear to bear a larger 
share of the burden of unemployment. However, these associations tend to be weaker or entirely 
absent when multivariate techniques are used to control for other factors that influence 
employment and unemployment levels" (OECD, 1999: 48). Moreover, the "regressions accord 
with the bivariate analysis in detecting no significant effect of overall EPL strictness on the 
overall share of temporary employment and, at best, a weak effect for youths. When three 
separate indicators of EPL strictness are included in the model for total temporary employment, 
many of the estimated coefficients are large but the signs are uniformly inconsistent with the 
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theoretical predictions that regulation of regular employment increases the incidence of 
temporary employment while regulation of temporary employment reduces it. Thus, the analysis 
does not confirm earlier research that found an important role for EPL in encouraging the growth 
of temporary employment" (OECD 1999: 79f.). The findings suggest that the consensus is not 
supported by the analysis, as soon as it moves beyond tests of bivariate association. 
In 2004, however, the OECD affirms the official consensus: "While EPL is generally shown 
to have little or no effects on the employment rates of prime-age men, several studies suggest that 
stringent employment protection tends to decrease the employment rates of both youth and 
women" (OECD 2004: p. 81). At the same, their own analytical results "vary in significance" 
(OECD 2004: p. 85), i.e. the negative effect of employment protection on youth employment is 
washed away completely, once country fixed effects are controlled for, echoing the result of the 
1999 study. Nevertheless, this is not interpreted as evidence against the consensus, and under the 
heading "main findings" the OECD concludes from their literature review and analysis that “it is 
possible to detect a link between EPL and employment rates for specific groups. Some studies, as 
well as the analysis presented in this chapter, suggest the possibility of a negative link between 
strict EPL and the employment rates of youth and prime-age women, while there may be positive 
links to the employment rates of other groups. [...] Indeed youth and prime-age women are more 
likely to be subject to entry problems in the labour market than is the case with other groups, and 
they are therefore likely to be disproportionately affected by the effects of EPL on firms’ hiring 
decisions” (OECD 2004: 63). While the conclusion is guarded with subjunctives, it only partly 
reflects the results of the analysis, which are sensitive to sensible specification changes. 
There have certainly been dissenting voices and findings over the past decades (Lazear, 1990; 
OECD 1999, 2004, see also Nickell, 1997; Gangl et al., 2003: p. 287; Baccaro and Rei, 2007; 
Howell et al., 2007; Baranowska and Gebel, 2010), but other scholars offered cross-sectional 
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evidence in support for the alleged adverse effects of employment protection on youth 
(un)employment (Esping-Andersen, 2000; Russell and O'Connell, 2001; van der Velden and 
Wolbers, 2003; Breen, 2005; Kahn, 2007) and temporary employment (Booth et al., 2002; van 
der Velden and Wolbers, 2003; Polavieja, 2006; Kahn, 2007). 49
Re-assessing the 1994 Jobs Study, the OECD concludes in 2006 that “[t]here is evidence that 
too-strict legislation will hamper labour mobility, reduce the dynamic efficiency of the economy 
and restrain job creation. This may worsen job prospects of certain groups, like young people, 
women and the long-term unemployed” (OECD, 2006: 12). The re-assessment then concludes 
that job security provisions and temporary contracts should be further deregulated in some 
countries. Absorbing the critique of the adverse effects of "partial deregulation" (Blanchard and 
Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002), they recommend a more balanced approach 
between both types of regulation. 
 Two studies published by the 
OECD use longitudinal data and panel estimators to support the view that employment protection 
lowers youth employment (Scarpetta, 1996; Bassanini and Duval, 2006), while Bertola et al. 
(2007) find mixed support. However, we should ask whether these results would be affected by 
more rigorous specification checks, by adjusting the standard errors for clustering of observations 
within countries, or using the updated OECD indicator of employment protection legislation. 
It should be pointed out that the OECD's own analyses (OECD 1999, 2004) on the effects of 
employment protection on aggregate youth labor market outcomes, at least those attempting 
somewhat more rigorous tests, fail to support their policy recommendations. While presenting a 
balanced theoretical discussion and guarding empirical findings with the necessary subjunctives 
and footnotes, the policy recommendations default on the rather market friendly, deregulatory 
 
49  Most of these studies relied on the 1999 indicator of employment protection (OECD, 1999), see 
discussion in Section 4.1.3 (p. 82f.). 
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consensus, which belies the inconsistent results of their own as well as published empirical work. 
Given its role as a consultative body, there are incentives to present solutions even when 
empirical is ambiguous. And given this ambiguity, there may be a tendency to fall back on the 
presently operative consensus. 
 
7.2. Has deregulation made young people better off? 
In Chapter 2, we documented a gradual erosion of job security on the youth labor market over the 
past four decades, despite ever increasing educational attainment and shrinking cohort sizes. The 
pattern observed fits with a modified version of the “unified theory”. Liberal Anglo-Saxon 
countries have witnessed rising earnings inequality, where income gaps have grown both 
between education and age groups. In Continental and Southern Europe, as well as Scandinavia, 
we observed growing gaps in job security between education and age groups. Young people and 
less educated youth in particular have borne a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment 
to adverse macroeconomic trends. Even corporatist model countries like Sweden or Germany 
OECD Employment Outlook 2006 - Re-assessing the Jobs Study, p. 22 
 
“Make sure that employment protection legislation helps labour-market dynamism and 
provides security to workers 
 
C7. Employment protection legislation should be reformed in countries where it is overly 
strict, by sanctioning unfair dismissal (for example by prohibiting dismissal on the basis of 
discrimination with respect to gender, age and ethnicity), but reducing constraints on 
dismissals for economic reasons; severance costs and administrative procedures should be 
made more predictable so as to reduce judicial uncertainty; reasonable dismissal notice 
periods should be provided so as to help laid-off workers find new jobs.  
 
C8. Regulations on fixed-term and temporary contracts may need to be relaxed in some 
countries; in order not to aggravate labour market duality and thus undermine labour market 
performance in the long term, a more balanced treatment between temporary and permanent 
contracts should be pursued, with one option being that dismissal protection rights grow in 
line with seniority” 
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could no longer contain exclusionary tendencies and witnessed, not unlike countries bordering 
the Mediterranean, a gradual retrenchment of secure, full-time jobs among younger cohorts. 
Apart from few outbursts of violence among discontent youth in France or Greece, these 
tendencies have been hardly politicized, or were greeted as the intended, positive results of 
deregulation/flexibilization; and they are likely to be amplified by the recent economic crisis 
In Chapter 3, we discussed theoretically the relationship between employment protection and 
job insecurity. Employment protection legislation appears to be a profound violation of the often 
cited need for more flexibility. Failing to document links to aggregate unemployment in 
particular, economists have refocused the critique of employment protection in terms of its 
distributional effects, stating that it makes young people worse off in relative or absolute terms. 
Against this consensus, we argued that the effect of employment protection on youth 
unemployment is theoretically indeterminate. However, we can draw clear links between 
employment protection and the growth of temporary employment.  
7.2.1. The effects of job security provisions on regular employment contracts 
Starting with the effects of job security provisions on regular employment contracts, we observe 
no effect of reforms on either employment or unemployment among either young people or adult 
men. For Western European countries, this suggests that, contrary to OECD (2004, 2006) 
recommendations, lowering job security provisions on regular employment contracts is unlikely 
to raise employment or lower unemployment among young people or adult men. Reforms will 
therefore also not redistribute unemployment risks between these groups. Maybe more 
controversially, our findings also show that reforms of job security provisions are unlikely to 
affect the incidence of temporary employment among young people. Using longitudinal data and 
adjusting for country fixed effect was sufficient not only to wipe out the positive effect of job 
Revising the Consensus 
 
183 
 
security provisions, but even to reverse its sign. Neither for employment, unemployment nor 
temporary employment could we find any evidence that the effect of job security provisions 
differ significantly across education groups or depends on the extent of regulations on temporary 
contracts. However, we did find some indication that strict job security provisions constrain labor 
market opportunities of young people, to which they respond by dropping out of or staying out of 
the labor market. Some may re-enter or prolong their educational career in higher education 
institutions. However, while raising tertiary enrolment and improving the skills of young people 
is an important policy goal in itself, this “solution” may neither be economically viable nor 
socially justifiable.  
Sociological research on tertiary enrolment attests to strong social selectivity in terms of 
eligibility for and enrolment in higher education (Arum et al., 2007). Conditional on individual 
ability, young people from more privileged social backgrounds are more likely to respond to 
perceived labor market difficulties with investing into more education. Young people from less 
privileged backgrounds are less likely to be eligible for or enroll in higher education and more 
likely face a tough transition to employment. Thus, young people from privileged backgrounds 
are relatively more likely to be pushed into higher education by adverse labor market conditions. 
Moreover, if young people from privileged backgrounds are thus pushed into higher education, 
although they would not enter higher education if labor market conditions were normal, this 
probably also increases adverse selection among tertiary students.  
Moreover, apart from raising educational inequalities and adverse selection into higher 
education, producing an excess number of graduates beyond market demands is in itself likely to 
bring down the returns to higher education, even for those who had high expected returns when 
they decided to enter higher education. As a result, tertiary educated youth, after spending 15 or 
more years in the education system, may have to settle for jobs that require increasingly lower 
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qualification levels. Over-educated youth then displace less educated youth from their skill-
adequate employment, which may lead to a process of crowding out. This description seems to fit 
the Spanish experience (Dolado et al., 2000) well and may also characterize other European labor 
markets (Gangl, 2002). 
Potential adverse effects of job security provisions on unemployment may be masked by 
young people’s labor supply response, particularly in countries with public higher education 
systems. However, we do not observe a correlation between job security provisions and labor 
force participation in the cross-section. Moreover, it is somewhat puzzling, that we do not 
observe a corresponding negative effect of job security provisions particularly on employment 
rates. The results of the fixed effects analysis point in this direction (Table 5.1, p. 117) but the 
difference-in-difference analysis finds no support (Table 5.15, p. 142).50
7.2.2. The effects of regulations on the usage of temporary contracts 
 Possibly, the effects are 
too weak to reach statistical significance in this study. Otherwise, I am not aware of any other 
study that has looked at the effects of job security provisions on youth labor force participation, 
since studies usually focus on either employment or unemployment. It would be a worthwhile 
task for future research to examine this issue more closely and look at the individual transitions 
between education, inactivity, unemployment and employment in relation to macroeconomic and 
institutional conditions (see for example, Azmat et al., 2006). 
Governments responded to the call for deregulation primarily by lowering constraints on the 
usage of temporary contracts (see Chapter 3). We could not detect aggregate effects of the 
deregulation of temporary contracts on employment, unemployment and labor force 
 
50 Some published research using fixed effects analysis (Bassanini and Duval, 2006; Bertola et al., 2002) do 
find negative effects, while Bertola et al., (2007) do not find negative effects. 
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participation. We also could not find any evidence that the effect of deregulation depends on the 
strictness of job security provisions on regular contracts, thus finding no support for the critics of 
partial deregulation (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002). However, 
beneath the aggregate level we found some evidence that lower regulations on temporary 
contracts increase overall employment among tertiary educated, while less educated adult men 
seemed to have suffered from deregulation in term of higher unemployment and lower 
employment. These results agree with Goux and Maurin (2005) and DiPrete et al. (2006) who 
suggest that skill-biased market shifts have led to a growth in skill-gaps in job security, facilitated 
by the deregulation of temporary contracts. The distributional effects of temporary contracts 
seem to fit the different functions that temporary contracts play in the different segments of the 
labor market, i.e. “stepping-stones” to permanent employment among highly educated and 
substitutes for permanent contracts among the less educated. In the countries and periods 
observed, deregulation of temporary employment has neither increased (temporary) employment 
nor diminished unemployment among the less educated. 
These effects do not seem to depend on the strictness of job security provisions on regular 
employment contracts. None of our results suggest that deregulating temporary contracts while 
maintaining job security provisions on permanent contracts makes young people (or adult men) 
worse off. Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) sought to expose 
the unintended consequences of partial labor market reform. While this view has been absorbed 
by the OECD, who now recommends a balanced deregulatory approach (see Table 1 above) to 
avoid the potentially negative effects of partial labor market reform (Blanchard and Landier, 
2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002), there has been to date no single published rigorous 
assessment of this claim (but see Giesecke and Gebel, 2009b), apart from Blanchard and 
Landier’s (2002) illustrative trend charts for France. Moreover, as we argued in Chapter 3, 
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neither theoretical analysis allows for strong predictions. In Blanchard and Landier’s analysis, the 
effect of partial deregulation on unemployment is in fact ambiguous (see Section 3.3.2) and in 
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay’s analysis, we obtain rather small effects at rather extreme values. On 
the basis of our analysis, we would reject the claim that partial deregulation has had an effect on 
the outcomes we studied. 
7.3. Methodological issues 
Particularly in our analysis of youth unemployment, where we could compare our results to a 
number of published studies, we noted the lack of robustness of even cross-sectional results. 
While past cross-sectional studies found a positive effect of job security provisions on youth 
unemployment, we found none or even a negative effect. Adjusting for fixed effects, the 
association disappeared fully. While we observed an extremely robust positive effect of 
regulations on temporary contracts on unemployment in the cross-section, this effect disappeared 
completely once we adjusted for fixed effects. Regarding temporary employment, we found the 
positive effect of job security provisions that other cross-sectional studies had also found, but the 
effect switched from positive significant to negative significant when adjusting for fixed effects, 
before disappearing after adding control variables.51
Stopping at any step along the way would allow us to tell quite different stories. One lesson 
in this application has been that cross-sectional results were not robust and should not be 
considered a good basis for policy recommendations, especially if longitudinal data sources are 
available. Single country studies, where we assess the effect of a single reform over time, are 
 
 
51 While we remain wary of attenuation bias in the fixed effects analysis and the lack of variation on our 
reform indicator, in particular for job security provisions, this cannot by itself account for the lack of robustness 
we observe. 
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likely to yield more convincing, causal estimates (e.g. Kugler et al., 2005; Autor et al., 2006; 
Bauer et al., 2007). Observations from different, adjacent years in the same country tend to be 
more similar in terms of unobservables than observations from different countries in the same 
year. The drawback of single country studies is that they are informative about one particular 
reform in one particular country, where the reform that is analyzed often occurred at least ten 
years before the date of publication. Therefore, it is not clear whether the results still apply to the 
current situation in the same or other countries.52
Another important concern is the estimation of standard errors. Methodological research has 
made considerable progress in specifying the conditions and developing estimators for causal 
inference (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). However, less seems to be known about how to obtain 
unbiased standard errors if residuals violate classical assumptions (Bertrand et al., 2004; Angrist 
and Pischke, 2009). In this application, we relied on the recommendation that has emerged in the 
literature and used a generalized Huber-White estimator, which allows for arbitrary patterns of 
correlation among the residuals within panel units, although our number of panel units falls short 
of what one would consider sufficient. The simulations by Bertrand et al (2004) suggest that the 
method chosen here is superior to the commonly used panel-specific AR1 correction that similar 
analyses to this one have used (Bertola et al., 2007; Nickell et al., 2005). The AR1 correction 
 Differences-in-differences analyses of pooled 
longitudinal data on reforms from different countries represents another possibility where we lose 
some internal validity, but obtain potentially more generalizable findings. 
 
52  Interestingly, recent studies that use differences-in-differences to evaluate individual employment 
protection reforms in one country do not generally find significant effects. An Italian study finds the expected 
effects on turnover (Kugler and Pica, 2008), but some studies on Germany do not find effects (Hunt, 2000; 
Bauer et al., 2007), while others do (Boockmann et al., 2008). Kugler et al. (2005) find strong 
distributional/segmenting effects of a Spanish reform, but it is less clear whether these effects are produced by 
the reduction of dismissal restrictions or the simultaneous, age-selective cut in payroll taxes. Autor et al. (2006) 
find modest employment effects of the passage of the implied contract exception in the United States, 
particularly among young people, which however seem to dissipate over time.  
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tends to produce standard errors that are biased downwards, which would lead us to falsely 
conclude that employment protection has an effect, which is really just due to serial correlation in 
the error term.  
Apart from specification searches, standard error estimation also adds to the asymmetry in 
producing quantitative results for publication that exists between researchers and reviewers, in 
particular if reaching conventional significance levels is assigned an important role in the 
selection of results for publication.53
7.4. Why has job insecurity increased on the youth labor market? 
 Regarding the effects of employment protection legislation 
on the youth labor market, incorrectly estimated standard errors may be part of the explanation 
behind the persistence of the deregulatory consensus. Properly calculating standard errors is 
therefore decisive for sound policy advice, but more research and guidance on the properties of 
different standard error estimators would be helpful. 
This study challenges the common view that employment protection legislation is to blame for 
high temporary employment or unemployment on the youth labor market. We have shown here 
using some of the most recent data available that deregulation of employment protection has 
neither lowered youth unemployment nor affected the growth of temporary employment in 
Western European countries between 1992 and 2006. In the following, we want to discuss 
potential ways, in which employment protection may have had effects that we could not or did 
not capture here; and we want to conclude with a short discussion of alternative explanations for 
the growth and persistence of job insecurity on the youth labor market. 
 
53 In a review of leading sociology journals, there is an usual clustering of results just below the 0.05 p-
value, which Gerber and Malhotra (2008) argue would have occurred by chance with a probability of 1 in 10 
million. They interpret this result as strong evidence for publication bias. 
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First, employment protection may lead to deterioration on the youth labor market only under 
specific macroeconomic conditions, which we did not specify here or that were not present in our 
period of observation. Focusing on the period from 1970 to 1996, Jimeno and Rodriguez-
Palenzuela (2002) directly address this issue, but do not find robust effects of interactions 
between employment protection and observed or unobserved macroeconomic shocks. 54
Second, employment protection may only be consequential when other institutional 
conditions are present. For example, economic approaches assume that for firing costs to produce 
an employment response, employers must constrained in their ability to transfer these firing costs 
onto workers in the form of wage cuts (Lazear, 1990; Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2007; Kahn, 2007). 
If wages are collectively bargained over, employers may not be able to turn firing costs into wage 
cuts and are instead forced to adjust their hiring behavior. Hence, we should expect stronger 
effects of employment protection when wage flexibility is constrained. Other institutional factors 
may similarly act as constraints on wage flexibility, especially at the lower end of the wage 
distribution, for example minimum wages or unemployment benefits. Moreover, other 
institutions may act as complements to employment protection legislation, mitigating its 
potentially adverse effects, for example vocational education systems (Breen, 2005) or active 
labor market policies. 
 
Similarly, initial deregulations on the usage of temporary contracts that occurred before our 
period of observation quite plausibly set off growth trends in temporary employment. However, 
our findings suggest that after temporary contracts have become established means of 
flexibilization, regulating their incidence seems to be difficult. 
 
54 A practical concern here is that there does not seem to be agreement on which macroeconomic conditions 
are relevant (inflation, terms-of-trade shocks, shocks to labor productivity, shocks to economic output, interest 
rates etc.) and how to best model these interactions. 
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Relatedly, under some circumstances, union behavior may lead to inequalities in the 
distribution of employment and selective non-participation in the labor force. In particular, if 
trade unions manage to extract wage increases beyond productivity increases, employers are 
forced to adjust employment levels. Unions may accept these employment effects to the extent 
that they obtain or safeguard rents for their core constituents (Bertola et al., 2007). If labor supply 
of those who suffer from disemployment effects is more elastic, there may be fewer incentives 
for unions to take their concerns into account. Compared to adult men, diminished labor market 
opportunities may be less costly for young people, because of the existence of alternative labor 
market states, like continuing or re-entering higher education. However, the impact of unions on 
wage setting and employment likely depends on the coordination of collective bargaining 
(Goldthorpe, 1984; Kenworthy, 2002).  
There are also a number of plausible alternative explanations for the growth and persistence 
of temporary employment. In general, young people, if they cannot find permanent jobs, should 
be more likely to accept temporary jobs. High rates of temporary employment then reflect more 
general problems on the (youth) labor market, like weak aggregate demand. However, specific 
institutional factors may also affect their incidence. First, it is possible that labor representatives 
have acquiesced to the growth of temporary employment. They may have agreed to redistributing 
risks onto groups that are perceived to be less electorally relevant, while defending or extending 
rights of their core constituents (Rueda, 2005, 2007). Second, employment protection regulations 
may not be properly enforced, because particularly those affected by irregular (illegal) temporary 
employment do not litigate. Particularly in the case of irregular temporary employment, young 
people may not see themselves in a position to successfully litigate, if they lack the resources, if 
jobs are scarce, and if temporary employment is considered a norm that is implicitly backed by 
labor representatives. Forcing employers to convert a temporary into a permanent contract in 
Revising the Consensus 
 
191 
 
court may not be appealing, if young people are then faced with negative consequence for their 
further career with that employer. 
In conclusion, we clearly require further efforts to better understand how job insecurity and 
employment outcomes are distributed across advanced economies, and in particular why some 
societies impose a disproportionate share of the burden of adjustment onto young people. Rising 
wage inequality has received a lot of attention, but we know much less about rising inequality in 
the distribution of job security as well as quality of employment. In this analysis, we have shown 
drastic inequalities between demographic groups in the incidence of temporary employment and 
unemployment. These inequalities should principally be amenable to policy intervention to 
improve the outcomes of groups at risk. Improving young people's outcomes in particular should 
remain a central concern, and social science should continue to strive to find politically viable 
solutions.  
 192 
 
 
References 
Acemoglu, Daron. 2002. Technical change, inequality, and the labor market. Journal of 
Economic Literature 40: 7-72. 
 
Acemoglu, Daron, and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 1998. “Why do firms train - theory and evidence.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1): 79-119  
 
Addison, John T., and Paulino Texeira. 2003. “The economics of employment protection.” 
Journal of Labor Research, 24(1): 85-127 
 
Algan, Yann, and Pierre Cahuc. 2006. “Job protection: the macho hypothesis.” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 22(3): 390-410 
 
Allard, Gayle J.  and Peter H. Lindert. “Euro-Productivity and Euro-Jobs since the 1960s: Which 
Institutions Really Mattered?” NBER Working Paper No. 12460. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. Mostly harmless econometrics: an empiricists 
companion. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 
 
Armingeon, Klaus, Potolidis, Panajotis, Gerber, Marlène, and Philipp Leimgruber. Comparative 
Political Data Set 1960-2007. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne 2009. 
 
Arulampalam, Wiji, Booth, Alison L., and Mark L. Bryan. 2004. “Training in Europe.” Journal 
of the European Economic Association, 2(2/3): 346-360 
 
 193 
 
Ashenfelter, Orley, and David Card. 1985. “Using the longitudinal structure of earnings to 
estimate the effect of training programs.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(4): 
648-660 
 
Autor, David H., Katz, Lawrence F., and Melissa S. Kearney. 2006. “The polarization of the U.S. 
labor market.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 96(2): 189-94 
 
Autor, David H., Donohue, John J. III., and Stewart J. Schwab. 2006. “The costs of wrongful 
discharge laws.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(2): 211-231 
 
Autor, David H., Kerr, William R., and Adriana D. Kugler. 2007.“Does employment protection 
reduce productivity? Evidence from US states”. The Economic Journal, 117: 189-217 
 
Baccaro, Lucio and Diego Rei. 2007. “Institutional determinants of unemployment in OECD 
countries: does the deregulatory view hold water?” International Organization, 61: 527-69 
 
Baranowska, Anna, and Gebel, Michael. 2010. “The determinants of youth temporary 
employment in the enlarged Europe.” European Societies,12(1): forthcoming 
 
Barbieri, Paolo. 2009. “Flexible employment and inequality in Europe.” European Sociological 
Review 25(6): 621-28 
 
Bassanini, Andrea, Booth, Alison, Brunello, Giorgio, De Paola, Maria, and Edwin Leuven. 2005. 
“Workplace training in Europe.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 1640. Bonn: Institute for the 
Study of Labor 
 
Bassanini, Andrea and Romain Duval. 2006. "Employment patterns in OECD countries: 
reassessing the role of policies and institutions." Social, employment and migration Working 
papers no. 35. Paris: OECD 
 
Bauer, Thomas K., Bender, Stefan, and Holger Bonin. 2007. “Dismissal protection and worker 
flows in small establishments ” Economica, 74: 804-821  
 
Becker, Gary S. 1964(1993). Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis, with special 
reference to education. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Bell, David N. F., and Blanchflower David G. 2010. “Youth Unemployment: Déjà Vu?” IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 4705. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor 
 
Bentolila, Samuel and Juan J. Dolado. 1994. “Labour flexibility and wages: lessons from Spain.” 
Economic Policy: 55-91 
 
Berger, Suzanne and Michael J. Piore. 1980. Dualism and Discontinuity in Industrial Society. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bertola, Giuseppe, and Richard Rogerson. 1997. “Institutions and labor reallocation.” European 
Economic Review, 41: 1147-l 171 
 194 
 
Bertola, Giuseppe. 1990. “Job security, employment and wages.” European Economic Review, 
34: 851-886 
 
Bertola, Giuseppe.1999. “Microeconomic perspectives on aggregate labor markets.” In Orley 
Ashenfelter and David Card (eds.): Handbook of labor economics, Amsterdam: North 
Holland: 2985-3028 
 
Bertola, Giuseppe, Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2002. “Labor market institutions 
and demographic employment patterns.” NBER Working Paper No. 9043. Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Bertola, Giuseppe, Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2007. “Labor market institutions 
and demographic employment patterns” Journal of Population Economics, 20: 833-867 
 
Blanchard, Olivier and Lawrence F. Katz. 1997. “What we know and do not know about the 
natural rate of unemployment.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1): 51-72 
 
Blanchard, Olivier, and Augustin Landier. 2002. “The perverse effects of partial labour market 
reform: fixed-term contracts in France. ” The Economic Journal, 112(480): 214-244 
 
Blanchard, Olivier, and Justin Wolfers. 2000. “The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of 
European unemployment: the aggregate evidence.” The Economic Journal 110(462): 1-33 
 
Blanchard, Olivier. 2006.“ European unemployment: the evolution of facts and ideas.” Economic 
Policy: 5-59  
 
Blanchard, Olivier, and Pedro Portugal. 2001. “What hides behind an unemployment rate: 
comparing Portuguese and U.S. labor markets.” The American Economic Review, 91(1): 187-
207 
 
Blanchflower, David G. and Richard Freeman. 2000. Youth unemployment and joblessness in 
advanced countries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter, Erik Klijzing, Melinda Mills, and Karin Kurz. 2005. Globalization, 
uncertainty and youth in society. London: Routledge 
 
Blau, Francine D., and Lawrence M. Kahn. 2002. “At Home and Abroad: US Labor Market 
Performance in International Perspective. ” New York: Russell Sage Foundation 
 
Boeri, Tito, and Juan F. Jimeno. 2005. “The effects of employment protection: Learning from 
variable enforcement.” European Economic Review, 49: 2057-77 
 
Breen, Richard. 1997. Risk, recommodification and the future of the service class. Sociology 31: 
473-89 
 
Breen, Richard. 2005. “Explaining cross-national variation in youth unemployment: market and 
institutional factors.” European Sociological Review, 21: 125-34 
 195 
 
Booth, Alison L., Dolado, Juan J., and Jeff Frank. 2002. “Symposium on Temporary Work: 
Introduction.” The Economic Journal, 112(480): 181-188 
 
Botero, Juan C., Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio and Andrei 
Shleifer. 2004. “The regulation of labor.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4): 1339-
1382 
 
Cahuc, Pierre, and Fabien Postel-Vinay. 2002. “Temporary jobs, employment protection and 
labor market performance.” Labour Economics, 9: 63- 91 
 
Cahuc, Pierre and Andre Zylberberg. 2007. Labor economics. Cambridge and London: The MIT 
Press  
 
Calmfors, Lars, Driffill, John, Honkapohja, Seppo, and Francesco Giavazzi. 1988. 
“Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance.” Economic 
Policy, 3(6): 14-61 
 
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2005. Microeconometrics: methods and applications. 
New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Canziani, Patrizia, and Barbara Petrongolo. 2000. “Firing costs and stigma: a theoretical analysis 
and evidence from microdata.” European Economic Review, 45: 1877-1906 
 
Card, David. 1992. “Using Regional Variation in Wages to Measure the Effects of the Federal 
Minimum Wage.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 46(1): 22-37 
 
Card, David, Francis Kramarz and Thomas Lemieux (1999). “Changes in the relative structure of 
wages and employment: a comparison of the United States, Canada, and France.” Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 32(4): 843-877 
 
Christopoulou, Rebekka. 2009. “The youth labor market problem in cross-country perspective. ” 
In Gregory DeFreitas (ed.): Young workers in the global economy. Job challenges in North 
America, Europe and Japan. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
Conway, Paul and Giuseppe Nicoletti (2006), “Product market regulation in non-manufacturing 
sectors in OECD countries: measurement and highlights.”, OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper No.530 
 
Culpepper, Pepper D., and Kathleen Thelen. 2008. “Institutional and collective actors in the 
provision of training: historical and cross-national comparison.” In Karl Ulrich Mayer and 
Heike Solga (eds.): Skill formation. Interdisciplinarity and cross-national perspectives. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
DeFreitas, Gregory (ed.). 2009. Young workers in the global economy. Job challenges in North 
America, Europe and Japan. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
 196 
 
Dew-Becker, Ian, and Robert J. Gordon. 2008. “The role of labor-market changes in the 
slowdown of European productivity growth. ” Unpublished manuscript. 
 
DiPrete, Thomas A. 2002. “Life course risks, mobility regimes, and mobility consequences: a 
comparison of Sweden, Germany and the United States.” American Journal of Sociology, 
108(2): 267-309 
 
DiPrete, Thomas A., Goux, Dominique, Maurin, Eric, and Amelie Quesnel-Vallee. 2006. “Work 
and pay in flexible and regulated labor markets: a generalized perspective on institutional 
evolution and inequality trends in Europe and the U.S.” Research in Social Stratification and 
Mobility, 24: 311-32 
 
Dolado, Juan J., Felgueroso, Florentino, and Juan F. Jimeno. 2000. “Youth labour markets in 
Spain: education, training, and crowding-out.” European Economic Review, 44: 943-956 
 
Dolado, Juan J., Garcia-Serrano, Carlos, and Juan F. Jimeno. 2002. “Drawing lessons from the 
boom of temporary jobs in Spain.” The Economic Journal, 112(480): 270-295 
 
Dreher, Axel. 2006. “Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a new 
Index.” Applied Economics, 38(10): 1091-1110. 
 
Dustmann, Christian, Ludsteck, Johannes and Uta Schoenberg. 2009. “Revisiting the German 
wage structure.” Quarterly Journal of Economics: 843-881 
 
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, and Bernhard Kittel. 2005. “European rigidity versus American 
flexibility?” Work and Occupations, 32(2): 163-195 
 
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 2000. “Who is harmed by labour market regulation? Quantitative 
evidence.” In G. Esping-Andersen and M. Regini (eds.): Why Deregulate Labour Markets? 
Oxford: Oxford  University Press. 
 
Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2001. “Social protection and the 
formation of skills: a reinterpretation of the welfare state.” In Peter Hall and David Soskice 
(ed.): Varieties of capitalism: the institutional foundations of comparative advantage. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Eurostat. 2005. Labour Force Survey - Anonymized data sets. Luxembourg: Eurostat. 
 
Fella, Giulio. 2005. “Termination restrictions and investment in general training.” European 
Economic Review, 49: 1479-99 
 
Gangl, Markus. 2002. “Changing labour markets and early career outcomes: labour market entry 
in Europe over the past decade.” Work, Employment & Society, 16: 67-90 
 
Gangl, Markus. 2004. “Welfare states and the scar effects of unemployment: a comparative 
analysis of the United States and West Germany.” American Journal of Sociology, 109: 
1319-64 
 197 
 
Gangl, Markus. 2006. “Scar effects of unemployment: An assessment of institutional 
complementarities.” American Sociological Review, 71: 986-1013 
 
Gebel, Michael and Johannes Giesecke. 2009a. “Labour market flexibility and inequality: the 
changing risk patterns of temporary employment in West Germany.” Zeitschrift für 
Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, 42: 234-51 
 
Gebel, Michael and Johannes Giesecke. 2009b. “Labour market flexibility and inequality: the 
changing skill-based temporary employment and unemployment risks in Europe.” 
Presentation at the 1st European User Conference for EU-LFS and EU-SILC, Mannheim, 
Germany 
 
Gerber, Alan S., and Neil Malhotra. 2008. “Publication bias in empirical sociological research: 
Do arbitrary significance levels distort published results? ” Sociological Methods and 
Research, 37(1): 3-30 
 
Giesecke, Johannes, and Martin Gross. 2003. “Temporary employment: chance or risk?” 
European Sociological Review, 19(2): 161-177 
 
Gladden, Tricia, and Christopher Taber. 2007. “Turnover and wage growth in the transition from 
school to work.” Unpublished manuscript 
 
Goldthorpe, John H. 1984. “The end of convergence: corporatist and dualist tendencies in 
modern western societies.” In John H. Goldthorpe (ed.): Order and Conflict in Contemporary 
Capitalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Gordon, Robert J., and Ian Dew-Becker. 2008. “Controversies about the rise of American 
inequality: a survey.” NBER Working Paper No. 13982. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research 
 
Goos, Maarten, and Alan Manning. 2007. “Lousy and lovely jobs: the rising polarization of work 
in Britain.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(1): 118-33 
 
Goos, Maarten, Manning, Alan and Anna Salomons. 2009. “Job polarization in Europe.” 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 99(2): 58-63 
 
Gottschalk, Peter. 1997. “Inequality, income growth, and mobility: the basic facts.” The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 11(2): 21-40 
 
Guell, Maia. 2000. “Fixed-term contracts and unemployment: an efficiency wage analysis.” 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 0461. Centre of Economic Performance. London: London 
School of Economics 
 
Heckman, James J. and Carmen Pagés (eds). 2004. Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
 198 
 
Ho, Daniel E., and Kosuke Imai. 2007. “Matching as nonparametric preprocessing for reducing 
model dependence in parametric causal inference.” Political Analysis, 15: 199-236 
 
Holmlund, Bertil, and Donald Storrie. 2002. “Temporary work in turbulent times: the Swedish 
experience. ” The Economic Journal, 112(480):245-269 
 
Howell, David R., Bakery, Dean, Glyn, Andrew, and John Schmitt. 2007. “Are protective labor 
market institutions at the root of unemployment? A critical review of the evidence.” 
Capitalism and Society, 2(1): 1-71 
 
Hunt, Jennifer. 2000. “Firing costs, employment fluctuations and average employment: an 
examination of Germany.” Economica, 67(266): 177-202 
 
Imbens, Guido W. and Donald Rubin. 2008. Causal inference. Unpublished book manuscript 
 
Imbens, Guido W., and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 2009. “Recent developments in the econometrics 
of program evaluation.” Journal of Economic Literature, 47(1): 5-86 
 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). (1990) Statistical Sources and Methods. Volume 3: 
Economically Active Population, Employment, Unemployment and Hours of Work 
(Household Surveys). Geneva: ILO. 
 
Jimeno, Juan F., and Diego Rodriguez-Palenzuela. 2002. “Youth unemployment in the OECD: 
demographic shifts, labour market institutions, and macroeconomic shocks.” European 
Central Bank Working Paper No. 155. Frankfurt: European Central Bank. 
 
Kahn, Lawrence M. 2007. “The impact of employment protection mandates on demographic 
temporary employment patterns: international microeconomic evidence.” The Economic 
Journal, 117: 333-56 
 
Kahn, Lawrence M. 2010. “Employment protection reforms, employment and the incidence of 
temporary jobs in Europe: 1996-2001.” Labour Economics, 17: 1-15 
 
Kalleberg, Arne L. 2009. “Precarious work, insecure workers: employment relations in 
transition.” American Sociological Review, 74: 1-22 
 
Kenworthy, Lane. 2002. “Corporatism and unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s. ” American 
Sociological Review, 67: 367-388 
 
King, Miriam, Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood, Katie Genadek, Matthew B. 
Schroeder, Brandon Trampe, and Rebecca Vick. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, 
Current Population Survey: Version 3.0. [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 2010. 
 
Krugman, Paul. 1994. “Past and prospective causes of high unemployment.” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, 3: 23-43. 
 
 199 
 
Kugler, Adriana D., and Gilles Saint-Paul. 2004. “How do firing costs affect worker flows in a 
world with adverse selection?” Journal of Labor Economics, 22(3): 553-584 
 
Kugler, Adriana D., Jimeno, Juan F., and Virginia Hernanz. 2005. “Employment consequences of 
restrictive permanent contracts: evidence from Spanish labor market reforms.” Unpublished 
manuscript. 
 
Kugler, Adriana, and Giovanni Pica. 2008. “Effects of employment protection on worker and job 
flows: Evidence from the 1990 Italian reform.” Labour Economics, 15: 78-95 
 
Layard, Richard, Mayhew, Ken, and Geoffrey Owen. 1994a. Britain's training deficit. Aldershot: 
Avebury 
 
Lazear, Edward P.1990. “Job security provisions and employment.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 105(3): 699-26 
 
Lemieux, Thomas. 2008. “The changing nature of wage inequality.” Journal of Population 
Economics, 21:21-48 
 
Ljungqvist, Lars. 2002. “How do lay-off costs affect employment?” The Economic Journal, 112: 
829-853 
 
Marinescu, Ioana. 2009. “Job security legislation and job duration: evidence from the United 
Kingdom.” Journal of Labor Economics, 27(3): 465-486 
 
Maurin, Eric, and Fabien Postel-Vinay. 2005. “The European job security gap.” Work and 
Occupations, 32(2): 229-252 
 
McGinnity, Frances, Mertens, Antje and Stefanie Gundert. 2005. “A bad start? Fixed-term 
contracts and the transition from education to work in West Germany.” European 
Sociological Review, 21(4): 359-374  
 
Morgan, Stephen L. and Christopher Winship. 2007. Counterfactuals and Causal Inference: 
Methods and Principles for Social Research. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Müller, Walter, and Yossi Shavit. 1998. “The institutional embeddedness of the stratification 
process. A comparative study of qualifications and occupations in thirteen countries.” Yossi 
Shavit and Walter Müller (eds.): From school to work. A comparative study of educational 
qualifications and occupational destinations. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Müller, Walter, and Markus Gangl. 2003. Transitions from education to work in Europe. The 
integration of youth into EU labour markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Nickell, Stephen, and Brian Bell. 1995. “The collapse in demand for the unskilled and 
unemployment across the OECD.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 11(1): 40-62 
 
 200 
 
Nickell, Stephen, and Brian Bell. 1996. “Changes in the distribution of wages and unemployment 
in OECD countries.” American Economic Review, 86(2): 302-308 
 
Nickell, Stephen. 1997. “Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North 
America.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(3): 55-74 
 
Nickell, Stephen, Nunziata, Luca, and Wolfgang Ochel. 2005. “Unemployment in the OECD 
since the 1960s. What do we know?” The Economic Journal, 115(500): 1-27 
 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 1994. The OECD Jobs 
Study: facts, analysis, strategies. Paris: OECD 
 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 1998. Thematic Review of 
the Transition from Initial Education to Working Life, Norway, Country Note. Paris: OECD 
 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 1999. Employment Outlook. 
Employment protection legislation. Paris: OECD 
 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2004. Employment Outlook. 
Employment protection regulation and labour market performance. Paris: OECD 
 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2006. Employment Outlook. 
Boosting jobs and incomes. Paris: OECD 
 
Pager, Devah. 2003. “The mark of a criminal record.” American Journal of Sociology, 108(5): 
937-75 
 
Polavieja, Javier G. 2003. “Temporary contracts and labour market segmentation in Spain: an 
employment-rent approach.” European Sociological Review, 19(5): 501-517 
 
Polavieja, Javier G. 2005. “Flexibility or polarization? Temporary employment and job tasks in 
Spain.” Socio-Economic Review, 3: 233-258 
 
Polavieja, Javier G. 2003. “The incidence of temporary employment in advanced economies: 
why is Spain different?” European Sociological Review, 22(1): 61-78 
 
Pontusson, Jonas. 2005. Inequality and prosperity. Social Europe vs. Liberal America. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press 
 
Rueda, David. 2005. “Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: the challenge to 
social democratic parties.” American Political Science Review, 99(1): 61-74 
 
Rueda, David. 2007. Social democracy inside out. Partisanship and labor market policy in 
industrialized democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
 201 
 
Russell, Helen, and Philip J. O’Connell. 2001. “Getting a job in Europe: the transition from 
unemployment to work among young people in nine European countries.” Work, 
Employment and Society, 15(1): 1-24 
 
Ryan, Paul. 2001. “The school-to-work transition: a cross-national perspective.” Journal of 
Economic Literature, 39: 34-92. 
 
Ryan, Paul. 2009. "Youth employment problems and school-to-work institutions in advanced 
economies." In Gregory DeFreitas (ed.): Young workers in the global economy. Job 
challenges in North America, Europe and Japan. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
 
Rosenbaum, James E., Kariya, Takehiko, Settersten, Rick, and Tony Maier. 1990. “Market and 
network theories of the transition from high school to work. Their application to 
industrialized societies.” Annual Review of Sociology, 16: 263-99. 
 
Rouse, Cecilia, and Claudia Goldin. 2000. "Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of Blind 
Auditions on Female Musicians" American Economic Review, 90(4): 715-741. 
 
Saint-Paul, Gilles (2000). The political economy of labour market institutions. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Salvatori, Andrea. 2009. “What do unions do to temporary employment?”, unpublished 
manuscript  
 
Siebert, Horst. 1997. “Labor market rigidities: at the root of unemployment in Europe.” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, 11(3): 37-54 
 
Sorensen, Aage B. 2000. “Toward a sounder basis for class analysis.” American Journal of 
Sociology, 105(6): 1523-58 
 
Spitz-Oener, Alexandra. 2006. “Technical change, job tasks and rising educational demands: 
looking outside the wage structure.” Journal of Labor Economics, 24(2): 235-270 
 
Stevens, Margaret (1996) “Transferable training and poaching externatlities”. In Booth, Allison 
L. and Dennis J. Snower (eds.): Acquiring skills: market failures, their symptoms and policy 
responses. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1987. “The uncertainties of management in the management of uncertainty: 
employers, labor relations and industrial adjustment in the 1980s.” Work, Employment and 
Society, 1(3): 281-308 
 
Thelen, Kathleen, and Ikuo Kume. 2006. “Coordination as a political problem in coordinated 
market economies.” International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 19(1): 
11-42. 
 
Thelen, Kathleen. 2009. “Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies.” British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 47(3): 471-498 
 202 
 
UNESCO. 1997. International standard classification of education: ISCED 1997. Montreal: 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
 
Venn, Danielle. 2009. “Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement: Updating the OECD 
employment protection indicators.” OECD Social, Employment and Migration working 
papers 
 
Visser, Jelle. 2009. Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007, 
Version 2. Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS, University of 
Amsterdam 
 
Wolbers, Maarten H. J. 2007. “Patterns of labour market entry. A comparative perspective on 
school-to-work transitions in 11 European countries.” Acta Sociologica, 50: 189-210. 
 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data. Cambridge 
and London: The MIT Press 
 
Young, Cristobal. 2009. “Model uncertainty in sociological research: an application to religion 
and economic growth.” American Sociological Review, 74: 380-397 
